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Digitalization has been changing the way how people use money, globally 
reducing the share of cash in transactions in favour of cards and e- money 
solutions Despite digital and electronic payment systems having become key 
payment means, these solutions have not challenged the architecture nor the 
nature of traditional monetary systems While decentralized cryptocurrencies 
have failed in reaching scale, remaining a niche market, the potential develop-
ment of stablecoins issued by large private corporations could rapidly trans-
form the current monetary systems In this context of growing digitalization of 
payments, the discussion around the introduction of a retail central bank dig-
ital currency (CBDC) has gained momentum Theoretically, CBDC could pro-
duce great efficiency gains, encourage contestability in payment systems, and 
foster financial inclusion Notwithstanding, benefits come together with new 
risks which need to be addressed by central banks CBDC’s underlying system 
could be differently designed – such as a two- layer system or one- layer system; 
token- based or account- based”, producing diversified issues and challenges 
A set of risks lies in the possible negative effects on the banking industry, like the 
consequences of potential disintermediation, and in the operational and secu-
rity challenges for central banks Moreover, CBDCs raise concerns on the bal-
ance of power in society, potentially increasing the ability of governments to look 
into financial transactions, altering the anonymity that cash gives to citizens 
Therefore, the development of CBDCs gives rise to several implications which 
blur the boundaries of the payment market, potentially transforming the core of 
the economy and society
To shed some lights on the potential effects, risks and benefits around the 
development of CBDCs, the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) has promoted, in 
partnership with Intesa Sanpaolo and with the support of Intesa Sanpaolo and 
Bank of Italy, a research effort by putting together a very qualified and diver-
sified group of experts who for more than a year exchanged their views and 
research on different aspects of this innovation The result is this book which, 
I believe, provides readers with an extremely useful tool to get interesting and 




Nicola Bilotta and Fabrizio Botti
Introduction
Global non-cash transactions reached 7085 billion transactions in 2019, surged 
by 80% since 2014 Despite cash being the most used payment instrument in 
the world, technological innovation and new consumer preferences are radically 
transforming the way consumers pay and manage money The COVID- 19 pan-
demic may have also been an accelerator in consolidating cashless transactions 
by driving the growth of e- commerce and mobile/ contactless transactions 
Private players currently dominate the digital payment ecosystem, urging central 
banks to seek solutions to ensure public access to legal tender if cash is phased 
out In this context, the idea of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) is gaining 
momentum  – a central bank liability, denominated in an existing unit of ac-
count, which serves both as a medium of exchange and a store of value The 
bulk of central banks surveyed by the Bank for International Settlements (80 per 
cent out of sixty- six central banks), representing 90 per cent of global output, 
are working on a CBDC Nevertheless, there is a need to better understand the 
implications in terms of risks, benefits and potential costs of CBDCs From pri-
vacy concerns to macroeconomic effects, these implications blur the bound-
aries of the payment and financial systems, challenging the core functions of our 
economy and society The key questions are manifold: how will a CBCD affect 
banking industry models and financial markets? What are the benefits and risks 
of introducing a CBDC? Which are the different design and technical solutions a 
CBDC can offer? What is the play- off between privacy as a democratic freedom 
and the enforcement of AML rules in the frame of CBDCs?
The Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), in partnership with Intesa Sanpaolo 
and with the support of Intesa Sanpaolo and the Bank of Italy, has carried out 
a research project to study the main economic and political implications of the 
development of CBDCs The result of this analysis – conducted with a group of 
international experts  – are presented in this book These experts have partic-
ipated actively in the research throughout the project and their contributions 
help to shed light on key specific issues and implications related to the develop-
ment of CBDCs The first chapter, by Nicola Bilotta and Fabrizio Botti, provides 
an overview of the approaches, features and implications of CBDCs It briefly 
explores the current literature on CBDCs and provides concrete example of this 
innovation’s stage of development The second chapter, by Massimo Cirasino, 
analyses in depth the conditions and factors to take into account when launching 
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a CBDC The third chapter, by Ali Robleh, explains how a CBDC system will 
shape the structure of the whole financial system Steven Schwarcz’s Chapter 4 
concentrates on how existing regulations will extend to CBDCs, investigating if 
this innovation will require further regulation if it is implemented, depending on 
the design of a CBDC system The following three chapters take a closer look at 
geographical areas that are at the frontier in the field of digital currency The fifth 
chapter, by Franco Passacantando, analyses the implications of a digital euro, 
focusing on its potential effects on the functioning of financial markets The next 
chapter, by Tim Masela, details the opportunities and risks of CBDCs and digital 
currencies in Africa The seventh chapter, by Jan Knoerich, analyses the features 
and implications of the Digital Currency/ Electronic Payments (DCEP), China’s 
CBDC, domestically and internationally The eighth chapter, by Nicola Bilotta, 
focuses on the political struggle to find a balance between anonymity and secu-
rity in CBDCs systems, calling ultimately for multilateralism to ensure the trans-
parency and fairness of CBDCs The final chapter, by Claude Lopez, looks into 
the need for a global framework that meets all the challenges produced by the 
multiplication of private digital currencies and CBDCs
Initiatives and projects on the developments of CBDCs are rolling out 
across the world Any future CBDC system will need to ensure financial sta-
bility, competition and resilience, helping central banks to achieve their public 
policy objectives The implementation of CBDCs will have a radical impact on 
the global economy, transforming, at least potentially, the way our society is 
organised This book aims at shedding some light on the economic, financial and 
political implications of the development of CBDCs
newgenprepdf
Nicola Bilotta and Fabrizio Botti
Chapter 1: CBDCs: The (Near?) Future of a 
Cashless Economy
1.1  Payments are the economy’s circulatory system
‘No cash accepted in this store’ What might seem to some like science fiction is 
actually on its way to becoming reality in some countries The rise of non- cash 
payments is a global phenomenon, although moving at different speeds around 
the world1 Global non-cash transactions reached 7085 billion transactions in 
2019, surged by 80% since 20142 The value of global cashless payments grew from 
900 trillion US dollars in 2014 to 1,370 trillion in 20183 In China and India, for 
example, the volume of cashless payments increased by 526 per cent and 514 
per cent respectively between 2014 and 2018 In contrast, this figure only grew 
by an average of 695 per cent in the G7 countries4 This gap is due to the fact 
that in advanced markets, cashless payments have already become ubiquitous 
Singapore, South Korea and Sweden led the world in the average number of cash-
less transactions per inhabitant, in 2018
Sweden is an intriguing case The country is predicted, by 2023, to become the 
first cashless society (meaning that cash is not extensively accepted as a mean of 
payment) in the world Already in 2018, only 13 per cent of retail payments in 
Sweden were made in cash5 A study shows that when cash transactions make up 
less than 7 per cent of total transactions, the costs of managing cash exceed the 
 1 Morten Bech and Codruta Boar, Commentary on Red Book Statistics: Shaping the Future 
of Payments, November 2019, https:// wwwbisorg/ statistics/ payment_ stats/ commen-
tary1911htm
 2 ‘World Payments Report 2020’, Capgemini, 01/2021 https://worldpaymentsreportcom/
resources/world-payments-report-2020/
 3 JP Morgan, J.P Morgan Perspectives. Blockchain, Digital Currency and Cryptocurrency: Moving 
Into Mainstream?, 21 February 2020, https:// marketsjpmorgancom/ research/ open/ url/ 
t59R6MoBP2TUkWA_ itSQBbfUlco1CmYnoNL3dA6WVSm82drJuOYLvdZIqDyuXyp- 
L4OrVEFw_ eAu4UgzicsInqAwjcbKIQHiPfGEjPF2Rt5PKUltFmEKGQaC3DeLBoW7
 4 Excluding Japan
 5 Sveriges Riksbank, The Payment Behaviour of the Swedish Population, updated 
20 November 2018, https:// wwwriksbankse/ en- gb/ statistics/ statistics- on- payments- 














marginal profits on cash sales If this happens, retailers will have no incentive to 
accept cash payments any longer6
However, a completely cashless society seems unlikely anytime soon Cash 
is still persistent in society and remains the most widely used payment instru-
ment in the world The 2018 G4S report shows demand for cash has actually 
increased Globally, average currency in circulation was 96 per cent of GDP in 
2016, up from 81 per cent in 2011 In Europe, 788 per cent of all transactions 
were conducted with cash; the global average was 50 per cent7 People like and 
trust cash According to a survey carried out by Deutsche Bank, among the top 
five reasons why people love cash is that people appreciate that it allows better 
tracking and spending, while making payments faster Furthermore, they con-
sider cash convenient and secure8
The availability of non- cash payment instruments has (and will) changed 
consumer behaviour and how people pay or manage money In addition to 
traditional means such as credit or debit cards, smartphones provide con-
sumers with access to digital payment technologies such as e- wallets and 
e- money According to the GSMA Mobile Economic Report, the number of 
unique mobile phone subscribers globally is 51 billion, or 67 per cent of the 
world’s population By 2025, the figure is expected to hit 58 billion, of which 
5 billion will also be mobile internet subscriptions These new digital payment 
solutions are threating both cash and cards transactions The market for cards 
in particular is under pressure As consumer preferences – especially among 
generation Z and millennials  – are increasingly shifting from cards to e- 
money and e- wallet solutions, cards issuers risk losing, in the short term, their 
interface with consumers and, in the long term, the loyalty of consumers9
This trend towards non- cash payment instruments and the preferences 
for non- card digital payment solutions are globally developing at different 
paces In mature markets such as Europe and the United States, for example, 
people have an entrenched history of using cards, making the shift to digital 
 6 Jonas Hedman, ‘Going Cashless: What Can We Learn from Sweden’s Experience?’, in 
Knowledge@Wharton, 31 August 2018, https:// knlgnet/ 2LJhVH3
 7 G4S Cash Solutions, World Cash Report 2018, August 2019, p  25, https:// www
g4scashreportcom
 8 Marion Laboure and Jim Reid, The Future of Payments - Part I. Cash: the Dinosaur 
Will Survive… For Now, Deutsche Bank Research, 21 January 2020, p 6, https:// www
dbresearchcom/ PROD/ RPS_ EN- PROD/ PROD0000000000504353/ The_ Future_ of_ 
Payments_ - _ Part_ I_ _ Cash:_ the_ Dinosaupdf
 9 Zachary Aron, Ulrike Guigui and Megan Scala, ‘Getting Ahead of the Curve’, in Deloitte 









CBDCs and Stablecoins: The (Near?) Future of a Cashless Economy 17
payments harder Analysts however expect to see increasing use of digital 
payments in these economies because of the preferences of younger genera-
tions (see Figure 11)
In contrast, in China and India, consumers have switched from cash- based 
transactions to digital payments, as the latter are more convenient and easier 
to access than cards Furthermore, these two countries have a much larger per-
centage of young people than the EU and the United States In India, according 
to KPMG, there are more than 45 mobile wallet providers and 50 providers of 
wallets based on the Unified Payment Interface or UPI The increase of cash-
less transactions has been boosted by the government’s decision, implemented 
in November 2016, to make 86 per cent of the cash in circulation illegal tender10 
In China, 49 per cent of the population uses mobile payments, a figure which is 
Figure 1.1: Weekly in- store purchases per country in 2019 and 2025
Source: Marion Laboure and Jim Reid, The Future of Payments - Part II. Moving to Digital Wallets 
and the Extinction of Plastic Cards, Deutsche Bank Research, 23 January 2020, p 3, https:// www
dbresearchcom/ PROD/ RPS_ EN- PROD/ PROD0000000000504508/ The_ Future_ of_ Payments_ - _ 
Part_ II_ _ Moving_ to_ Digitapdf
 10 Bhaskar Chakravorti, ‘One Year After India Killed Off Cash, Here’s What Other 
Countries Should Learn from It’, in Harvard Business Review, 2 November 2017, https:// 
hbrorg/ 2017/ 11/ one- year- after- india- killed- off- cash- heres- what- other- countries- 






likely to increase to 605 per cent by 2023 The total transaction value of barcode 
mobile payments reached 323 trillion US dollars in China in 2018, according to 
iResearch Consulting Group11
In Africa too, digital payments are having a remarkable impact M- Pesa, 
a mobile money transfer solution, has more than 37  million users in seven 
countries (the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Mozambique and Tanzania) In Sub- Saharan Africa around 10 per cent of aggre-
gate GDP in transactions occur through mobile money  – in Kenya, M- Pesa 
alone accounted for 50 per cent of the country’s GDP in 201812 In Africa, there 
are now more mobile payment accounts than bank accounts, the former proving 
to be an extraordinary instrument for financial inclusion
The COVID- 19 pandemic might accelerate adoption of cashless transac-
tion habits, as there is a general (incorrect) perception that cash can transmit 
the virus On 9 March, the World Health Organization released a statement 
recommending the use of cashless transactions to slow down the spread of 
COVID- 19 According to Google Trends, the number of Internet research of the 
words ‘cash’ and ‘virus’ peaked A BIS report stressed that this research was more 
significant in countries where more small- value banknotes are in circulation rel-
ative to GDP13 In addition, many countries – such as Austria, the Netherlands, 
Ireland and the UK – increased the maximum limits for contactless payments with 
credit or debit cards This option mitigated the risks of contagion in comparison 
to payments that require a signature or a PIN input Similarly, digital wallets – 
like Apple Pay or Google Pay  – allow smooth payments without the need to 
touch any terminal other than the payer’s personal mobile device Furthermore, 
the sharp jump of online shopping during the lockdowns benefitted the advance 
of cashless payments
It is too early to accurately assess whether the COVID- 19 pandemic has 
created a stronger preference for cashless payment solutions in the short- and 
long- term However, it has encouraged consumers and businesses to face the 
new realities of cashless payments, raising awareness of the alternatives to 
cash For example, while there has been a fall of 60 per cent in the total value 
of point- of- sale transactions compared to 2019, the number of contactless 
 11 ‘China Is Moving Toward a Cashless Society’, in eMarketer, 25 November 2019, https:// 
wwwemarketercom/ content/ china- is- moving- toward- a- cashless- society
 12 Amadou NR Sy, ‘Fintech in Sub- Saharan Africa: A Potential Game Changer’, in IMF 
Blog, 14 February 2019, https:// blogsimforg/ ?p=25686
 13 Raphael Auer, Giulio Cornelli and Jon Frost, ‘Covid- 19, Cash, and the Future of 
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transactions in Europe is estimated to have experienced a monthly growth of 4 
per cent in March 2020 and an additional weekly increase of 5 per cent in April 
202014 In the United States, the firm Square reported that while only 8 per cent 
of US sellers identified as cashless on 1 March 2020, by 23 April the figured 
had increased to 31 per cent15 As e- commerce has rocketed, ACI Worldwide 
recorded a 74 per cent increase in transaction volumes for online retail and 
Adyen said that it registered a growth of 30– 50 per cent in retail payments 
during the lockdown16
Technological innovation and new consumer preferences are driving trans-
formations in the way people use money Financial technology has dramatically 
changed the payments industry, transforming how consumers access and spend 
money However, the nature of money has not changed yet Aside from the niche 
market of cryptocurrencies, the other innovative solutions currently available 
on the market – such as M- Pesa, PayPal or Alipay – only mediate transactions 
between traditional issuers and holders Therefore, electronic payments have so 
far not changed the architecture of the existing model of monetary exchange, 
which is based on central bank money and deposits in banks Nevertheless, the 
landscape of digital transformations could empower the advance of digital cur-
rency technology, disrupting both the payment market and the nature of money 
as we know it
1.2  What is money today?
Technology has the potential to disrupt the functioning of the current archi-
tecture of the monetary system, allowing the development of digital forms of 
money Our economies have already experienced forms of digital money People 
have held digital money balances, banks have offered demand deposits and cen-
tral banks have issued digital reserves to banks Technology has provided the 
monetary architecture with the opportunity to develop and manage a fully dig-
ital currency The most common, but not the only form of recording and sharing 
 14 Martina Weimert and Arnaud Saiag, COVID- 19 and European Retail Payments, Oliver 
Wyman, June 2020, p 3, https:// wwwoliverwymancom/ our- expertise/ insights/ 2020/ 
jun/ covid- 19- and- european- retail- paymentshtml
 15 Alex Gray, ‘Cashless Payments Have Spiked During COVID- 19, But Don’t Expect 
Paper Money to Disappear’, in Fast Company, 10 June 2020, https:// wwwfastcompany
com/ 90514952
 16 Stefan Thomalla and Marlene Schnippe, ‘How COVID- 19 Is Reshaping Retail Payments 









the distributed ledger, is blockchain technology The blockchain captures the 
transaction data of simultaneous transactions in individual blocks, which are 
then linked in a chronological order, forming a chain of all past transactions17 
The disruptive potential of blockchain technology lies in its promise to deliver 
near- instant transactions at low cost18
Still, the development of digital currencies for retail and wholesale activity would 
completely change the nature of access to and usage of digital money Digital cur-
rency is a type of currency that has no physical configuration and only exists in 
digital form According to the European Central Bank (ECB), virtual currencies 
are not full forms of money and are defined ‘as a digital representation of value, not 
issued by a central bank, credit institution or e- money institution, which in some 
circumstances can be used as an alternative to money’19 While electronic money (e- 
money) is described as ‘an electronic store of monetary value on a technical device 
that may be widely used for making payments to entities other than the e- money 
issuer’ and, depending on the jurisdiction, could be perceived as money in a specific 
currency20 However, with the development of new types of digital currency, the 
concepts of e- money or virtual currency have widen
With these radical changes happening in the monetary architecture, a new 
taxonomy for all forms of money is required The BIS (see Figure 12) suggests 
identifying a taxonomy grounded in the interaction of four basic features 
(accessibility, issuer, form and technology)21 Similarly, Claeys (see Figure 13) 
proposes three criteria:  (i) who the issuer is: private or public; (ii) what form 
 17 Trevor I Kiviat, ‘Beyond Bitcoin: Issues in Regulating Blockchain Transactions’, in Duke 
Law Journal, Vol 65, No 3, December 2015, p 569– 608, https:// scholarshiplawduke
edu/ dlj/ vol65/ iss3/ 4
 18 Darrell Duffie, Digital Currencies and Fast Payment Systems: Disruption is Coming, 
Draft presented to the Asian Monetary Policy Forum, Singapore, 31 May 2019, https:// 
wwwdarrellduffiecom/ uploads/ policy/ DuffieDigitalPaymentsMay2019pdf
 19 European Central Bank (ECB), Virtual Currency Schemes:  A Further Analysis, 
Frankfurt am Main, ECB, February 2015, p 25, https:// wwwecbeuropaeu/ pub/ pdf/ 
other/ virtualcurrencyschemesenpdf
 20 ECB website:  Electronic Money, https:// wwwecbeuropaeu/ stats/ money_ credit_ 
banking/ electronic_ money/ html/ indexenhtml
 21 Morten Linnemann Bech and Rodney Garratt, ‘Central Bank Cryptocurrencies’, in 
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the transaction takes:  digital or physical; and (iii) how transactions are set-
tled: centralised or decentralised22 Adrian and Mancini- Griffoli (see Figure 14) 
have proposed a different framework The first attribute to be considered is type 
(a claim or an object), followed by value (either fixed or variable), and tech-
nology (centralised or decentralised settlement) There is also a fourth feature, 
related only to fixed means, which is whether this form of money is privately or 
publicly backstopped23
 22 Grégory Claeys and Maria Demertzis, ‘The Next Generation of Digital Currencies: In 
Search of Stability’, in Bruegel Policy Contributions, No 15, December 2019, https:// 
wwwbruegelorg/ ?p=33489
 23 Tobias Adrian and Tommaso Mancini Griffoli, ‘The Rise of Digital Money’, in FinTech 
Notes, No 19/ 01, July 2019, https:// wwwimforg/ en/ Publications/ fintech- notes/ Issues/ 
2019/ 07/ 12/ The- Rise- of- Digital- Money- 47097
Figure 1.2: The money flower: a taxonomy of money







Despite different approaches, what clearly stands out from their analysis is 
that our society is experiencing a growing landscape of competing means of 
mediums of exchange
The question is therefore whether digital currencies are a form of money 
Money is traditionally defined as a financial asset which acts as (i) a medium 
Figure 1.3: A taxonomy of money
Source: Grégory Claeys and Maria Demertzis, ‘The Next Generation of Digital Currencies…’, cit, p 3
Figure 1.4: Money trees
Source: Tobias Adrian and Tommaso Mancini Griffoli, ‘The Rise of Digital Money’, cit, p 3
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of exchange, (ii) store of value and (iii) unit of account To fulfil these three 
functions, money needs to have broad acceptance and needs to guarantee the 
safeguard of its value Some experts believe that digital currencies barely meet 
the criteria to be considered full forms of money24
Whether new digital currencies can be considered a full- fledged form of 
money or not seems to be just a theoretical discussion Once a digital currency 
is issued and starts circulating, it can be used as an unbundled form of money 
by the general public As previously described, the taxonomy of digital money 
is a challenging exercise Due to the nature of money being a ‘promise to pay’, 
the support of any digital currency is directly linked to the trust that market 
participants will accept this type of medium of payment25 Thus, two types of 
digital currency appear to be the best equipped to potentially reach scale in the 
coming future: CBDCs and stablecoins backed by large corporations While the 
former benefit from being a public form of money supported by the state, the 
latter seem to provide lower volatility than cryptocurrencies, offering to users 
a more stable store of value Furthermore, if backed up and integrated in a 
pre- established large ecosystem of service, stablecoins might have the features 
needed to quickly scale up
But does it really matter if digital currencies are money or if they have the 
traditional features of a currency? Even if none of the digital currency options 
become mainstream because they lack all the traditional features of currency, 
they could easily boost the unbundling of a currency’s functions, encouraging 
consumers to choose currency based on specific needs26 Even if a digital cur-
rency becomes popular only as a mean of payment, being too volatile as a store 
of value, it could still be adopted widely Also, in a scenario in which cash, fiat 
money and different kinds of digital currency coexist, the impacts on the mon-
etary system would be ground- breaking, disrupting the historical monopoly of 
central banks, and producing new risks and effects
 24 Eddie Gerba and Margarita Rubio, ‘Virtual Money: How Much do Cryptocurrencies 
Alter the Fundamental Functions of Money?’, in Salomon Fiedler et al, The Future of 
Money. Compilation of Papers, Luxembourg, European Parliament, December 2019, 
p 51, https:// opeuropaeu/ s/ on1P
 25 Central Bank Digital Currencies Working Group (CBDC WG), ‘Key Aspects around 
Central Bank Digital Currencies Policy Report’, in CEMLA Reports, May 2019, p 11, https:// 
wwwcemlaorg/ fintech/ docs/ 2019- 06- KeyAspectsAroundBankDigitalCurrenciespdf
 26 Markus K Brunnermeier and Harold James, ‘The Digitalization of Money’, in NBER 








1.3  CBDCs: a digital ‘public’ currency
In the current monetary system, central banks’ money has a physical form (bills and 
coins) and a digital form (as reserves held at central banks by financial institutions 
that can access this deposit facility for wholesale transactions) The introduction 
of a CBDC would then produce a new form of central bank money, creating a 
digitalised form of a sovereign currency that would be a liability of central banks 
According to the Bank of England, a CBDC can be defined as electronic central 
bank money that
(i) can be accessed more broadly than reserves, (ii) potentially has much greater function-
ality for retail transactions than cash, (iii) has a separate operational structure to other 
forms of central bank money, allowing it to potentially serve a different core purpose, and 
(iv) can be interest bearing, under realistic assumptions paying a rate that would be dif-
ferent to the rate on reserves27
An extensive body of literature on CBDCs exists, discussing their 
advantages and disadvantages;28 systemic implications;29 how they should be 
 27 Michael Kumhof and Clare Noone, ‘Central Bank Digital Currencies  — Design 
Principles and Balance Sheet Implications’, in Bank of England Staff Working Papers, 
No 725, May 2018, p  4, https:// wwwbankofenglandcouk/ working- paper/ 2018/ 
central- bank- digital- currencies- - - design- principles- and- balance- sheet- implications
 28 Todd Keister and Daniel Sanches, ‘Should Central Banks Issue Digital Currency?’, in 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Papers, No 19– 26, June 2019, https:// 
doiorg/ 1021799/ frbpwp201926; Jinock Kim and Jaejung Kang, ‘Money, to Be 
Publicly Issued, or Not to Be, That Is the Question’, in The Journal of Internet Electronic 
Commerce Resarch, Vol 19, No 5, 2019, p 77– 91; Hanna Armelius, Carl Andreas 
Claussen and Scott Hendry, ‘Is Central Bank Currency Fundamental to the Monetary 
System?’, in Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review, No 2020– 2, June 2020, p 19– 32, 
https:// wwwriksbankse/ globalassets/ media/ rapporter/ pov/ artiklar/ engelska/ 2020/ 
200618/ 2020_ 2- is- central- bank- currency- fundamental- to- the- monetary- systempdf; 
Timothy Jackson and George Pennacchi, ‘How Should Governments Create Liquidity?’, 
in University of Liverpool Management School Working Papers, No 202029, September 
2020, https:// wwwliverpoolacuk/ media/ livacuk/ schoolofmanagement/ research/ eco-
nomics/ How,Should,Governments,Create,Liquiditypdf
 29 Markus K Brunnermeier and Dirk Niepelt, ‘On the Equivalence of Private and Public 
Money’, in Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol 106, October 2019, p 27– 41; Jesús 
Fernández- Villaverde et al, ‘Central Bank Digital Currency: Central Banking for 
All?’, in NBER Working Papers, No 26753, February 2020, https:// wwwnberorg/ 
papers/ w26753; Ohik Kwon, Seungduck Lee and Jaevin Park, Central Bank Digital 
Currency, Inflation Tax, and Central Bank Independence, 13 February 2020, http:// 
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designed;30 their role in cross- country payments;31 their effects on the interna-
tional role of currencies;32 and laws governing them33
Although CBDCs are not a new idea, the research on developing them has 
gained momentum in recent years Some analysts however argue that CBDCs’ 
innovation is not due to their digital nature but due their broad access34 With 
the growing megatrend of cashless payments dominated by private players, cen-
tral banks seek to ensure public access to legal tender if cash is phased out, mit-
igating the consolidation of privately issued money Furthermore, CBDCs could 
improve efficiency of the payment industry (see  chapter 2 in this volume)
The design of a CBDC directly shapes its functionality and effects in the 
economy The first key factor is the degree of access: ‘retail CBDC’ (also called 
‘general purpose CBDC’) or ‘wholesale CBDC’ In a retail CBDC structure, the 
general public would be allowed to hold and access the CBDC, either by owning 
the Post- Covid- 19 World, London, Centre for Economic Policy Research, June 2020, 
https:// voxeuorg/ node/ 65851
 30 Itai Agur, Anil Ari and Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, ‘Designing Central Bank Digital 
Currencies’, in IMF Working Papers, No 19/ 252, 2019, https:// wwwimforg/ en/ 
Publications/ WP/ Issues/ 2019/ 11/ 18/ Designing- Central- Bank- Digital- Currencies- 
48739; Seyed Mohammadreza Davoodalhosseini and Francisco Rivadeneyra, ‘A 
Policy Framework for E- Money’, in Canadian Public Policy, Vol 46, No 1, March 2020, 
p 94– 106, https:// doiorg/ 103138/ cpp2019- 010; Sarah Allen et al, ‘Design Choices 
for Central Bank Digital Currency: Policy and Technical Considerations’, in NBER 
Working Papers, No 27634, August 2020, https:// doiorg/ 103386/ w27634
 31 Udo Milkau, ‘International Payments: Current Alternatives and Their Drivers’, in 
Journal of Payments Strategy & Systems, Vol 13, No, 3, Fall 2019, p 201– 216
 32 Massimo Ferrari, Arnaud Mehl and Livio Stracca, ‘Central Bank Digital Currency in 
an Open Economy’, in CEPR Discussion Papers, No 15335, October 2020, https:// cepr
org/ active/ publications/ discussion_ papers/ dpphp?dpno=15335
 33 Hossein Nabilou, Central Bank Digital Currencies: Preliminary Legal Observations, 
6 February 2019, https:// dxdoiorg/ 102139/ ssrn3329993; Simon Hess, Regulating 
Central Bank Digital Currencies: Towards a Conceptual Framework, 11 August 2020, 
https:// dxdoiorg/ 102139/ ssrn3582501; Juan J  Duque, ‘State Involvement in 
Cryptocurrencies A Potential World Money?’, in The Japanese Political Economy, Vol 
46, No 1, 2020, p 65– 82; Ansgar Belke and Edoardo Beretta, ‘From Cash to Central 
Bank Digital Currencies and Cryptocurrencies: A Balancing Act Between Modernity 
and Monetary Stability’, in Journal of Economic Studies, Vol 47, No 4, 2020, p 911– 938
 34 Dirk Niepelt, ‘Digital Money and Central Bank Digital Currency:  An Executive 
Summary for Policymakers’, in VoxEU, 3  February  2020, https:// voxeuorg/ node/ 
65037; or ‘Reserves for Everyone – Towards a New Monetary Regime?’, in VoxEU, 










an account at the central bank or through third- party mediums such as pre- 
paid cards or e- wallets on mobile devices Wholesale CBDCs, however, can be 
accessed only by specific economic actors for interbank payments and securities 
transactions This might not be disruptive as, in an efficient economy, domestic 
banks can already make transactions between each other using reserves held in 
the national central bank, allowing fast transactions using the real- time gross 
settlement (RTGS) system35 It would be a different story if a wholesale CBDC 
system were to support cross- border transactions, allowing foreign institutions 
to hold and transact in the CBDC This architecture could therefore improve 
the current infrastructure of cross- border interbank payments, reducing time 
and costs of transactions The current system seems to be somewhat inefficient, 
because many domestic banks do not hold accounts in foreign central banks, 
requiring the latter to process cross- border transactions through other networks 
or foreign partners Similarly, retail CBDCs could bring the benefit of efficiency 
in retail cross- border payments In this case, central banks would need to allow 
foreign entities to own liquidity in the CBDC36
The next design decision lies in whether a CBDC should be toked- based or 
account- based In a token- based system, a CBDC is built with a specific denom-
ination of a token, and the control over a transaction occurs in verifying the 
authenticity of the token, which is similar to how cash transactions work An 
account- based system requires central banks to hold accounts, manage credit/ 
debit transactions and verify the identities of the two parties involved in the 
process, as with credit card transactions37 In addition to introducing two dif-
ferent models of governance, these two options produce different macroeco-
nomic and political risks and benefits For example, central banks could have 
trouble paying interest on token- based CBDCs, as interests could affect the 
value of the tokens themselves, (its value will increase when interest payments 
occur) Meanwhile, an account- based system cannot guarantee fully anonymous 
transactions and would require central banks to manage a large number of retail 
 35 Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures, ‘Central Bank Digital Currencies’, 
in CPMI Papers, No 174, 12 March 2018, p 7, https:// wwwbisorg/ cpmi/ publ/ d174
htm
 36 Ashley Lannquist et al, ‘Central Bank Digital Currency Policy- Maker Toolkit’, in World 
Economic Forum Insight Reports, January 2020, https:// wwwweforumorg/ whitepapers/ 
central- bank- digital- currency- policy- maker- toolkit
 37 Matthieu Bouchaud et al, Central Banks and the Future of Digital Money, ConsenSys 
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and corporate accounts, increasing the risk of disintermediation of incumbent 
financial institutions Some central banks have also proposed a hybrid system 
in which token- based CBDCs are integrated in a closed architecture of certified 
accounts, in the attempt to maximise the benefits of the two systems while miti-
gating the negative effects
Moreover, central banks can decide whether to issue a CBDC as a new liability 
backed by other assets or bonds (thereby expanding their balance sheets) or to 
replace existing liabilities – cash or reserves – with a CBDC Technical questions 
also exist over the underlying technology that would be best suited to support 
a CBDC system A BIS report stresses that the implementation of distributed 
ledger technology (DLT) in case of a wholesale CBDC might not produce sig-
nificant gains in terms of efficiency and costs compared to the current infra-
structure38 Niepelt argued that CBDCs could also be stored in accounts, prepaid 
cards or on decentralised database structures39 A recent paper published by the 
Bank of Canada highlights that a conventional centralised system could sup-
port a CBDC, incorporating some properties of a blockchain, such as immutable 
data or smart contracts40 Other analysts instead argue that a blockchain system 
would assure greater transparency, resilience and continuous functionality than 
a centralised system41 Nevertheless, the choice of technology implemented is 
crucial, as it has wider implications for the effect of the CBDC on the economy, 
particularly whether the central bank is seeking a decentralised or centralised 
verification process
A final critical issue is how to structure the distribution channel of 
CDBCs Central banks can either directly distribute it or delegate it to specific 
intermediaries – most likely financial institutions The former scenario would 
produce high disintermediation, giving central banks much more relevance and 
power Further concerns exist on the effects on credit provision if incumbent 
banks lose access to demand deposits On the other hand, the second scenario 
would reduce the effectiveness and accuracy of the central bank’s monetary 
policies
 38 Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures, ‘Central Bank Digital Currencies’, 
cit, p 1
 39 Dirk Niepelt, ‘Digital Money and Central Bank Digital Currency…’, cit
 40 Dinesh Shah et  al, ‘Technology Approach for a CBDC’, in Bank of Canada Staff 
Analytical Notes, No 2020– 6, February 2020, https:// wwwbankofcanadaca/ ?p=209522











A survey carried out by BIS in January 2020, involving 66 six central banks 
representative of 90 per cent of global output, shows that 80 per cent of the 
respondents are currently (or will soon be) working on a CBDC, up from 65 per 
cent in 2017 The countries that are not yet engaging are either very small or have 
more urgent priorities Most central banks (around 50 per cent) are focusing 
on both general purpose and wholesale CBDCs About 40 per cent of the 
respondents said they have advanced from conceptual research to experiments 
or proof- of- concept However, only 10 per cent have run pilot projects so far 
Furthermore, 70 per cent of the respondents reported that it is unlikely or very 
unlikely that they will issue any CBDC in the short term, while 10 per cent re-
ported they are ready to do so and 20 per cent said they are considering imple-
mentation in the medium term42
Countries which are at a more mature stage of CDBC development are 
Uruguay, Bahamas and Sweden Interestingly, these countries have different 
socio- economic structures and, consequently, different motivations to develop 
a CBDC The Banco Central de Uruguay (BCU) experimented with a CBDC 
called e- Peso in a pilot programme from November 2017 to November 2018 
Since 2011, the country has undertaken a broad financial inclusion programme 
As part of this effort, the government promoted a massive growth of cash dis-
pensing mechanisms and increased ATM presence Yet, the volume of cash in 
circulation and ATM withdrawals were steadily falling, encouraging the BCU 
to test a CBDC to further intensify its financial inclusion campaign43 The BCU 
released in circulation 20 million e- Pesos in the form of unique digital banknotes 
of different denominations through a ‘e- note manager platform’ whose function 
was to register and verify the ownership of the digital banknotes Of the total 
amount, 7 million e- Pesos were distributed by RedPagos – a third- party pay-
ment service provider  – that was holding an equivalent value of pesos in an 
account at the central bank Users could cash- in and cash- out through the 
RedPagos network Retail and corporate users’ wallets could hold a maximum 
of 30,000 e- Pesos (around 1,000 US dollars) and 200,000 e- Pesos (around 6,600 
 42 Codruta Boar, Henry Holden and Amber Wadsworth, ‘Impending Arrival - A Sequel 
to the Survey on Central Bank Digital Currency’, in BIS Papers, No 107, January 2020, 
p 12– 13, https:// wwwbisorg/ publ/ bppdf/ bispap107htm; Christian Barontini and 
Henry Holden, ‘Proceeding with Caution - A Survey on Central Bank Digital Currency’, 
in BIS Papers, No 101, January 2019, https:// wwwbisorg/ publ/ bppdf/ bispap101htm
 43 Gerardo Licandro, Uruguayan e- Peso on the Context of Financial Inclusion, Presentation 
for the conference on ‘Economics of Payments IX’, Basel, 15– 16 November 2018, 
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US dollars) respectively Users could transfer e- Pesos via mobile phones through 
text message or via the ad- hoc app, allowing both mobile data- based and off- 
line functions The infrastructure supporting the e- Peso did not use DLT44 The 
experiment was considered a success and the BCU is currently evaluating the 
results to better understand the risks and plan future steps
In December 2019, the Central Bank of the Bahamas launched the pilot phase of 
Project Sand dollar, a digital Bahamian dollar, in Exuma in December 2019, which 
has been extended to Abaco in the first half of 2020 As with Uruguay, the central 
bank’s motivation for the experiment was to increase financial inclusion, improving 
the domestic payment market In this case, the experiment seems to have been on 
a much larger scale45 The sand dollar is a general purpose CBDC that will be avail-
able offline as well as through mobile data in the form of tokens To avoid the risks 
of producing dramatic disintermediation effects, the central bank planned to set a 
limit on the amount of the currency that retail and corporate users could hold Retail 
users have been allowed a maximum holding capacity of 500 Caribbean dollars and 
of 1,500 US dollars in monthly transactions, either as payments or receipts For 
individual accounts which accepted to undergone a tighter due- diligence, the limits 
were to be 5,000 US dollars holding capacity and 10,000 US dollars in monthly 
transactions (and a cap of 100,000 US dollars in transactions per year) In case of 
corporate users, the limits are to be 8,000 US dollars (or 1/ 20th of their annual sales 
receipts) and up to 1 million US dollars per year holding capacity, and 1/ 8 the of 
annual sales or 20,000 US dollars per year in transactions46
In addition, for high- value transactions, digital wallets will have to be linked 
to deposit accounts at domestic financial institutions, so in case there is any 
excess currency, it can be directed to bank deposits Finally, the CBDC will not 
pay interests on deposits47 Furthermore, incumbent financial institutions will 
maintain a primary role The Bahamian central bank will not provide consumers 
with front- end customer service, leaving it to incumbents to offer digital wallets 
and accounts The central bank however forecasts that in the medium term it 
will build up a centralised KYC/ identity register to also allow users without a 
banking profile to supply data to the register Incumbent financial institutions 
are then expected to conduct due diligence on users and transactions
 44 Christian Barontini and Henry Holden, ‘Proceeding with Caution…’, cit, p 5
 45 Central Bank of the Bahamas, Project Sand Dollar:  A Bahamas Payments System 
Modernisation Initiative, 24  December  2019, https:// wwwcentralbankbahamas
com/ publications/ main- publications/ project- sanddollar- a- bahamian- payments- 
 system- modernization- initiative
 46 Ibid, p 14










The Bahamian central bank selected the tech start- up NZIA to build the back 
end of the infrastructure that supports the CBDC system, leaving the front- 
end opened to allow third parties to develop services and products around the 
CBDC48 Despite the lack of specific details on the proposed core infrastructure, 
the NZIA’s website mentioned that the system ‘meshes blockchain based pay-
ment systems and cutting edge communication network technologies […] Our 
system is designed to work with existing financial systems’49
Driven by different factors, Sweden is also at an advanced stage of 
experimenting with a domestic CBDC In the country, the cash use has dramati-
cally fallen, increasing the costs of accepting cash, which could ultimately lead to 
a scenario in which cash will no longer accepted Since early 2017, the Swedish 
central bank (Riksbank) has been working on a CBDC, the e- Krona project, that 
is still in the first phase of technical investigation According to the information 
publicly available, the e- Krona will be token- based and will distributed by third- 
party payment service providers However, the underlying infrastructure that 
will support the CBDC has not yet been explained Riksbank acknowledges that 
the current stage of DLT development is too immature but it could potentially be 
a useful tool in the future50
Finally, it is also important to mention an experiment of cross- border and 
cross- currency payment CBDC, which is taking place between Canada and 
Singapore The central banks of the two countries have linked their domestic 
CBDC experiments  – Project Jasper and Project Ubin respectively  – which 
have been developed on two different DLT platforms51 Cross- border CDBC 
experiments are important tools to envisioning how an international monetary 
system based on CBDCs could be shaped
 48 Neil Hartnell, ‘Provider for Digital B$ “Will Not Be Greedy” ’, in The Tribune, 
31 May 2019, http:// wwwtribune242com/ news/ 2019/ may/ 31/ provider- digital- b- will- 
 not- be- greedy
 49 NZIA website: NZIA Limited Identified as Preferred Technology Solutions Provider 
by the Central Bank of The Bahamas for Digital Currency Project, https:// nziaio/ pr/ 
central- bank- of- the- bahamas
 50 Sveriges Riksbank, The Riksbank’s E- Krona Project Report 1, September 2017, 
https:// wwwriksbankse/ en- gb/ payments- - cash/ e- krona/ e- krona- reports/ e- 
krona- project- report- 1; and The Riksbank’s E- Krona Project Report 2, October 
2018, https:// wwwriksbankse/ en- gb/ payments- - cash/ e- krona/ e- krona- reports/ 
e- krona- project- report- 2
 51 Kevin Helms, ‘Central Banks Worldwide Testing Their Own Digital Currencies’, in 
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(continued on next page )
Table 1.1: Retail CBDC projetcs I think I would prefer if the table would be horitonzally 
designed in line with the main text
Design choices Project/ 
Country

























D U A N Rafkróna
Iceland
Research; Aim to address ‘steadily diminishing 
use of banknotes and coin’; ‘many issues have 
yet to be clarified, and they must be dealt with 
appropriately before a position can be taken’
D U A N Sand Dollar
The Bahamas
Pilot; Improve ‘financial inclusion […], [reduce] 
the size of legitimate but unrecorded economic 
activities, [strengthen] national defences against 
money laundering and other illicit ends [and 
…] deliver government services through digital 
channels, thereby improving tax administration 
and increasing the efficiency of spending’
D U U N E- krone*
Denmark
Research; ‘the potential benefits of 
introducing CBDC are not assessed to 
match the considerable challenges that the 
introduction would present’
D U U N E- krone*
Norway
Working group; focus on ‘independent back- 
up solution, credit riskfree alternative to bank 
deposits, competition, legal tender’; ‘more 
information is required before a conclusion 
can be reached’
H or I C A I E- euro*
The 
Netherlands
Research; ‘The introduction of CBDC does 
not require the use of DLT’; ‘opting for CBDC 
implies trust in the central bank, which is 
why we have chosen a reference design with 
a centralised consensus mechanism’; ‘the 
technology behind account- based digital 
payment systems has proven itself to a far 
greater extent than value- based digital money’






Ongoing work; aim to create digital alternative 




Design choices Project/ 
Country
Notes on status, motivation and conclusion
H or I D A/ T I E- euro*
ECB
Research: ‘CBDC with the status of legal tender 
could guarantee that all users have, in principle, 
access to a cheap and easy means of payment’; 
‘proof of concept also highlights a number of 
areas where there is room for improvement’
H or I D&C A/ T N E- dollar*
Canada
Contingency plan; ‘building, as a contingency, 
the capability to issue a cash- like central bank 
digital currency (CBDC) to the public, should 
the need ever arise’
H or I D A/ T N E- krona
Sweden
Pilot; ‘within a few years, if the current trend 
continues, we will find ourselves in a situation 
where cash is no longer generally accepted as a 
means of payment’; ‘an account- based e- krona 
could rationalise payments from agencies and 
make them less dependent on commercial 
agents’
H or I D T N Digital Fiat 
Currency
Brazil
Research; ‘Improve the efficiency of the 
monetary function, […] payment processes 
and systems, […] financial inclusion and […] 
user experience’ Architecture: Hybrid, as on the 
one side ‘any relationship between the Central 
Bank and society is intermediated by financial 
institutions, just Rise of the CBDCs: drivers, 
approaches and technologies 40 as with physical 
cash’ On the other side intermediaries are only 
‘custodian of the new cash form’
H or I U U U E- pound*
United 
Kingdom
Research; ‘households and businesses should 
be able to make fast, efficient and reliable 
payments, and benefit from a resilient, inclusive, 
innovative, and competitive payment system’; 
‘two key elements of the platform: (1) a core 
ledger, provided by the Bank, would record 
CBDC and process payments, and (2) private 
sector ‘Payment Interface Providers’ would 
handle the interaction with end users of CBDC 
and provide additional payments functionality 
through overlay services’
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Table 1.1: Continued
Design choices Project/ 
Country
Notes on status, motivation and conclusion
U D T I DXCD
Eastern 
Caribbean
Pilot; Aim to address the ‘high cost of current 
payment instruments and banking services’, 
needs of customers and inefficient cheque 
settlement
U C A N Dinero 
Electrónico
Ecuador
Pilot; ‘means of payment available to 
absolutely all Ecuadorians’ Operated 2014– 16; 
discontinued
U D U N Bakong
Cambodia
Pilot; aim to ‘increase access to quality formal 
financial services’; ‘decrease demand for […] 
cash’
U D U N E- hryvnia
Ukraine
Pilot; Test DLT ‘as a technological framework 
for e- hryvnia issuance and circulation’; no 
fundamental advantage in using DLT in a 
centralised model
U U T N Electronic 
legal tender
South Africa
Expression of interest; ‘The scope of this project 
is specific to the use of a CBDC as electronic legal 
tender (ELT), similar to the characteristics of, and 
complementary to, cash’
U U U I E- euro*
France
Research; ‘account based model would offer 
better results for a retail CBDC However, it 
might also lead to a greater loss of resources for 
banks’
U U U I E- euro*
Spain
Research; ‘The case of non- anonymous CBDC 
based on technology similar to the current 
electronic payment methods would imply 
significant infrastructure costs and operational 
and regulatory requirements’
U U U N Billete Digital
Uruguay
Pilot; ‘Digital bills that aim to have same 
functions and uses as physical bills’; ongoing 
evaluation
U U U N E- shekel
Israel
Research; ‘help in the struggle against 
unreported transactions’; ‘contribute to the 
high- tech sector (fintech)’; Conclusion that 
‘the team does not recommend that the Bank 
of Israel issue digital currency (e- shekel) in the 
near future’
(continued on next page )
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Table 1.1: Continued
Design choices Project/ 
Country
Notes on status, motivation and conclusion
U U U N CBDC series
New Zealand
Research; ‘Safer and cheaper to transport 
than cash’; ‘Provides public access to an 
electronic form of legal tender’; ‘Reduces cash 
demand and supply which could reduce the 
availability of cash in an electricity outage’; ‘Slow 
payment authorisation in a blockchain- like 
cryptocurrency’
U U U N E- lilangeni*
Eswatini
Research; ‘evaluate whether clear use cases 
exist for the introduction of a retail and/ or 
wholesale CBDC specifically within the context 
of Eswatini Findings from the first phase of 
investigation indicate that there are indeed at 
least three potential use cases’ ‘However, while 
these results are positive, further research is 
warranted’
U U U N E- rupiah*
Indonesia
Research
U U U N E- ringgit*
Malaysia
Research; ‘Pioneering work reviewed generally 
concludes that CBDC, even if introduced in 
the future, would likely be a complement rather 
than a substitute to cash and bank deposits’ 
‘Technological hurdles need to be considered, as 
central bank credibility must take priority’
U U U N E- won*
Korea
Pilot; Start researching and reviewing 
technology, process, legal framework Test 
if CBDC will technically work in a limited 
environment
U U U U E- dinar*
Tunisia
Research
U U U U E- rouble*
Russia
Research
U U U U Digital- dollar*
United States
Research ‘the opportunities and challenges 
of, as well as the use cases for, a CBDC, as 
a complement to cash and other payments 
options’
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Table 1.1: Continued
Design choices Project/ 
Country
Notes on status, motivation and conclusion
U U U U E- AUD*
Australia
Research ‘the case for issuing a CBDC for use 
by households has not been established’; ‘the 
implications of CBDC for the structure of the 
financial system would need to be carefully 
considered’
U U U U Digital- Yen*
Japan
Research
U U U U E- franc
Switzerland
Research; ‘Examine the opportunities and 
risks of introducing a cryptofranc (e franc)’; 
‘additional benefits currently low, outweighed 
by risks’
Notes:
Architecture: D = direct; H or I = hybrid or intermediated; U = unspecified or multiple options 
under consideration
Infrastructure: C = conventional; D = DLT; U = unspecified or multiple options under 
consideration
Access: A = account- based; A/ T = tiering of account- and token- based; T = token- based; 
U = unspecified or multiple options under consideration
Interlinkage: I = international; N = national; U = unspecified or multiple options under 
consideration
* Not an official designation by the central bank
Source: Raphael Auer, Giulio Cornelli and Jon Frost, ‘Rise of the Central Bank Digital 
Currencies: Drivers, Approaches and Technologies’, in BIS Working Papers, No 880, August 
2020, p 39– 41, https:// wwwbisorg/ publ/ work880htm
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Chapter 2: CBDC in the Broad Context 
of National Payments System Development
Payment and settlement systems and services (PSSSs) have become vital 
components of the economic life of contemporary societies They consist of 
integrated networks of institutions involved in the execution and delivery of 
fund transfer services across economies Their smooth functioning is essen-
tial to the overall efficiency and stability of market economies To ensure such 
smooth functioning, national oversight authorities have been established world-
wide, typically with a leading role of central banks, and oversight activities have 
been developed to take account of the growing interconnectedness and mutual 
interdependence of PSSSs and other financial market infrastructures, including 
across borders PSSSs constitute what is often referred as the national payments 
system (NPS) of each country, NPSs are also mutually interconnected in what 
can be referred to as the global payments system (GPS)1
The retail payments landscape, in particular, has changed significantly in view 
of drastic technological developments in the financial sector and changing con-
sumer preferences As these unfold, back- end and front- end arrangements that 
provide consumers with the ability to pay, save and transfer value have under-
gone remarkable improvements including, among other, the emergence of so- 
called fast or instant payment systems, the launch of new means of payment 
based on emerging technologies such as blockchain (eg virtual currencies, 
stable- coins), and the spread of additional access channels and enabling envir-
onments that accommodate the use of digital payments such as Quick Response 
(QR) codes and Application Programming Interfaces (APIs)
However, despite the rise of digital payments, evidence suggests that cash re-
mains the most widely used retail payment instrument around the world2 As 
 1 This chapter reflects discussions held in the context of the preparation of ‘Central Bank 
Digital Currencies: the Payments Perspective’, a World Bank paper to be published in 
January 2021 Hence, its ideas and insights also belong to Holti Banka, Biagio Bossone, 
Ahmed Faragallah, Maria Chiara Malaguti, Harish Natarajan and Gynedi Srinivas 
Errors and omissions are the sole responsibility of the author
 2 Cash in the form of physical banknotes and coins issued by the central bank or the 







such, central banks, enabled also by new technologies, have been exploring the 
issuance of a digital instrument with cash- like features  – central bank digital 
currency (CBDC) CBDC can be defined as a liability of (claim on) the central 
bank issued in digital form, which can be used as a medium of exchange and 
means of payment, store of value, settlement asset and unit of account CBDC 
can be token- based or account- based and it can be wholesale or retail A retail 
CBDC (RCBDC) is used like a digital extension of cash by all players in the 
economy, whereas a wholesale CBDC (W- CBDC) could be used only by per-
mitted institutions as a settlement asset in the interbank market
Although it can be argued that most central banks already issue wholesale 
CBDC and that a W- CBDC would just be an evolution of existing systems, in 
recent years several central banks have been testing and piloting the CBDC con-
cept in the retail space as an innovative development There is recognition of the 
complexity associated with such an initiative, given that it cuts across multiple 
areas: payment system development, monetary policy, financial stability, legal, 
and oversight, as well as the practical challenges of implementation Nevertheless, 
central banks want to be well- positioned in the new era of payments and not be 
overshadowed by the private sector
Depending on their circumstances and local context, central banks are guided 
by different drivers in their desire to explore the issuance of CBDC The main 
drivers can be broadly summarized as follows
• Cost: The high cost associated with the printing, handling, storage and trans-
port of physical cash is pushing central banks to consider less costly versions 
of currency, such as CBDC
• Financial inclusion:  As many emerging markets are facing significant gaps 
in access to transaction accounts and usage of digital payment instruments, 
CBDC could potentially constitute a solution toward universal access
• Instant access:  Given that access to information is instant in today’s era, 
there has been a growing demand from consumers and businesses for pay-
ment mechanisms that allow instant and continuous access to funds on the 
payee’s side
• Risk:  In some countries (eg Sweden), most retail payments are digital 
(enabled by privately issued payment instruments), which implies high levels 
of dependence on the private sector By implementing CBDC, central banks 
can shift some of that risk back to the central bank, as the CBDC will compete 
with privately issued digital payment instruments
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• Competition: Given that similar initiatives are being undertaken by the private 
sector (eg Libra), central banks do not want to be left behind or outcompeted 
by the private sector in the payments sector, where they also have a role to play
• Role of central banks: Central banks have gone beyond their traditional role 
of issuing currency and are also serving as retail payment system operators in 
many cases, thus dealing directly with market participants and end users This 
positions them to potentially undertake the CBDC project, which requires 
cooperation and interaction with many different stakeholders
• Seigniorage: CBDC can boost seigniorage revenue for central banks, given the 
low production cost compared to physical cash
• Technology advancements: New emerging technologies, including blockchain, 
have made the implementation of CBDC easier
• Cross- border transactions:  If designed for cross- border transfers/ payments, 
CBDC can lower costs significantly for such transactions
• Tax collection: Many jurisdictions believe that CBDC can increase transpar-
ency and significantly reduce tax evasion, because transactions can be tracked, 
even under an anonymous CBDC design
• Capital market development: some forms of CBDC could match more modern 
techniques for clearing and settlement of securities and derivatives, and facil-
itate delivery versus payment in these new environments
The implementation of CBDC comes with dilemmas, risks and challenges 
Central banks need to make important decisions regarding the design of CBDC, 
such as interest bearing or non- interesting bearing; token- based or account- 
based; anonymous or non- anonymous; accounts held at central bank or at com-
mercial institutions; and cost structure and fees charged to participants and end 
users These are some key questions that need to be answered in advance In ad-
dition, there are risks and challenges that pertain to, for example, how monetary 
policy will be affected by the issuance of CBDC and how the Anti money laun-
dering and counter financing of terrorism (AML/ CFT) mechanisms in payments 
through CBDC will be handled
Overall, it is important for central banks to have a clear objective so they 
can decide first whether CBDC is the right instrument and whether other ex-
isting mechanisms can fulfil the objective Even if the solution is indeed CBDC, 
the implementation and design features will have to be guided by the needs of 
the implementer Finally, determining the right timing for the introduction of 
CBDC is of utmost importance, as this could influence the success of the project 
and adoption of the instrument
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2.1  CBDC in the broad context of national payments system 
development
From an NPS perspective, the decision on whether, when, how and by whom a 
CBDC should be introduced is complex and needs to be taken with close atten-
tion to some important considerations As the NPS in almost every country is far 
from optimal efficiency, CBDC has the potential to reduce costs and improve user 
experiences by putting competitive pressure on existing payment instruments
Some potential advantages of the introduction of W- CDBC, as an advanced 
version of existing real time gross settlement (RTGS) systems, are:
 1 Longer operating hours: W- CBDC is likely to be available 24/ 7, 365 days a 
year, unlike RTGS systems
 2 Increased operational resilience:  W- CBDC is expected to run on a 
permissioned network, relying on several cloud based nodes instead of the 
two to three data centres common to RTGS systems However, one could 
argue that current systems are already resilient and do not need extra levels 
of resilience
 3 Tokenization of financial assets:  the financial industry is making huge 
efforts to tokenise financial assets, such as securities (eg SDX or HQLAx) 
These platforms will require tokenised money like W- CBDC for settlement 
purposes
Some potential advantages of the introduction of a (domestically used) 
RCBDC are:
 1 Reduced cost for the production, handling and distribution of physical cash 
Comparative cost studies will be instrumental to measuring this impact
 2 Increased competitive pressure on the efficiency of other payment 
instruments As a RCBDC will be offered, in principle, at little or no cost to 
payers and payees, it could improve the overall efficiency of the retail segment 
of the NPS by putting pressure on other instruments that will have to ‘market’ 
their other characteristics and advantages It remains to be seen how CBDC 
features will be designed
 3 A more stringent anti- money laundering/ know your customer (AML/ KYC) 
regime than physical cash This will depend on the RCBDC model selected: (i) 
pure value- based CBDCs present similar concerns to cash; (ii) account- based 
CBDCs could mitigate AML/ KYC concerns
 4 Easier way to measure the real circulation of cash
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 5 Capacity to attract underserved or unserved segments of the population to 
increase financial inclusion
Some potential advantages of the introduction of an (internationally used) 
RCBDC are:
 1 Efficiency gains for cross- border payments, in particular at the regional level, 
as CBDC can serve as a cost- effective and faster payment means or an effi-
cient settlement asset
 2 Positive impact on de- risking as global reserve currencies issued as CBDCs 
could replace some correspondent banking arrangements
 3 For smaller states, it could increase demand for the national currency
The decision on CBDC should follow a structured and strategic approach, for 
which four main recommendations are provided below
Recommendation A: Preliminary considerations for successful launch of a CBDC. 
Before embarking on a structured programme to launch a CBDC in any given 
country, the central bank, other government authorities and relevant stakeholders 
should engage in a careful analysis of the following ten (10) considerations:
 1. Be informed! The decision on whether, when, how, and by whom a CDBC 
should be launched should be based on a full understanding of the NPS struc-
ture and needs, and on reliable and comprehensive data In this regard, rele-
vant data might be available through a cost study executed using the World 
Bank (WB) comprehensive methodology3 This set of data would be instru-
mental in guiding strategic decisions on this matter Also, the WB guidance 
on retail payment system stocktaking4 can provide some helpful insights (see 
Annex 1)
 2. Be strategic! The introduction of any form of CBDC should be part of and 
coherent with a strategic plan of reform of the NPS In principle, the intro-
duction of a CBDC is in line with the broad objectives of NPS reforms 
 3 The World Bank has developed a methodology to run such analysis See World Bank, 
Retail Payments. A Practical Guide for Measuring Retail Payment Costs, Washington, 
World Bank, November 2016, http:// hdlhandlenet/ 10986/ 25861 For an application 
of this methodology, see World Bank and Bank of Albania, The Retail Payment Costs 
and Savings in Albania, Washington, World Bank, June 2018, http:// hdlhandlenet/ 
10986/ 30060
 4 World Bank, Banco Central do Brasil and European Central Bank, A Practical Guide for 
Retail Payments Stocktaking, Washington, World Bank, 2012, https:// webworldbank






However, a careful attention of the potential trade- offs among the different 
strategic directions of the plan will need to be given (see also the following 
considerations)
 3. Be safe! CBDC, both wholesale and retail, should adhere to the highest 
standards of safety and security For example, W- CBDC should fully observe 
the CPMI- IOSCO Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMIs)5 
(see Annex 2) Both wholesale and retail CBDCs should be subject to strin-
gent cyber risk management RCBDCs should be subject to strict measures 
to avoid counterfeiting and token manipulation, as well as having adequate 
consumer assistance and protection mechanisms
 4. Inject efficiency! CBDC, wholesale and retail, should contribute greatly to 
improving the overall efficiency of the NPS As mentioned above, the analysis 
of relevant data, including through the use of the WB cost study, would shed 
light on where to intervene to enhance NPS efficiency in the country Should, 
for example, the study reveal that there are significant costs in producing 
and handling cash in the economy, and should some doubts remain on the 
capacity of the financial sector to foster the adoption of digital payments, 
then the introduction of an RCBDC could be accelerated On the wholesale 
side, a careful and urgent assessment of the current and prospective RTGS 
arrangements in relation to the efficiency principles of the CPMI- IOSCO 
PFMIs would inform any decision Some additional guidance on this matter 
can be provided in the relevant standards/ guidance6 (CPSS NPS Guidance 
report, see Annex 3) and in the WB retail package7
  In the broad NPS development framework CBDC can significantly improve 
disbursement and collections of government payments (see Annex 4 for the 
World Bank Guidelines for GPS)8 and can facilitate handling emergency situ-
ations (see Annex 5)
 5 Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and International Organization 
of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures, 
Basel, Bank for International Settlements, April 2012, https:// wwwbisorg/ cpmi/ publ/ 
d101ahtm
 6 Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS), ‘General Guidance for 
Payment System Development’, in CPMI Papers, No 70 (January 2006), https:// www
bisorg/ cpmi/ publ/ d70htm
 7 Massimo Cirasino and Jose Antonio Garcia (eds), Developing a Comprehensive 
National Retail Payments Strategy, Washington, World Bank, 2012, http:// documents
worldbankorg/ curated/ en/ 839121469729131991
 8 World Bank, General Guidelines for the Development of Government Payment Programs, 
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 5. Be fair! CBDC, in particular retail, should integrate smoothly with other 
payment instruments/ schemes and foster a competitive environment within 
the NPS In this context, the WB guidance and the spirit of competing on 
services and cooperating on infrastructures should help policymakers make 
the right choices (see Annexes 6 and 7) In particular, in some cases, consid-
eration should be given to the choice between a CBDC and the introduction 
of faster payments solutions that are being launched in several countries In 
principle, RCBDC and faster payments provide a similar experience to end- 
users in that the availability of funds is immediate However, there are some 
important considerations in terms of finality, anonymity, intermediation, 
and cost that would probably lead to the co- existence of both instruments, 
in the same way physical cash co- exists with other payment instruments 
The fact that, in some countries, central banks would be behind both 
initiatives would call for a careful analysis of the implications and planning 
of the timing of their launch
 6. Foster inclusion! CBDC, in particular retail, should be consistent with finan-
cial inclusion objectives The prospective CBDC should be consistent with 
the framework defined by the CPMI- World Bank Guiding Principles for the 
Payment Aspects of Financial Inclusion (PAFI), (see Figure 21) and the recently 
issued report on ‘Payment aspects of financial inclusion in the fintech era’9
 7. Be neutral! CBDC, in particular retail, should maintain at least the 
same level of AML- CTF compliance that existed before its introduc-
tion Relevant Financial Action Task Force (FATF) provisions should be 
studied and applied as needed to the prospective CBDC In this context, 
a study of the AML- CTF perspective on the NPS in the country would be 
beneficial
 8. Help the world! CBDC, both wholesale and retail, where used for cross- 
border purposes and/ or international remittances should enhance the 
efficiency and safety of the GPS The CPSS- WB General Principles for 
International Remittance Services10 (see Annex 8)  and the recent CPMI 
 9 The full reports can be downloaded at the following links: Committee on Payments 
and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) and World Bank, ‘Payment Aspects of Financial 
Inclusion’, in CPMI Papers, No 144 (April 2016), https:// wwwbisorg/ cpmi/ publ/ d144
htm; CPMI and World Bank, ‘Payment Aspects of Financial Inclusion in the Fintech 
Era’, in CPMI Papers, No 191 (April 2020), https:// wwwbisorg/ cpmi/ publ/ d191htm
 10 Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and World Bank, ‘General 
Principles for International Remittance Services’, in CPMI Papers, No 76 (January 







Retail and Cross- border reports can provide important guidance on this 
matter In some countries, these cross- border and remittance dimensions 
can probably become relevant at a subsequent stage, depending on the level 
of adoption of the CBDC
  A general perception is that cross- border payments lag behind domestic 
ones A  recent assessment by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) of ex-
isting payment arrangements has identified four types of important 
challenges:  cost, speed, access and transparency11 These challenges affect 
a number of different stakeholders on the supply side (bank and non- bank 
payment system operators or PSPs and technical service providers) and the 
demand side (end users composed of individuals, businesses and govern-
ment agencies), and affect each of them in different ways
 9. Be collegial! The decisions on whether, when, how and by whom a CBDC 
should be introduced, as well as those regarding its implementation (if it 
is approved) should be made through a structured process of consultation 
with all relevant stakeholders Central banks, typically, engage with all rel-
evant stakeholders in the production of the NPS strategy and some of its 
implementation In this spirit, a cooperative approach should be followed, 
Figure 2.1: The PAFI framework
 11 See Financial Stability Board (FSB), Enhancing Cross- border Payments. Stage 1 Report to 
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with the possible creation of a working group in the context of a plan to 
create a National Payments System Council or Forum, where this is not 
already in place
 10. Implementation is key! CBDC, both wholesale and retail, should be sub-
ject to rigorous pre- planning and project management techniques, and 
should protect central banks from reputational risk This would not be dif-
ferent from other NPS reform projects, with the possible caveat of an even 
stronger reputational role for the CBM The WB Guidelines for Integration 
of Regional Infrastructures12 provide some important insights on how to 
structure decision- making and implementation processes in the payments 
field (see Annex 9 and Recommendation C)
Recommendation B: Legal and regulatory aspects. The issuance of CBDC requires a 
careful consideration of its legal and regulatory consequences.13 Therefore, the cen-
tral bank, in cooperation with other relevant authorities, should carefully review 
the legal and regulatory framework prior to the launch of a CBDC.
A few premises are required In the first place, each legal order has its own 
institutional setting and substantive provisions Consequently, any concrete 
analysis should rely on the actual legal context of the relevant jurisdiction In 
the second place, constraints might exist in legal orders; however, this would not 
impede the establishment of CBDC, but possibly force some decisions or require 
amendments to legislation and/ or new regulation Finally, legal and economic 
concepts do not always exactly match and consequently an assessment is always 
required of the scope of legal definitions to correctly transpose the aims to be 
attained under policy into legal and regulatory terms
CBDC against cash and fiduciary money: CBDC implies a reconsideration 
of legal tender The central bank needs to have the authority to issue CBDC In 
general, central banks do have the general power to issue currency Unless rele-
vant legislation expressly states otherwise, the central bank should thus be able 
to issue currency also in digital form However, a more subtle issue may arise as 
for the legal value of CBDC to extinguish obligations
Considering CBDC as legal tender could not automatically imply a duty by 
the creditor to accept a specific payment instrument Legal tender should thus 
be recognized to take the form of reserves, cash and CBDC However, a different 
 12 World Bank, Guidelines for the Successful Regional Integration of Financial Infrastructures, 
Washington, World Bank, 2014, http:// hdlhandlenet/ 10986/ 22110







matter concerns acceptance of payment instruments through which the means 
of payment is delivered As a matter of principle, parties should be free to agree 
on the kind of instrument they are ready to accept according to cost, needed 
technology, or risk As stated above in this paper, CBDC is issued and then 
embedded into a payment instrument, possibly regulated through a scheme and 
processed through a system To that end, CBDC is embedded into a payment 
product which competes with other payment products in the market
In the lack of clarification within each legal order of the above categories, the 
introduction of CBDC may create some inconsistencies, since CBDC, as liability 
of the central bank, would possibly be considered as legal tender, with the con-
sequence that its acceptance would be compulsory under many legal systems, 
although the creditor might not be equipped from a factual point of view to be 
paid under its terms
To the same extent, as a way of exception to the general principle that 
parties should freely choose payment instruments, there may be public policy 
justifications requiring the regulator to impose some restrictions in the use of 
a payment instrument against another This is well- known to the generality of 
countries, where thresholds are often imposed in the use of cash, e- money or 
cheques A different understanding of the above issues may reduce the autonomy 
of the central bank to manage its policies by imposing restraints on the use of a 
kind of payment instrument against another
The issuance of CBDC must not be in conflict with the statutory functions of 
the central bank or possible constraints on its activities Once it is ensured that a 
central bank can issue CBDC because this is a means of payment as reserves and 
cash are, and that this is legal tender, a second check might be needed in the light 
of the objectives and functions of the central bank as established by its statute
If a central bank issues a CBDC to the general public, it is potentially exposed 
to the same legislation as other payment services providers or system operators 
Functions of a central bank often include also the power to operate a system 
Rarely such power would be statutorily limited to wholesale systems However, 
it has been quite unusual until now for a central bank to directly provide pay-
ment services to the general public besides physical cash, as it could be the case 
under models where it is the central bank itself to distribute the product and to 
have direct relationships with the users In all these operational roles, the central 
bank should in principle be subject to the same standards as any other provider 
in the market, as well as the product distributed should be subject to the same 
rules as competing products This would make the central bank subject to gen-
eral legislation on payments In addition to anti- money laundering regulations, 
such as KYC regulations and overseeing transactions, this might involve data 
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protection legislation, consumer protection legislation in the payment services 
field, responsibility for unauthorized transactions, tax legislation and the like 
The regulatory framework to apply would depend on which option is chosen, 
but in principle the central bank should be subject to the same provisions as any 
other market participant issuing similar DC mechanisms (see below for over-
sight) It needs to be noted, however, that a counter- argument is that physical 
cash – the most used payment instrument in the world and issued by the central 
bank, is not necessarily following the same standards and provisions as other 
payment instruments and this can be in principle extended to CBDC, as well
It should yet be clarified that CBDC is not e- money E- money products are 
issued by regulated entities and are pre- paid products The customer has a spe-
cific amount registered on a devise for payments against actual delivery of fiat 
money to the intermediary, who will manage it according to relevant legislation 
This happens mainly by depositing funds received from customers at deposit- 
taking institutions under fiduciary accounts, which the intermediary manages as 
a trustee (or analogous institution) to the benefit of the customers From a legal 
standpoint, this means that the trustee or other fiduciary holder has the power 
to administer the founds but it does so not to its own benefit, but to that of the 
customer, who is the beneficiary owner of such funds These legal structures are 
often misinterpreted:  the fact that the customer is the beneficial owner of the 
funds deposited at the deposit taking institution – with the consequence that in 
the event of default by the intermediary such funds are not included within the 
intermediary’s property – , does not mean that the relationship between the inter-
mediary and the customer changes: the customer keeps having a claim against 
the intermediary for the execution of its payment obligations Even under the 
circumstance that such accounts are held at a central bank rather than at a com-
mercial bank, such pre- paid instruments rely on the liability of the intermediary 
E- money products and CBDC thus do not coincide, since the latter represents a 
liability of the central bank However, e- money legislation, which currently exists 
in many countries, does not always define ‘e- money’ as such in the same way In 
particular, under some legislation the definition does not specifically clarify that 
e- money must be issued against fiat money This may generate uncertainties on 
whether such legislation would apply also to digital currency in general, and to 
CBDC in particular In the light of the structural difference between the two 
instruments, it would be advisable that a clear distinction is made However, it 
cannot be excluded that some of the provisions applying to e- money products 
could equally apply to the CBDC, such as on AML, authorization, verification, 
protection of data
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Legal issues for cross- border CBDC have additional implications CBDC 
for cross- border payments is inherently exposed to a plurality of legal systems 
Anything that crosses borders implies that it is potentially subject to (at least) 
two different legal systems These systems do not necessarily have similar rules 
governing the same events or contingencies And even when some similarities 
exist, such as, for instance, when international standards apply to both systems, 
the actual application of the same standards in each country might vary or even 
be in conflict Conflicting standards and, even worse, conflict of laws engender 
the risk that the expected effects of a transaction may not materialise or that 
unexpected consequences might occur
Any CBDC that is legally issued in a country should be fully recognised in 
other countries If, in the issuing country, the central bank has the authority to 
issue a CBDC, any other country should accept this CBDC as the currency of 
the issuing country in the same way as it accepts foreign currencies of any other 
form This means that the legal issues associated with CBDC transfers should 
be the same as those associated with any other cross- border transfers A situa-
tion where a country accepts a foreign currency under a specific form, say cash, 
while it refuses another currency under another form (hypothetically, CBDC) 
would be inconceivable in legal terms, especially if the latter is understood to be 
a means of payment and not a commodity (as is the case with CBDC) However, 
in view of the fact that CBDC also permits non- residents, at least in principle, 
to freely purchase domestic currency, thus placing both currencies (as means 
of payment) in much greater competition with each other than is currently the 
case, the circumstance cannot be ruled out wherein the receiving country would 
impose limitations on CBDC use within its jurisdiction in order to safeguard its 
own currency
Finally, standards and regulations need to be tailored to the CBDC model 
chosen For W- CBDCs, the major concern is the sound operation of the 
supporting infrastructure To that end, regulatory inconsistencies might 
emerge if, for instance, different criteria exist for the authorization of finan-
cial institutions as participants, or if different conditions apply for access of 
participants to central bank systems and facilities or to open accounts at central 
banks These differences do not affect the legal soundness of the infrastructure, 
but they may rather weaken its efficiency and obstruct the achievement of its 
goals However, in the case of general purpose CBDCs, the protection of end 
users become a relevant concern in addition to operational soundness In this 
area, however, countries may have different legal provisions for (financial) con-
sumer protection, financial integrity, data collection and protection, and trans-
parency (in particular as for traceability and transparency of fees and costs) 
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Such differences among countries participating in a CBDC infrastructure for 
cross- border payments would not affect the legal soundness of the payments or 
the infrastructure as a whole, but they might affect the achievement of common 
regulatory standards for the use of the same CBDC across the jurisdictions 
involved, and ultimately alter the homogeneous quality of CBDC services to the 
public across the whole arrangement
Recommendation C: Project management and resources. The central bank should pre-
pare a realistic action plan, identifying relevant milestones for the implementation of 
the CBDC and should count on adequate human and financial resources.
The action plan should include a feasibility phase, pilot phase and the (potential) 
full- scale implementation phase In the feasibility phase, the central bank should 
consider the various design options for a CBDC), analyse the relevant data, com-
pare them with the needs and elaborate on a model for the CBDC in the country 
The pilot phase should be regarded as critical, and entering it, the central bank 
should be open to any outcome, including the possibilities of having to significantly 
change the original design or drop the project altogether
The central bank should carefully check what the resources will be needed for 
implementing a CBDC, keeping in view other NPS reform projects underway The 
complexity and cost of implementing a CBDC should not be underestimated; it 
is neither easy nor resource- free Therefore, all necessary resources, financial and 
human, internal and external to the central bank, should be available and ready to 
be deployed effectively
Here one can draw extensive lessons from the WB regional guidelines for the 
successful implementation of regional financial infrastructures
Recommendation D: NPS oversight implications.14 The launch of a CBDC might have 
implications on the role of the central bank as overseer of the NPS, which should be 
carefully evaluated and, eventually, addressed.
Increasingly, since the late 1990s, central banks have redefined their role as 
oversight agencies for the NPS Most central banks today have in place a policy 
framework for NPS oversight, which they periodically revisit based on the 
evolution of the NPS as influenced by ongoing institutional and technological 
developments15 Interest has arisen from financial regulators and the payments 
 14 This section draws extensively on contributions from Gynedi Srinivas (World Bank)
 15 In two path- breaking papers, the Banca d’Italia (1997, 1999) outlined the main features 
of payment system oversight that were then taking shape and reported the results of a 
survey of the oversight functions then carried out by central banks in leading indus-
trial countries Another early example of the attempt to set out explicit objectives for 






industry on how to organise the oversight function in a way that is most condu-
cive to a sound long- term balance among the various objectives16
Oversight as it has evolved over the years and been practiced by central banks 
has been based on the premise of promoting safety and efficiency of payment and 
settlement systems by ‘monitoring existing and planned systems, assessing them 
against these objectives and, where necessary, inducing change’17 The definition 
encompasses the ‘public policy objectives of oversight (safety and efficiency), its 
scope (payment and settlement systems) and its activities (monitoring, assessing 
and inducing change)’ Additional public policy objectives such as financial 
inclusion, consumer protection and standards for payment instruments also fall 
under the scope of oversight in the case of central banks
The oversight powers of central banks have been broadly seen to cover and 
capture the above elements either in new payments system laws or through 
amendments to existing laws such as central banking laws These powers of over-
sight by and large do not always capture the likely development, deployment and 
use of a CBDC either as a retail payment instrument or as a wholesale settlement 
asset, given that this is an idea that has gained traction only recently Nonetheless 
it is interesting to analyse how the concept of oversight can be applied to CBDCs
RCBDCs: The RCBDC would be a general purpose digital payment instru-
ment that would be available to the general public either as a token- based var-
iant or an account- based variant A token- based variant would largely be a type 
of England’s report on Oversight of Payment Systems, issued in November 2000 Finally, 
see World Bank- CEMLA work by Bossone and Cirasino, where a template for the over-
sight of PSSS was first designed for the central banks of emerging market economies, 
and which has since become the oversight policy ‘manifesto’ for many central banks 
worldwide See Biagio Bossone and Massimo Cirasino, ‘The Oversight of the Payments 
Systems: A Framework for the Development and Governance of Payment Systems in 
Emerging Economies’, in Western Hemisphere Payments and Securities Clearance and 
Settlement Systems Research Series, No 1 (July 2001), http:// documentsworldbank
org/ curated/ en/ 646651468156578578
 16 For a review of oversight issues, see contributions reported in Bruce J Summers 
(ed), Payment Systems: Design, Governance and Oversight, London, Central Banking 
Publications, 2012 For a discussion of how public policy considerations and goals 
influence the design and operation of systems, see Bruce J  Summers, ‘Payment 
System Design and Public Policy’, in Bruce J Summers (ed), Payment Systems: Design, 
Governance and Oversight, London, Central Banking Publications, 2012, p 3– 16
 17 Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS), ‘Central Bank Oversight of 
Payment and Settlement Systems’, in CPMI Papers, No 68 (May 2005), p 11, https:// 
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of ‘digital cash’ and could be distributed to the general public in various ways, 
compared to an account- based variant Aimed primarily at retail transactions, it 
would be widely available18
Token RCBDC: If one were to conceptualise a token RCBDC as a bearer 
instrument akin to cash/ bank notes, widely available to the general public for 
daily payment needs, the issue that needs to be determined is whether the is-
suance, circulation/ distribution, redemption, destruction, operational reliability, 
security and customer redressal issues would all fall under the purview of NPS 
oversight Physical cash issued by the central bank is a bearer instrument and the 
central bank’s oversight scope and powers do not extend over cash comprising 
bank notes, which are legal tender Other departments within the central banks 
are tasked with the responsibility of bank- note design, their security features, 
distribution mechanisms, destruction of soiled bank notes and customer re-
dressal (exchange of soiled or mutilated bank notes) Other authorities such as 
law enforcement work with central banks and their distribution entities (usually 
banks) to detect forged notes and prosecute those responsible
A case could be made out that since other units of the central bank have been 
successfully managing the life- cycle of bank notes, with adequate re- skilling and 
training they would be able to do the same with token RCBDC as well Seen from 
this perspective, NPS oversight does not appear to have any role in the oversight 
(monitoring, assessing and inducing change) of token RCBDC
It could also be the case that the general public would not like to have on their 
person the full value of a bearer instrument (token RCBDC) and may like to 
store some balance in an account to be used as and when required When token 
RCBDC can be stored in an account (either with the central bank or with other 
authorised entities), such arrangements could fall outside the traditional scope 
of NPS oversight Other departments within central banks are responsible for 
managing the accounts of entities permitted to hold accounts with central banks 
and more often than not the internal audit unit of the central bank is tasked 
with ensuring that the department handling the accounts (within the central 
bank) is functioning in a safe and efficient manner Where accounts are held with 
banks, the banking supervisors would prescribe guidelines for opening accounts 
for customers, along with customer redressal measures One could surmise that 
perhaps NPS oversight could play a role in prescribing account opening criteria 
 18 Codruta Boar, Henry Holden and Amber Wadsworth, ‘Impending Arrival - A Sequel 
to the Survey on Central Bank Digital Currency’, in BIS Papers, No 107 (January 2020), 




(including customer redressal measures) where RCBDC accounts are held with 
non- bank providers licensed by NPS oversight
Seen from the above perspective, one could infer that the role of oversight 
over RCBDCs is rather circumscribed But this need not always be the case 
Where an RCBDC is the payment instrument used by the general public, it could 
be argued decisively that NPS oversight has a role in the safe and efficient func-
tioning of the retail payment system (whether operated by the central bank or 
a private PSP) to fulfil its objectives in maintaining public confidence in money 
and in the systems used to transfer money
As a ready reckoner (using the ECB framework for card payments), if one 
were to analyse the above retail payment system (which uses RCBDC) as a 
‘scheme’, then it becomes very evident that NPS oversight has a role The ECB 
defines a card payment scheme as
the set of functions, procedures, arrangements, rules and devices that enable a holder 
of a payment card to effect a payment and/ or cash withdrawal transaction with a third 
party other than the card issuer The oversight framework covers the entire payment 
cycle, ie the transaction phase (including the manufacture of payment instruments 
and the processing of data) and the clearing and settlement phase It accommodates 
concerns relating to both the retail payment system and the payment instrument used19
The above framework can be applied ipso facto to an RCBDC payment arrange-
ment by replacing payment cards with the RCBDC Adopting a ‘scheme’ frame-
work allows the overseer to conduct oversight over the entire payment cycle 
comprising the generation/ manufacturing, data processing, and the associated 
clearing and settlement of transactions using the RCBDC
While taking the view that the life- cycle management of an RCBDC as a pay-
ment instrument could be the responsibility of other departments within the 
central bank, it becomes necessary that under a ‘scheme’ framework (as outlined 
above), the NPS oversight department is fully co- opted in this process (secu-
rity, design, distribution of RCBDC) by the central bank management A case 
could also be made that as RCBDC is a new payment instrument, it should be 
the operations department which should be tasked with the life- cycle manage-
ment of the RCBDC Whichever arrangement is chosen, it should be recognised 
that this would be a central bank function in which various departments of the 
central bank would have to work together, including NPS oversight, given the 
 19 European Central Bank (ECB), Oversight Framework for Card Payment Schemes – 
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adoption of a ‘scheme” framework Based on the above, it becomes evident that 
oversight has a vital role to play in the life- cycle management of RCBDC as a 
retail payment instrument Based on the motivations (financial inclusion, alter-
native to commercial bank money, etc) of the central bank for issuance of the 
RCBDC, the oversight unit should contribute to the security and design features 
of the RCBDC to ensure that it is neutral in terms of form- factor (through a card, 
smartphone app, a feature phone, etc) and technology, and is widely available 
for use These inputs from the oversight unit would help realise the objectives of 
the central bank
However, when it comes to the clearing and settlement phase, it should be 
recognised that it would be the exclusive domain of the oversight unit within the 
central bank, as they are tasked under the oversight function to ensure the safe 
and efficient functioning of payment and settlement systems This is because pay-
ment clearing and settlement systems facilitate the exchange of money (in this case 
RCBDC) for goods and services (and possibly financial assets), and if they were 
inefficient or failed altogether, money (RCBDC) would not fulfil this purpose effec-
tively, and that could impair public confidence in RCBDC and in the systems used 
to transfer it20
As part of the oversight process, a subset of the PFMI could be adopted to ensure 
that the clearing and settlement arrangements are safe and efficient The choice 
of principles in the subset would largely be dependent on parameters such as the 
volume and value of transactions being cleared and settled, limits to individual 
transaction values, and the choice of clearing and settlement mechanisms used The 
subset would typically comprise principles to manage and mitigate financial risk 
(include governance and access criteria), and measures to mitigate operational risk 
(including cyber risks) and improve efficiency It should also be recognised that it 
may not be the case that all key considerations associated with individual principles 
are attracted in this process
W- CBDC: A payment system using W- CBDC would lend itself to be classified 
as a systemically important payment system (SIPS) as it is presumed that it would 
be used to process and settle time- critical, high- value payments in the economy, 
among others21 Based on this premise, a W- CBDC payment arrangement will 
 20 CPSS, ‘Central Bank Oversight of Payment and Settlement Systems’, cit
 21 ‘In general a payment system is systemically important if it has the potential to trigger 
or transmit systemic disruptions; this includes, among other things, systems that are 
the sole payment system in a country or the principal system in terms of the aggregate 






attract all the principles and their respective key considerations that are appli-
cable to a SIPS,22 to ensure that such an arrangement is functioning in a safe and 
efficient manner
The oversight unit would be responsible for ensuring that the W- CBDC ar-
rangement is functioning in a safe and efficient manner and would also cover 
critical service providers23 In addition, where such an arrangement is being 
operated by the central bank, key considerations in respect of some of the prin-
ciples would not be applicable24 The oversight unit should also take into account 
additional guidance provided by CPMI- IOSCO25 The oversight unit/ department 
would also be tasked with the five responsibilities as an overseer of systemically 
important payment systems (SIPS) listed in the CPMI- IOSCO PFMI report26 
To this end it is critical that it cooperates with other regulatory entities both 
domestically and on a cross- border basis depending on the type of W- CBDC 
arrangement, for example in payment versus payment (PvP) and delivery versus 
payment (DvP) arrangements
It is likely going forward that certain elements could gain criticality in the 
oversight mandate with regard to W- CBDCs For instance, these could be greater 
emphasis on higher operational reliability; greater cyber resilience and cyber 
security (especially in a DLT platform where there could be no single point of 
failure but could have multiple vulnerable points for cyberattacks); and inter-
dependencies and linkages with other FMIs
In summary, the oversight departments of central banks will have to gear 
themselves to take on this new challenge while adhering in most respects to the 
time- tested principles of oversight As in the case of any payment instrument and 
payment system, the degree of emphasis on various aspects would vary, but the 
systems that settle payments used to effect settlement in other systemically important 
FMIs’ CPSS and IOSCO, Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures, cit, p 12
 22 Ibid
 23 See Annex F in ibid, p 170– 171
 24 CPSS and IOSCO, ‘Application of the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures 
to Central Bank FMIs’, in CPMI Papers, No 130 (August 2015), https:// wwwbisorg/ 
cpmi/ publ/ d130htm
 25 Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI), ‘Reducing the Risk of 
Wholesale Payments Fraud Related to Endpoint Security: A Toolkit’, in CPMI Papers, 
No 188 (October 2019), https:// wwwbisorg/ cpmi/ publ/ d188htm
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basic tenets of oversight to ensure safe and efficient operation of financial market 
infrastructures27 would continue to apply and would need to be adhered to
Some of the other issues that overseers could be confronted with would 
depend on the type of CBDC arrangement adopted For instance, this would 
include the use cases – would a RCBDC arrangement be used only for person- 
to- person payments or for various other use cases such as P2B, B2P, B2B, P2G, 
G2P, B2G, and G2B Depending on the use cases, the central bank may have to 
take a decision on the account holding structure it would adopt and the distribu-
tion model for the RCBDC Another issue is the ease with which users can con-
vert CBDC into commercial bank money and vice versa, and the interlinkages 
between the two, while at the same time addressing issues of interoperability 
Fee structure (if any) would also have to be devised by central banks for CBDC 
arrangements
Central banks would have to take into account the likely impact on private 
sector innovation and competition in the payments arena Last but not least, 
central banks should not lose sight of the fact that reskilling their staff would be 
necessary to effectively carry out the oversight function A high level of coordi-
nation between various central bank departments would also have to be ensured 
by the managements of the central banks to avoid turf wars
Annex 1:  World Bank practical guide for retail payments 
stocktaking28
Guideline 1  The overall scope and structure of the stocktaking exercise shall 
be driven by the high- level public policy goals set forth in the area of retail 
payments
Guideline 2 Adequate attention needs to be devoted to the planning and organi-
zation of the stocktaking exercise
Guideline 3 Industry players should be involved from the very early stages
Guideline 4 Obtaining sufficient, high- quality data and other types of informa-
tion is at the heart of the stocktaking exercise
Guideline 5 Devote sufficient time to report preparation and to designing the 
strategy for the wide dissemination of results
 27 CPSS and IOSCO, Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures, cit
 28 Source: World Bank, Banco Central do Brasil and European Central Bank, A Practical 







Annex 2:  CPMI- IOSCO principles for financial market 
infrastructures29
General organisation
Principle 1 Legal basis: Any financial market infrastructure (FMI) should have a 
well- founded, clear, transparent and enforceable legal basis for each material 
aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions
Principle 2 Governance: An FMI should have governance arrangements that are 
clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and sup-
port the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest 
considerations and the objectives of relevant stakeholders
Principle 3 Framework for the comprehensive management of risks: An FMI 
should have a sound risk- management framework for comprehensively man-
aging legal, credit, liquidity, operational and other risks
Credit and liquidity risk management
Principle 4  Credit risk:  An FMI should effectively measure, monitor and 
manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its pay-
ment, clearing and settlement processes An FMI should maintain sufficient 
financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with 
a high degree of confidence In addition, a central counterparty (CCP) that 
is involved in activities with a more complex risk profile or that is systemi-
cally important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial 
resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that 
should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and 
their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit expo-
sure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions All other CCPs 
should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range 
of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the 
default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the 
largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market 
conditions
Principle 5  Collateral:  An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its 
participants’ credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity 
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and market risks An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conserva-
tive haircuts and concentration limits
Principle 6 Margin: A CCP should cover its credit exposures to its participants 
for all products through an effective margin system that is risk- based and reg-
ularly reviewed
Principle 7  Liquidity risk:  An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and 
manage its liquidity risk An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources 
in all relevant currencies to effect same- day and, where appropriate, intraday 
and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of con-
fidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, 
but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would 
generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but 
plausible market conditions
Settlement
Principle 8 Settlement finality: An FMI should provide clear and certain final 
settlement, at a minimum by the end of the value date Where necessary or 
preferable, an FMI should provide final settlement intraday or in real time
Principle 9 Money settlements: An FMI should conduct its money settlements 
in central bank money where practical and available If central bank money is 
not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity 
risk arising from the use of commercial bank money
Principle 10 Physical deliveries:  An FMI should clearly state its obligations 
with respect to the delivery of physical instruments or commodities and 
should identify, monitor and manage the risks associated with such physical 
deliveries
Central securities depositories and exchange- of- value settlement 
systems
Principle 11 Central securities depositories:  A central securities depository 
(CSD) should have appropriate rules and procedures to help ensure the integ-
rity of securities issues and minimise and manage the risks associated with the 
safekeeping and transfer of securities A CSD should maintain securities in an 
immobilised or dematerialised form for their transfer by book entry
Principle 12 Exchange- of- value settlement systems:  If an FMI settles transac-
tion that involve the settlement of two linked obligations (for example, secu-




conditioning the final settlement of one obligation upon the final settlement 
of the other
Default management
Principle 13 Participant- default rules and procedures:  An FMI should have 
effective and clearly defined rules and procedures to manage a participant 
default These rules and procedures should be designed to ensure that the FMI 
can take timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and continue 
to meet its obligations
Principle 14 Segregation and portability:  A CCP should have rules and 
procedures that enable the segregation and portability of positions of a 
participant’s customers and the collateral provided to the CCP with respect 
to those positions
General business and operational risk management
Principle 15 General business risk: An FMI should identify, monitor and manage 
its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity 
to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations 
and services as a going concern if those losses materialise Further, liquid net 
assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind- 
down of critical operations and services
Principle 16 Custody and investment risks: An FMI should safeguard its own 
and its participants’ assets and minimise the risk of loss on and delay in access 
to these assets An FMI’s investments should be in instruments with minimal 
credit, market and liquidity risks
Principle 17 Operational risk: An FMI should identify the plausible sources of 
operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through 
the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures and controls Systems 
should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reli-
ability, and should have adequate, scalable capacity Business continuity man-
agement should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the 
FMI’s obligations, including in the event of a wide- scale or major disruption
Access
Principle 18 Access and participation requirements: An FMI should have objec-
tive, risk- based and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit 
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Principle 19 Tiered participation arrangements: An FMI should identify, mon-
itor and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participa-
tion arrangements
Principle 20 FMI links: An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs 
should identify, monitor and manage link- related risks
Efficiency
Principle 21 Efficiency and effectiveness: An FMI should be efficient and effec-
tive in meeting the requirements of its participants and the markets it serves
Principle 22 Communication procedures and standards: An FMI should use, 
or at a minimum accommodate, relevant internationally accepted commu-
nication procedures and standards in order to facilitate efficient payment, 
clearing, settlement and recording
Transparency
Principle 23 Disclosure of rules, key procedures, and market data:  An FMI 
should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should pro-
vide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate under-
standing of the risks, fees and other material costs they incur by participating 
in the FMI All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed
Principle 24 Disclosure of market data by trade repositories: A trade repository 
should provide timely and accurate data to relevant authorities and the public 
in line with their respective needs
Responsibilities of central banks, market regulators, and other relevant 
authorities for financial market infrastructures
Responsibility A Regulation, supervision, and oversight of FMIs: FMIs should 
be subject to appropriate and effective regulation, supervision and oversight by a 
central bank, market regulator or other relevant authority
Responsibility B  Regulatory, supervisory, and oversight powers and re-
sources: Central banks, market regulators, and other relevant authorities should 
have the powers and resources to carry out effectively their responsibilities in 
regulating, supervising and overseeing FMIs
Responsibility C  Disclosure of objectives and policies with respect to 
FMIs:  Central banks, market regulators and other relevant authorities should 
clearly define and disclose their regulatory, supervisory and oversight policies 





Responsibility D Application of principles for FMIs: Central banks, market 
regulators and other relevant authorities should adopt, where relevant, interna-
tionally accepted principles for FMIs and apply them consistently
Responsibility E Cooperation with other authorities: Central banks, market 
regulators, and other relevant authorities should cooperate with each other, both 
domestically and internationally, as appropriate, in promoting the safety and effi-
ciency of FMIs
Annex 3:  General guidance for NPS development30
A. Banking system
Guideline 1 Keep the central bank at the centre: due to its overall responsibility 
for a sound currency, the central bank has a central role in the development 
of the use of money as an effective means of payment
Guideline 2 Promote the role of a sound banking system: payment accounts, 
instruments and services available to end users are provided by banks and 
other similar financial institutions, which compete individually but often 
need to act cooperatively as a system
B. Planning
Guideline 3 Recognise complexity: planning should be based on a comprehen-
sive understanding of all the core elements of the national payment system 
and the principal factors influencing its development
Guideline 4 Focus on needs: identify, and be guided by, the payment needs of all 
users in the national payment system and by the capabilities of the economy
Guideline 5 Set clear priorities: plan and prioritise development of the national 
payment system strategically
Guideline 6  Implementation is key:  ensure effective implementation of the 
strategic plan
C. Institutional framework
Guideline 7 Promote market development: the expansion and strengthening of 
market arrangements for payment services are key aspects of the evolution of 
the national payment system
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Guideline 8  Involve relevant stakeholders:  encourage the development of ef-
fective consultation among relevant stakeholders in the national payment 
system
Guideline 9 Collaborate for effective oversight: effective payment system over-
sight by the central bank often requires collaborative arrangements with other 
authorities
Guideline 10 Promote legal certainty: develop a transparent, comprehensive and 
sound legal framework for the national payment system
D. Infrastructure
Guideline 11 Expand availability of retail payment services:  extend the avail-
ability and choice of efficient and secure non- cash payment instruments and 
services available to consumers, businesses and government by expanding 
and improving retail payment infrastructures
Guideline 12 Let the business case guide the large- value payment system: develop 
a largevalue payment system based primarily on the needs of financial markets 
and the growth in time- critical interbank payments
Guideline 13 Align development of payment and securities systems: coordinate 
the development of securities and large- value payment systems for safety and 
efficiency in the financial system
Guideline 14 Coordinate settlement of retail, large- value and securities sys-
tems: the settlement processes for the core systems should be operationally 
coordinated to efficiently manage the interrelated liquidity needs and settle-
ment risks among them
Annex 4:  World Bank guidelines for government payment 
programs (GPS)31
The General Guidelines aim at the following public policy goals for GPS: Payments 
and collections made as part of existing or new GPS should support the sound, 
efficient and transparent management of public financial resources GPS should 
therefore be safe, reliable, and cost- effective In addition, efforts to modernize 
GPS should be leveraged to accelerate the development of the national payments 
system more broadly, and to promote financial inclusion







A. Governance, safety and efficiency
Guideline 1 Ensure proper program governance and risk management: gover-
nance arrangements should ensure accountability, transparency, and effec-
tiveness in managing the risks associated with GPS
Guideline 2 Review and streamline treasury processes, then work on their auto-
mation: the treasury should devote extensive efforts to identifying all relevant 
needs with regard to improved safety, efficiency and transparency
Guideline 3 Take full advantage of electronic payment methods: the extensive 
use of electronic payments in GPS can reduce costs and improve transparency 
and traceability
Guideline 4 Create appropriate organizational arrangements to foster the con-
tinuous development of GPS: the national treasury/ ministry of finance should 
consider engaging in collaborative schemes with the central bank and other 
stakeholders to identify additional improvement opportunities for these 
programs and, eventually, facilitate their implementation
B. Legal and regulatory
Guideline 5 An appropriate legal framework with specific applicability to GPS 
can further underpin their safe and efficient operation: laws and/ or regulations 
that provide clarity and certainty to the various parties involved, and that pro-
mote effectiveness and transparency in the execution of programs should be 
enacted/ approved
Guideline 6: Laws and regulations on payment instruments and systems, com-
petition and consumer protection can also have an important bearing on 
GPS:  the legal basis should support sound and fair practices in the market 
place, and be flexible enough to accommodate innovations
C. Payment systems infrastructure
Guideline 7  An appropriate payments infrastructure should be in place:  the 
potential to obtain substantial benefits from migrating government 
expenditures and collections to electronic payments relies on there being the 
required payments infrastructures to process such payments safely, efficiently 
and at a reasonable cost
Guideline 8  Maximize the potential of the available infrastructures through 
interoperability and widespread usage: payment service providers being able 
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infrastructures promotes efficiency, network expansion, and a level playing 
field for all players
D. Cooperation and partnerships to leverage GPS
Guideline 9 Adopt a strategic approach to the development of GPS: the reforming 
of GPS has the potential to trigger the development of a robust payments 
infrastructure, which in turn will support the safe and efficient processing of 
government payments
Guideline 10 Leverage on GPS to promote financial inclusion: the large volume 
of payments issued by governments, as well as the nature of some specific 
programs like social spending programs, represents an opportunity to pro-
mote or facilitate financial inclusion on a large scale
Annex 5:  CBDC and payment services during emergencies32
In cases of national emergencies, CBDC may play a special role In emergen-
cies, governments need to find ways of getting money to people on the margins 
of society and facilitate their payments activity Yet, as experience worldwide is 
painfully showing at the time of writing this note, during the COVID- 19 pan-
demic, public authorities may be encountering significant challenges in getting 
funds to those in need and enabling access to money Often, the complexity 
of public funding programmes slows down the speed at which businesses and 
citizens receive the money to sustain themselves and raises uncertainty as to 
whether and when the money will actually be made available In various coun-
tries, small and medium size enterprises have expressed concerns that delivery 
of measures is taking too long33 Failure to address these challenges aggravates 
the macroeconomic effects of the crisis and diminishes people’s ability to 
weather them, increasing their frustration Their persistence might breed exas-
peration and foment social upheaval The pandemic will probably accelerate 
 32 Prepared by Biagio Bossone and Harish Natarajan (World Bank) In particular, this 
annex draws on Biagio Bossone and Harish Natarajan, ‘Getting Funds to Those in 
Need and Enabling Access to Money during COVID- 19, Part 3: Central Bank Digital 
Currencies and Other Instruments’, in VoxEU, 15 July 2020, https:// voxeuorg/ node/ 
65987
 33 See, for instance, Organisation for Economic Co- operation and Development 
(OECD), Coronavirus (COVID- 19): SME Policy Responses, Paris, OECD, updated 
July 2020, https:// wwwoecdorg/ coronavirus/ policy- responses/ coronavirus- covid- 







CBDC developments (the ‘digital dollar’ discussed below is an example), even 
by clearing the political way toward its introduction, and may amplify calls to 
defend the role of CBDCs
In the context of crises such as the COVID- 19 pandemic, CBDC could 
greatly assist in delivering funds to the greatest bulk of the population in need 
Particularly during emergencies, a central bank could agree to act as government 
agent and execute CBDC fund transfers on the government’s behalf to individ-
uals and businesses that the government identifies as being in need of financial 
support Through CBDC, governments could send direct payments much more 
rapidly than through checks or tax refunds and could provide geographically 
and temporally targeted relief The CBDC supporting infrastructure would also 
enable fund receivers to make payments and transfers seamlessly to other CBDC 
holders and/ or non- CBDC holders, anywhere and anytime across the economy 
In addition, CBDC could reinforce the resilience of a country’s retail payment 
services, especially in cases where private sector infrastructures are disrupted 
due to, say, technical problems, personnel unavailability or inability of service 
providers to operate Finally, CBDC would serve as a substitute for cash and 
in- person payment methods when social distancing is required or when the use 
of cash plummets as people are increasingly wary of engaging with potentially 
germ- infested surfaces
During crises, CBDC could be used as a payment conduit for delivering stim-
ulus packages to households and businesses This would be especially useful 
when businesses risk closing because they run out of money, and people lose 
their jobs or become ill and also run out of money An example is the recent 
proposal for a US House of Representatives emergency COVID- 19 stimulus 
bill, which referred to creating a: digital dollar” to get stimulus payments to un-
banked Americans In practice, the US Treasury would make payments through 
direct deposits to recipient accounts (FedAccounts) held at Federal Reserve 
Banks (FRBs) or FRB- member banks through pass- through FedAccounts The 
proposal was ultimately pulled from the final legislation, but is now the subject 
of a dedicated Senate draft bill
A relevant consideration to be made between using CBDC for aggregate 
demand stimulus or for giving emergency cash to distressed households 
and businesses If the primary purpose of cash transfers is to raise aggregate 
demand, it is not critically important if some people don’t get the money 
What matters is that CBDC reaches a majority of people and businesses that 
spend the money and stimulate demand On the other hand, however, if the 
primary purpose is to relieve hardship, then it matters if the money doesn’t 
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reach the right people and enterprises, since hardship would not be effec-
tively relieved and the scheme would be seen as unfair Failures in this area 
might put central banks at reputational and political risks Thus, if CBDC 
were to be used for relief purposes, a perimeter of responsibilities should be 
set establishing with clarity that the central bank acts as the agent of govern-
ment and only executes government instructions The central bank should not 
get involved in discussions as to whom or which entities should be entitled to 
receive money (except in so far as restricting the distribution of money would 
affect its own mandate)
Annex 6:  World Bank guidance on developing a comprehensive 
retail payments strategy34
Guideline 1: The market for retail payments should be transparent, have adequate 
protection of payers and payees interests, and be cost- effective
Guideline 2: Retail payments require reliable underlying financial, communications 
and other types of infrastructure; these infrastructures should be put in place 
to increase the efficiency of retail payments These infrastructures include an 
inter- bank electronic funds transfer system, an inter- bank card payment plat-
form, credit reporting platforms, data sharing platforms, large value inter- bank 
gross settlement systems, availability of robust communications infrastructure 
and also a national identification infrastructure
Guideline 3: Retail payments should be supported by a sound, predictable, non- 
discriminatory, and proportionate legal and regulatory framework
Guideline 4:  Competitive market conditions should be fostered in the retail 
payments industry, with an appropriate balance between co- operation and com-
petition to foster, among other things, the proper level of interoperability in the 
retail payment infrastructure
Guideline 5: Retail payments should be supported by appropriate governance and 
risk management practices
Guideline 6:  Public authorities should exercise effective oversight over the retail 
payments market and consider proactive interventions where appropriate
 34 Source: Massimo Cirasino and Jose Antonio Garcia (eds), Developing a Comprehensive 





Annex 7:  World Bank guidelines on balancing cooperation and 
competition35
Guideline 1: Market complexities need to be recognized and analyzed in detail 
before any action is decided and implemented Environmental, legal and 
legacy factors, and governance of the infrastructure has a significant impact 
on cooperation/ competition Gaining access to messaging, clearing and set-
tlement services is of capital importance for new entrants in the market
Guideline 2: Policy trade- offs are relevant in this domain Therefore, policy pri-
orities will have to be determined and the type of public intervention should 
depend on the main public objective(s) pursued Public policy objectives 
in retail payments systems are multiple The justification for intervention 
depends upon the main public policy objective(s) pursued and evidence of 
perceived market failure; ex- ante, transparent determination of policy object-
ives is desirable
Guideline 3: Effective oversight of retail payment systems by the central bank 
is crucial to balance cooperation and competition issues Effective oversight 
is the main tool to achieve an appropriate balance between cooperation and 
competition, central banks being the ‘natural’ PS overseers in cooperation 
with other authorities PS oversight function scope should be broad/ flexible 
enough to cover new instruments/ players
Guideline 4: Institutional mechanisms to promote cooperation and information 
sharing are essential Fragmentation of relevant policymakers and scope of 
their mandates may be an issue; authorities’ cooperation frameworks to be 
strengthened/ broadened; payment councils, industry associations groups and 
similar bodies to be leveraged
Annex 8:  The CPSS- World Bank general principles for 
international remittance services36
General principle 1:  Transparency and consumer protection:  The market for 
remittance services should be transparent and have adequate consumer 
protection
 35 Based on: Massimo Cirasino and Jose Antonio Garcia (eds), Developing a Comprehensive 
National Retail Payments Strategy, cit, p 55– 56
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General principle 2:  Payment systems infrastructure:  Improvements to pay-
ment system infrastructure that have the potential to increase the efficiency of 
remittance services should be encouraged
General principle 3: Legal and regulatory framework: Remittance services should 
be supported by a sound, predictable, non- discriminatory, and proportionate 
legal and regulatory framework in relevant jurisdictions
General principle 4:  Market structure and competition:  Competitive market 
conditions, including appropriate access to domestic payments infrastructures, 
should be fostered in the remittance industry
General principle 5:  Governance and risk management:  Remittance serv-
ices should be supported by appropriate governance and risk management 
practices
Roles of remittance service providers and public authorities:  (a) Remittance 
service providers should participate actively in the implementation of the gen-
eral principles (b)  Public authorities should evaluate what actions to take to 
achieve the public policy objectives through the implementation of the general 
principles
Annex 9:  World Bank guidelines for successful integration of 
regional financial infrastructures37
The WB- led G25 Experts Group drafted guidelines to provide high- level guid-
ance to principal policymakers and stakeholders in the development of regional 
or cross- regional integration of financial infrastructures The 19 guidelines 
belong to the following categories:
Enabling and institutional guidelines: Outline the set of institutional arrangements 
that enable a regional financial infrastructure integration proposal to move 
forward from its preliminary vision to an actual operational arrangement in 
an effective fashion
Planning guidelines: The basis for determining if regional financial infrastruc-
ture integration is necessary and justifiable for the stakeholders in the region 
at that particular time This is the ‘make or break’ stage at which regional FI 
integration initiatives either move forward or are postponed






Design guidelines and implementation guidelines:  Deal with the heart of the 
regional financial infrastructure integration programme It is at these stages 
of the integration initiative that leadership, commitment, consultation and 
effective management become most crucial
Sustainability guidelines: Help establish a strategic direction and sound business 
culture for the regional FI arrangement that, together with the continuous 
oversight from public sector authorities, will help ensure that it will continue 
to evolve and develop to meet future stakeholder needs, legal and regulatory 
requirements, and policy standards affecting its operations, and will do so in 
a transparent and credible fashion
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Chapter 3: Central Bank Digital Currency and 
the Future Financial System
Central bank digital currency (CBDC) creates the opportunity to build the foun-
dation of a new financial system that is more secure, less risky and more efficient 
than the current system In this chapter we look at three basic functions of the 
financial system – payments, payment versus payment (PvP) and delivery versus 
payment (DvP) – to show how CBDC could alter the structure of the financial 
system by reshaping the underlying technology
This chapter has four parts:  first it describes how these three functions 
(payments, PvP and DvP) work in the existing system; then it looks at what we 
can learn from existing digital currencies about how these transactions can be 
done differently; third, it addresses CBDC design; and finally it examines how 
this could improve the structure of the financial system
In this chapter, we adopt the common definition of a CBDC: a universally 
available, direct liability of the central bank, with the core infrastructure oper-
ated by the central bank itself and user- facing services operated by private- sector 
providers1
3.1  The existing financial system
The financial system has three main goals: 1) financing productive enterprises, 
households and governments while providing returns to investors; 2) insuring 
against risk; 3) making payments
The financial system as presently constituted is comprised of institutions, 
rules and software All these elements play a role in making the system function, 
but the mechanism for enforcement varies In some cases, the rules of the system 
are enforced by contract, with the software merely recording data In others the 
 1 For more discussion of CBDC definitions and structures, see Bank of England, Central 
Bank Digital Currency. Opportunities, Challenges and Design, Discussion Paper, March 
2020, https:// wwwbankofenglandcouk/ paper/ 2020/ central- bank- digital- currency- 
opportunities- challenges- and- design- discussion- paper; and Raphael Auer and Rainer 
Boehme, ‘The Technology of Retail Central Bank Digital Currency’, in BIS Quarterly 






software itself is part of the enforcement mechanism  – for example in deter-
mining the format of how data is exchanged in the system Ultimately laws 
and institutions lie at the root of the system, and any ability the software has to 
enforce rules is derived from them
The rules of the existing system are drawn from different sources – contracts 
and legislation This combination of private and public law defines the obligations 
between the different institutions in the system, as well as creating the institutions 
themselves Pistor describes these laws as a toolkit: ‘Their toolkit consists of the 
modules of the code:  the rules of property and collateral law, the principles of 
trust, corporate, and bankruptcy law; and contract law; the most malleable of 
them all’2
This characterization is useful because it demonstrates the parallel between 
software and law when thinking about the financial system Both are a set of 
rules with a method of enforcement; larger bespoke systems are constructed 
from smaller standard modules; and both are created by expert practitioners 
The difference is in how the rules are translated into a functioning system
Retail payments
There are many different types of payment system, both wholesale and retail, but 
from an institutional perspective they work in a similar way, with a centralised 
system operator setting the rules and managing the participants, both users and 
members
In any payment system there are different types of participant For example, in 
a retail card system, in addition to the payment system operator there are banks, 
merchants and the end users
All the relationships in the system are defined by contracts The members 
have an agreement with the payment system provider setting out the rules 
by which they must abide In turn, the members have contracts with the end 
users and the merchants that establish the terms upon which they can use 
the system
From a technology perspective, the members can use different software for 
their own internal systems, because a retail network is overlaid on top of an ex-
isting set of bank accounts that operate independently The payment system pro-
vider does have to establish certain technical standards for how the common 
 2 Katharina Pistor, The Code of Capital. How the Law Creates Wealth and Inequality, 
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software and hardware in the system function, for example messaging standards 
and contactless payments3
The technical standards are an interesting aspect of the system, as they dem-
onstrate how software is used to enforce the rules even in the current system 
This shows that software is not merely incidental to the functioning of the ex-
isting financial system, but can be considered intrinsic to it
For example, messages in the system have to conform to the format set out in 
the technical standards The standards themselves are part of the legal agreement 
to which the members agree when they join the system However the primary 
method of enforcement of the standards on message format is not through the 
legal agreement, but through the software itself
If a message is incorrectly formatted, it will be rejected by the system directly 
and the payment will not work This is, in a sense, a method of enforcement The 
rules are set in the technical standards and they are enforced primarily by the 
software
Foreign exchange settlement – PvP
Settlement risk in foreign exchange transactions occurs when one party to the 
transaction has to send one currency before receiving the other The most famous 
example of this risk materialising is from 1974, when Herstatt Bank in what was 
then West Germany went bankrupt Payments to counterparties failed because 
Figure 3.1: Retail payment system structure
 3 See Visa contactless payments technical standards:  Visa website:  Technology 







of Herstatt’s insolvency between when the Deutschmarks were received in the 
European morning and when the US dollars were due to be paid in New York
The solution to this problem is PvP This process ensures that both payments 
have to be received from the counterparties before either can be paid In the ex-
isting financial system this function is performed by an institution called CLS4
CLS works by maintaining reserve accounts at the central banks of issue 
for 18 currencies Members hold accounts at CLS and it ensures that when 
two currencies are swapped, both members have the funds to complete the 
transactions This setup ensures that so- called Herstatt risk is eliminated as, un-
like a normal bank, CLS does not have any other business that could incur losses 
capable of causing insolvency and the use of central bank money for CLS ac-
counts minimises credit risk for money held there
Figure 32 shows a simplified example of how CLS foreign exchange settle-
ment works In this case, User A and User B wish to settle a US dollar/ euro trans-
action using CLS They do so via their banks, Member 1 and Member 2, which 
are both direct members of CLS CLS has several members that offer settlement 
services to their customers, and in fact there may be a longer chain of intermedi-
ation that shown in  figure 32
 4 Official website: https:// wwwcls- groupcom
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Both the euros and US dollars are held at CLS in credit- risk free reserve accounts at 
the central bank of issue, and neither of the payments can move until the money is in 
the CLS account This eliminates the risk of one leg of the transaction happening before 
the other and the intermediating entity failing before paying out to the end users
This is the institutional method of eliminating risk, essentially creating a low- 
risk, trusted third party that can accept custody of both assets – currencies in the 
case of CLS – and only swap them when both have been received
Existing securities settlement – DvP
Securities settlement or DvP works much like PvP in foreign exchange The chal-
lenge is the same – two digital assets that need to be swapped simultaneously – and 
the solution is similar
Securities settlement sits at the heart of market- based finance Central securities 
depositories (CSDs) store records of both shares and bonds When a share or a bond 
is traded, the essence of the transaction is swapping an agreed amount of money for 
a specified number of securities
Now that the financial system is completely digitised, the challenge for those 
trading securities is to ensure that the money and the asset are exchanged simulta-
neously If there were only two participants, someone would have to go first, creating 
the risk that the counterparty would receive the money but not send the securities
In the existing financial system, this problem has an institutional solution – the 
CSD In essence, the CSD stands between sellers and buyers, holding cash and secu-
rities and only swapping them when both have been received As with CLS, end 
users do not interact directly with the CSD, but through CSD members that provide 
access to these services CSD members are normally large financial institutions, and 
CSD end users are non- financial firms and individuals
In the example illustrated in Figure 33, User A and User B are settling a securities 
trade In this case, they access the CSD via their banks, which are direct members of 
the CSD Once the trade has been agreed to, the CSD executes the transaction As 
with CLS, this is a simplified example as there can be longer chains of intermedia-
tion between the end users and CSD members Also, any securities trade is likely to 
include an exchange but this part of the process has also been omitted for simplicity
Systemically important financial market infrastructures (FMIs) such 
as CLS and CSDs are governed by the Principles for Financial Market 
Infrastructures (PFMIs),5 issued by the Committee on Payments and Market 
 5 Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, ‘Principles for Financial Market 







Infrastructures6 Principle 9 requires FMIs to settle transactions in central bank 
money where practical and available As CSDs hold the master record of the 
securities being traded and have access to central bank money, it means that 
both legs of the transaction can be settled with minimum risk to the end users
3.2  Digital currencies
The original purpose of Bitcoin was simple  – digital payments without 
institutions The first sentence in its whitepaper describes it as ‘a purely peer- 
to- peer version of electronic cash [that] would allow online payments to be sent 
directly from one party to another without going through a financial institu-
tion’7 Understanding this point is key to understanding the impact of digital 
currencies on the financial system It is about a rebalancing between institutions 
and software
Figure 3.3: Securities settlement
 6 See BIS website: CPMI - Overview, https:// wwwbisorg/ cpmi/ about/ overviewhtm
 7 Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer- to- Peer Electronic Cash System, March 2009, p 1, 
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Digital currencies like Bitcoin are fundamentally different in that the rules 
of the system are intrinsic to the software and enforcement is carried out by 
machines running the software – it does not rely on any external rules, or on 
legal agreements or institutions to enforce them
Another significant change introduced by digital currencies is programma-
bility Until Bitcoin emerged, payment systems had a single instruction – send 
amount X from A to B There are two ways of thinking about this change One 
is to say that existing payment systems had no programmability and that Bitcoin 
introduced the entire concept The other view is to consider the command ‘send 
amount X from A to B’ a very simple form of programmability, in which the only 
variables are the amount, sender and recipient
The latter view is probably closer to reality, as most payments in existing pay-
ment systems are executed end- to- end by computers, and, in this narrow sense, 
are akin to Bitcoin transactions – the difference being the institutional architec-
ture surrounding the technology
Transactions
Bitcoin transactions are structured around inputs and outputs The inputs are the 
outputs from earlier transactions that have not yet been spent – so called unspent 
transaction outputs (UTXOs) and the outputs are the addresses that will control 
the bitcoin in the transaction once it has been processed
Within the inputs and outputs of the transaction is further information: data 
that satisfies requirements of the input’s restriction is added to the input, and 
new requirements are added to the output The examples below will describe 
the types of digital signatures and preimages that are commonly used to restrict 
outputs This locking and unlocking process is key to understanding how 
programmability in Bitcoin works and how it could work for a CBDC
In this chapter, we will look at three elements of Bitcoin programmability – 
signature locks, timelocks and hashlocks – that can be used to implement DvP 
and PvP in a way that shifts enforcement to the software
Signature locks
The signature lock implements the instruction ‘send amount X from A to B’ – 
essentially replicating the basic function of existing payment systems
Bitcoin transactions do not require a signature lock If you have bitcoin in 
your wallet it is perfectly possible to create an output without a signature lock 
and submit it to the network This means anyone who sees the output can claim 




As this type of transaction is not particularly useful, the vast majority of bitcoin 
transactions use signature locks
Signature locks use public key cryptography to create and verify signatures 
Public key cryptography works by creating a keypair – the secret key (SK) and 
the public key (PK) that is derived from it This is a one- way function; the PK is 
easily derived from the SK but it is computationally infeasible to derive the SK 
from the PK
The SK is created by the sender and kept secret – as the name suggests – so it 
can be used to create signatures that, when combined with the PK, allow anyone 
to verify that the signature and message were created using the corresponding SK
The PK is made available to the network with the transaction input to verify 
the signature The SK is applied to the transaction to create the digital signature 
that will be submitted to the network with the transaction This demonstrates 
that the user who created the transaction has the authority to spend the coins in 
the transaction input
Figure 34 shows how the transaction is assembled The first element is the 
transaction input which is the amount to be spent in the transaction and the 
Figure 3.4: Constructing a transaction
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corresponding public key The second element is the script, in this case a signa-
ture lock for the PK to which the money is being sent The SK is then applied to 
these elements to create the third element, the signature These three elements 
are then combined into a transaction, which can be submitted to the network
For the sake of simplicity,  figure 34 shows a single input and output In reality 
there would likely be multiple inputs and outputs for each transaction
Timelocks
Adding a timelock to a transaction allows payments to take the format ‘send 
amount X from A to B not before time Y’ Implementing this requires an addi-
tional script to be added to the transaction alongside the signature lock
Figure 35 shows the transaction with a timelock added The effect of adding 
the timelock script is to delay the transaction Delaying a payment until an 
agreed time is useful by itself, but when combined with a hashlock – described 
in the next section – it is an important element of implementing DvP and PvP 
using digital currencies






There are also relative and absolute timelocks An absolute timelock specifies 
a certain date after which the timelock expires and a relative timelock specifies 
a certain amount of elapsed time after the transaction (eg, 7 days) after which 
the transaction can be spent These are sometimes interchangeable, but both are 
needed and used in lightning transactions and the difference is important
Hashlocks
Hashlocks allow us to implement the function ‘send amount X from A to B if 
they know preimage Z’ At first sight this function may not appear to have a great 
deal of utility but when combined with timelocks and signature locks it is an 
important element of making PvP and DvP function
Hash functions are at the core of hashlocks A hash function takes an input of 
arbitrary length and produces a fixed- length output This is a one- way function 
in that it is easy to calculate the hash from the input but computationally infea-
sible to calculate the message from the hash
Figure 36 demonstrates the process using the SHA- 256 hash function The 
input, ‘hello’ in this case – commonly known as the preimage – is entered into 
the hash function and produces the hash ‘2cf … 824’ The same preimage will 
always produce the same hash and even a tiny change in the preimage will pro-
duce a completely different hash
The application of hash functions to hashlocks allow transactions to be set up 
which require both a digital signature and knowledge of a secret In Figure 37 
above, the hashlock uses the hash of the secret Z and can only be spent when the 
recipient has Z revealed to them
The purpose of doing so is to understand the degree of programmability 
required to replicate useful functions of the existing financial system This will 
help us to assess the degree of functionality that is desirable in a CBDC and the 
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Digital currency generations
From the release of the Bitcoin whitepaper in late 2008 to 2020, there have been 
two distinct generations of digital currency platforms Bitcoin and other dig-
ital currencies cloned from its code represent the first generation Two design 
choices characterise Bitcoin, one is that the scripting language is deliberately 
simple and is not Turing complete That is to say that it cannot be used to per-
form any arbitrary calculation – for example, there is no loop function in Bitcoin 
script The second design choice is that Bitcoin is difficult to change so adding 
this functionality is very unlikely
The difficulty of significantly altering Bitcoin led to the second generation of 
digital currencies led by those who wanted to experiment with a broader fea-
ture set than would exist in Bitcoin One notable example from the second gen-
eration is Ethereum, which includes a programming language which is much 
more expressive than Bitcoin, including Turing completeness The result is that 
Ethereum smart contracts can have much greater functionality, although this 





In any software system there is an essential trade- off between functionality 
and security The more functionality, the greater the chance the developer of the 
system makes a mistake These mistakes weaken the system in two ways One is 
that a bug in a smart contract can cause significant losses and undermine trust in 
the system as a whole because of a mistake made in the code Adding complexity 
to the system makes it increasingly difficult for programmers to predict all the 
possible behaviours of a piece of code and avoid writing something that causes 
a problem
The other is deliberate attack Mistakes may not cause the system to spontane-
ously fail, but could create a vulnerability that an attacker can exploit Digital 
currencies are a prime target for these types of attack because they are money 
and the incentive has risen with their value since Bitcoin first emerged more than 
a decade ago
The question is what can be learned from the first two generations of digital 
currencies when designing the third generation of digital currencies – CBDC
3.3  CBDC – The foundation of the new financial system
CBDC will form the foundation of a new financial system Its design will 
have a profound impact on the shape of anything built on top of it The pri-
mary requirements any CBDC will have to meet when providing the desired 
functionality to the new system are security, resilience, performance and 
adaptability Meeting these goals will determine the design decisions made 
for a CBDC
CBDC requirements
Security is the most important requirement in a CBDC Central bank money 
is at the foundation of the financial system and any system that is used to 
transact with it must be secure CBDC is another form of central bank money 
and has to have the highest level of security This is the major consideration 
when addressing CBDC design The trade- off being made is attack surface and 
functionality, the question is what is the maximum useful functionality avail-
able in the system for the simplest possible design so as to minimise the attack 
surface of the system
CBDC has to be resilient as well as secure Any CBDC system has to be able 
to withstand failure in any part of the system and continue functioning A lot of 
the debate around CBDC concerns whether it should have a distributed ledger 
or not In practice, every CBDC system will have multiple copies of the ledger 
 
 
Central Bank Digital Currency and the Future Financial System 87
because having a single copy is too great a risk if that ledger failed The only ques-
tion is how this redundancy is implemented Increasing the number of copies of 
the ledger running in parallel increases the resilience of the system but there is a 
trade- off with performance The real questions are what the degree of decentral-
ization is, who can read and maintain copies of the ledger, and who can write to 
the ledger How these capabilities are divided in the system is a policy question 
for the central bank – for example, whether the CBDC ledger should be public 
or private
Performance is another key requirement Ultimately a CBDC has to be 
capable of supporting every payment in the financial system – retail and whole-
sale That does not necessarily mean that retail and wholesale CBDC have to 
be the same system, it is possible that two separate systems running in parallel 
could serve these two purposes, it is however unknown at this stage whether 
the distinction between retail and wholesale will persist into the future The 
key issue when considering performance is what proportion of transactions 
pass through the core CBDC ledger Existing high throughput payment sys-
tems use databases to run the ledger With a CBDC, there are two approaches 
to scaling – one is to put as much as possible through the core ledger and focus 
on making the database as high- performance as possible The alternative ap-
proach is to develop a system in which the CBDC acts as the core upon which a 
second layer can be built to scale up the larger system The two- layer approach 
has architectural implications, as the core system will need sufficient function-
ality to facilitate the second layer
The demands on a CBDC will alter over time Any CBDC needs to be capable 
of adapting as the demands on it change The goal is to create a CBDC system 
that does not need to be replaced every 20– 30 years, as current systems do, but 
one that can be altered incrementally over time in response to new requirements 
as they emerge For example, the CBDC needs to be designed in such a way 
that it can be implemented in different programming languages so that as older 
languages fall out of use, they can be replaced
This avoids a current problem in the financial system whereby many legacy 
systems still rely on COBOL, though there is little continuing support for the 
language Another aspect of adaptability is supporting innovation It is impos-
sible to predict at this stage all the uses to which a CBDC could be put The 
larger goal of introducing a CBDC is to improve the functioning of the financial 
system This means supporting an environment in which beneficial innovation 
can flourish
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Vision of the new financial system
A clear vision of what the future financial system should look like is also funda-
mental to CBDC design The ultimate goal is a financial system that has lower 
risk and greater competition
This vision of the future financial system supported by a CBDC matters 
because it will affect how the CBDC is designed If the existing financial system 
is taken as the template for the new financial system, then all the existing com-
plexity of the system would have to be replicated Since the crisis, policymakers 
have repeatedly expressed a desire for a simpler financial system with greater 
transparency and less risk8 In this respect, the design of the financial system is 
similar to the design of a software system – greater complexity means more risk 
Any CBDC design should support this larger policy goal of creating a simpler 
and less risky financial system
Making the financial system more competitive is another important goal One 
of the persistent problems in the financial system is the lack of competition and 
the rent extraction which results9 Creating a CBDC system with a structure that 
reduces switching costs is important to making the overall financial system more 
competitive In the next section we will look at some specific examples of this 
arising from how the CBDC is designed
Another important issue to address is the balance of responsibilities between 
the central bank and the private sector While the overall strategic goal is to 
simplify the financial system, the new system will still have to be capable of 
supporting useful innovation This means it will change over time and that from 
the start the CBDC will have to be set up to facilitate this as not all the possible 
future use cases can be foreseen from the start While the new financial system 
should be simpler than the existing system,, complexity cannot be completely 
eliminated Private sector innovation will mean a set of functions being built on 
top of the CBDC which are more complex than the core system This leads to 
the final issue of how to synthesise all we currently know about existing digital 
 8 See for example Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, The Regulatory 
Framework: Balancing Risk Sensitivity, Simplicity and Comparability, Discussion Paper, 
July 2013, https:// wwwbisorg/ publ/ bcbs258htm
 9 For example antitrust cases against Visa brought by the US Department of Justice (US 
Department of Justice website: U.S. v. VISA U.S.A., et al., https:// wwwjusticegov/ 
atr/ case/ us- v- visa- usa- et- al); and against Mastercard by the European Commission 
(European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Accepts Commitments by Mastercard 
and Visa to Cut Inter- Regional Interchange Fees, 29 April 2019, https:// eceuropaeu/ 
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currencies, CBDC requirements and the vision of the future financial system 
into a viable CBDC design that takes all these considerations in to account
Implications for CBDC design
Put together, the CBDC requirements and the vision of the future financial 
system point towards a CBDC with a simple design The central bank should 
operate a small and resilient CBDC core that can facilitate other parts of the 
financial system, which can offer user- facing services and build greater com-
plexity on top where needed The core CBDC system can then rely on a second 
layer to scale the system rather than attempting to run everything through the 
core ledger This approach is in keeping with the existing role of a central bank 
in the financial system, in which the core infrastructure is kept simple and fast, 
with the rest of the system built on top
As CBDC is the third generation of digital currencies, it can learn the lessons 
of the first two generations The most important lesson to learn is that rela-
tively little programmability is required to implement useful functions such as 
a second layer, PvP and DvP All a CBDC needs in the core system at this stage 
is signature locks, hashlocks and timelocks, which have been described in detail 
above We learnt that most of the first generation functions were never actually 
used in practice and that all the useful features could be implemented with these 
three functions
The added programmability in the second generation of digital currencies 
increased both complexity and the attack surface while adding features that will 
be unnecessary for a CBDC, where security is the highest priority The overall 
lesson for CBDC from the first two generations of digital currencies is; less, 
not more
3.4  The new financial system
In this section, we will take up the three examples addressed in the first part of 
the  chapter – payments, PvP and DvP – to see how the new financial system 
could function with a CBDC and the effects this could have on its structure
Payments
Any CBDC has to be designed to support the bulk of payments in the economy 
This implies the system as a whole will have to process a very large volume of 





main ledger operated by the central bank itself (the first layer) In such a setup, 
there would still be a role for the private sector in provide user- facing services 
such as wallets, point of sale and online payments processing, but every transac-
tion, no matter how small, would hit the CBDC ledger The core CBDC database 
could be optimised, but it would still be very difficult to scale to a point in which 
the tiniest payments were being processed directly by the central bank
The alternative setup would be to structure the system to resemble the way 
Bitcoin supports payment channels, most notably the lightning network10 In this 
design, the CBDC would process the larger transactions required to open and 
close payment channels The central bank would focus on operating the core 
CBDC ledger and accepting that scaling the system falls to supporting an active 
second- layer network of payment channels, rather than pushing all the transac-
tion processing into the core CBDC database The advantage of this approach is 
that scaling the system to accommodate even micropayments across the whole 
economy becomes a much more viable proposition and does not put as much 
strain on the central bank system
In addition to the scaling advantages of using a two- layer network, there are 
also competition benefits if the system is set up correctly A two- layer network 
functions much like the Internet itself When you visit a website, the data request 
between your computer (the client) and the website (the server) is routed through 
a number of different intermediating machines (routers), as is the data the server 
returns to the client to display the website As with data on the Internet, a two- 
layer payment is routed through a number of different nodes before reaching its 
destination Each node in the network will charge a small fee for routing the pay-
ment, making node provision a viable business Figure 38 shows how two- layer 
routing works for CBDCs The customer’s wallet software calculates the fastest 
and cheapest route to get the payment to the merchant and executes the multi- 
hop payment The payment channels between the nodes are anchored to the 
first- layer CBDC ledger with transactions that use signature locks and timelocks 
to function
The competition advantage comes in by making it easy for the customer to 
switch between different nodes from one payment to the next If any node in 
the system starts to overcharge relative to its peers, it will receive little traffic as 
the customer’s wallet software routes around it to a cheaper option Figure 39 
 10 Joseph Poon and Thaddeus Dryja, The Bitcoin Lightning Network: Scalable Off- Chain 
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shows the payment being routed using a different path between customer and 
merchant, as the orange node in the original path raises its routing fee too high
This system structure for second- layer payments in CBDC makes switching 
very low- cost and, as a result, facilitates competition This is in contrast to ex-
isting payment networks in which a single provider routes the money from cus-
tomer to merchant and the very high switching costs mean that fees can rise with 
little check from competition
While the technology facilitates this increased competition it would also need 
a concerted policy focus to ensure that all the nodes were not consolidated into 
a single provider There will be considerable incentive to do this, as once all the 
nodes between customers and merchants are controlled by a single entity, the 
rent- seeking that we see in the current system would rapidly return, regardless 
Figure 3.8: Payment routing




of the underlying technological architecture This demonstrates that new tech-
nology alone will not solve the problems we have in the financial system if it is 
not combined with effective policy New technology creates the opportunity to 
build a better system – it does not guarantee it
PvP in a CBDC environment
Implementing PvP using a CBDC requires a combination of signature locks, 
hashlocks and timelocks in the core ledgers These are simple elements of 
programmability and can be implemented in a CBDC without creating a signifi-
cant attack surface as the functionality in the core system is deliberately limited
Figure  310 shows a simplified model of how Hashed Timelock Contracts 
(HTLCs)11 can be used to implement PvP settlement with two different CBDCs 
In this model it is assumed that both CBDCs have implemented the same basic 
functionality of signature locks, timelocks and hashlocks, such that the same 
HTLC Secret Z can be used in both transactions HTLC Secret Z is the key that 
unlocks both transactions and, when combined with timelocks, ensures that both 
users can have confidence that both legs of the transaction will settle automat-
ically The HTLCs allow both CBDC systems to synchronise the two matching 
transactions without any direct link between the two underlying CBDCs
This is a simplified model as in reality, the transaction would not settle directly 
between the two users because currency transactions would still need market- 
makers This highlights an important point about CBDC: its purpose is not to 
eliminate intermediation but to change its nature such that risk is reduced and 
competition is increased As with the payment routing described above, the goal 
of CBDC, or a system of multiple CBDCs in this case, is to support a new finan-
cial system to develop around it
While the underlying CBDC ledgers can operate completely independent 
of each other in this setup, the issuing central banks would have to agree on 
some common standards on how signature locks, hashlocks and timelocks 
are implemented in their systems such that this cross- currency settlement 
could work
Allowing the CBDC systems to interoperate would bring a great deal of ben-
efit to the system as a whole, and an important part of CBDC prototyping at 
different central banks should be experimenting with how these standards could 
 11 For an explanation of how HTLCs work at a technical level see part 4 of Joseph 
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be developed There has already been international cooperation between central 
banks undertaking CBDC research, for example between the ECB and Bank of 
Japan,12 as well as the Monetary Authority of Singapore and Bank of Canada13 
Future CBDC research should build on these cross- border experiments to deter-
mine how different underlying CBDC systems can interact with each other suc-
cessfully while retaining their independence from each other
DvP in a CBDC environment
From a practical perspective, as with the existing financial system, DvP uses 
the same underlying method as PvP (hashed timelock contracts) To a machine 
a ledger of securities and a CBDC ledger are fundamentally the same – just a 
structured list of records If the securities ledger is set up to facilitate hashlocks, 
timelocks and signature locks, then it will be relatively easy to implement DvP It 
Figure 3.10: PvP using HTLCs
 12 Bank of Japan, Project Stella: the ECB and the Bank of Japan Release Joint Report on 
Distributed Ledger Technology (Phase 4), 12 February 2020, https:// wwwbojorjp/ en/ 
announcements/ release_ 2020/ rel200212ahtm
 13 Monetary Authority of Singapore, Central Banks of Canada and Singapore Conduct 
Successful Experiment for Cross- Border Payments Using Distributed Ledger Technology, 
2  May  2019, https:// wwwmasgovsg/ news/ media- releases/ 2019/ central- banks- of- 







may even be possible for the securities ledger to make use of an adapted version 
of an open source CBDC codebase to run its ledger
Although a modified version of the CBDC ledger could be used to issue 
securities, the difference would be the structure of the issuer itself With a 
CBDC this is straightforward, the issuer is the central bank Securities have 
different types of issuer, the majority of them private entities It is possible 
that companies may opt to manage the ledgers of their shares and bonds in 
issue themselves rather than delegating the task to a CSD The difference is 
that unlike a central bank, which has the authority to issue a CBDC itself, 
private companies need authorization from securities regulators to offer their 
financial assets for sale publicly
Securities regulators could allow companies to run their own ledgers or 
license third parties to do it on the companies’ behalf as it may be that some 
companies do not wish to run their own securities ledgers and delegate this 
to another entity The overall effect is to create a financial system with greater 
decentralization and more resembles a peer- to- peer network than the current 
hub and spoke model with large entities dominating the financial system and the 
negative systemic effects that brings
Moving towards this model of a decentralised financial system requires a 
number of changes, one of which is allowing securities settlement to function 
in a more decentralised way Once companies have the option of hosting their 
own ledgers of shares and bonds, it puts competitive pressure on incumbent 
intermediaries in the financial system to lower their prices
While it is true that trading and settlement of vanilla securities is relatively 
low cost, from a technological perspective it makes sense to automate the sim-
pler aspects of the financial system such as DvP before moving on to the more 
complex parts Building this foundation will also yield useful insights into how 
the rest of the system should be designed
Shape of the new financial system
Money and relatively simple financial instruments such as securities form the 
foundation of the financial system We can see how creating CBDCs and trading 
securities using similar ledgers can alter the structure of the system such that it 
resembles a peer- to- peer network more closely In such a system, multiple enti-
ties would compete to provide services in which switching costs are much lower 
This contrasts with the current financial system, which, while still a network, 
has more of a hub- and- spoke model in which powerful intermediaries act as 
gatekeepers for different parts of the financial system
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The steps described in this chapter are aimed at the foundational layers of the 
financial system CBDCs offers central banks and other policymakers a unique 
opportunity to re- engineer the financial system in a way that regulations alone 
do not This does not mean that regulations will not have a part to play In ad-
dition to competition enforcement to ensure that rent extraction does not creep 
back into the system through consolidation of competing services, financial 
regulations can also play a beneficial role
More decentralised technological architecture alone will not be sufficient to 
maintain a flatter structure to the financial system Regulation is still needed 
to prevent entities emerging in the new financial system that are too big to fail 
A key element of financial services reform is to create a new financial system 
in which failure of individual firms cannot threaten the integrity of the wider 
system Failure of individual firms is, in fact, desirable as free entry and exit are a 
critical aspect of maintaining a competitive market structure
Another method through which CBDC can improve the financial system 
is data standards By creating the foundation of the new financial system, cen-
tral banks can have considerable influence on how the rest of the system looks 
through the operation of both standards and open source software In the DvP 
section above, we described how companies could adapt CBDC software to dif-
ferent use cases, such as securities The software defines how the data is struc-
tured and passed through the system, so by setting the standards for CBDC as 
the foundation of the system, the central bank influences how the rest of the 
system will work from a technical perspective
Making the data the financial system runs on more standardised and machine- 
tractable creates the opportunity for better tools and greater automation A long- 
standing goal for macroprudential policymakers has been a ‘weather map’ of 
the financial system that allows them to see major risk in the system as a whole, 
rather than trying to piece it together from data on individual firms14 The key 
to making this approach work is high- quality standardised data that can be 
processed into a picture of the whole financial system
Improved data quality also allows the financial system to make more use of 
machine learning and artificial intelligence to operate the financial system We 
can see the start of this already in the existing financial system, with algorithmic 
 14 Andrew Haldane, Tails of the Unexpected, paper presented at the conference ‘The 
Credit Crisis Five Years On: Unpacking the Crisis’, held at the University of Edinburgh 
Business School, 8– 9  June  2012, https:// wwwbankofenglandcouk/ speech/ 2012/ 




trading and greater automation in credit risk assessment While human influence 
is still needed in these systems to ensure that bias from the data is not simply 
encoded into an algorithm, our aim for the new financial system is performing 
its necessary functions in the most efficient way possible Ultimately the financial 
system is a set of digital records that need to be reliably updated and maintained 
The more we can simplify and automate this record- keeping the more efficient 
it will be CBDC is not a complete solution but it is the key to unlocking the 
benefits of a new financial system that extracts less and serves better
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Chapter 4: Central Bank Digital Currencies 
and Law
This chapter examines the legal issues surrounding a ‘retail’ central bank dig-
ital currency (CBDC) – one that is used by consumers on a day- to- day basis as 
an alternative to cash1 Most discussions about CBDC focus on its purported 
benefits and initial design questions Little is written about how existing laws 
and regulations will extend to CBDCs or what new regulations will have to be 
implemented2 This chapter engages in that analysis
The analysis assumes that future retail CBDCs will be account- based, 
meaning the currency will be represented by book entries in accounts that are 
held and managed by banks The central bank will prescribe interest rates on 
these accounts, and rules and regulations for their governance and use Much 
of the existing infrastructure of both central and commercial banks3 – as well 
as the widespread application of that infrastructure to so- called ‘wholesale’ 
electronic funds transfers between businesses and financial institutions4  – is 
already account- based,5 and much of the recent literature on CBDC assumes the 
account- based system6
 1 Steven L Schwarcz is the Stanley A Star Distinguished Professor of Law & Business 
at Duke University School of Law and Senior Fellow at the Centre for International 
Governance Innovation (CIGI) The author would thank Benjamin Geva and Lev 
Menand for excellent comments and Eric Horsley and Carson Calloway for invaluable 
research assistance
 2 Patrycja Beniak, ‘Central Bank Digital Currency and Monetary Policy: A Literature 
Review’, in MPRA Papers, No 96663, 26 October 2019, p 2, https:// mpraubuni- 
muenchende/ 96663
 3 For convenience, this chapter refers to commercial banks broadly, as including all 
non- governmental banks
 4 See Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), Prefatory Note
 5 Financial institutions in the United States, for example, hold accounts at the Federal 
Reserve and use Fedwire to transfer money between these accounts See Fedwire Funds 
Service website: Product Sheet, https:// wwwfrbservicesorg/ assets/ financial- services/ 
wires/ fundspdf
 6 See, eg, Morgan Ricks, John Crawford and Lev Menand, ‘FedAccounts:  Digital 
Dollars’, in George Washington Law Review, forthcoming (15 April 2020), https:// ssrn















A retail account- based CBDC would likely use technologies largely already in 
place at banks and merely extend their access to a wider user base That is because 
any account- based digital currency, whether wholesale or retail,7 would operate 
through electronic funds transfers8 To that extent, digital currency transfers are 
synonymous with electronic funds transfers
This calls into question why retail CBDC should be regulated any differently 
than wholesale electronic funds transfers As this chapter will show, it should not 
generally be regulated differently – with relatively few exceptions, such as con-
sumer protection
Two primary sources of regulation currently govern wholesale electronic 
funds transfers Those funds transfers are governed in the European Union by 
the European Directive on payment services in EU internal markets (the ‘EU 
Directive’), and in the United States by Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial 
Code (UCC) As this chapter will show, Article 4A is the more relevant regulatory 
The digital currency being developed by the People’s Bank of China appears to be an 
account- based system, though details remain confidential Cf Anton N Didenko et al, 
‘After Libra, Digital Yuan and COVID- 19: Central Bank Digital Currencies and the New 
World of Money and Payment Systems’, in UNSW Law Research Series, No 65/ 2020 
(30 September 2020), https:// ssrncom/ abstract=3622311 (discussing how China’s dig-
ital currency will be transferred) Although some claim that consumers lacking a bank 
account will be able to use China’s digital currency, the details are sparse See Karen 
Yeung, ‘What Is China’s Cryptocurrency Alternative Sovereign Digital Currency and 
Why Is It Not Like Bitcoin?’, in South China Morning Post, 13 May 2020, https:// www
scmpcom/ economy/ china- economy/ article/ 3083952/ what- chinas- cryptocurrency- 
sovereign- digital- currency- and- why (claiming digital wallets can be used without 
linking to a bank account) But cf Benjamin Geva, ‘Virtual Currencies and the State’, 
in Just Money, 22 April 2020, https:// wpme/ paGDrD- 10W (arguing that efficiency 
gains from disintermediation favor token- based CBDCs, though with concomitant 
risks) See also the chapter by Robleh Ali in this volume
 7 All funds transfers can be classified as either wholesale or retail Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS), Annual Economic Report 2020, 30 June 2020, p 68, https:// wwwbis
org/ publ/ arpdf/ ar2020ehtm
 8 Cf Charles M  Kahn and William Roberds, ‘The Design of Wholesale Payments 
Networks: The Importance of Incentives’, in Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic 
Review, Vol 84, No 3 (1999), p  30– 39, https:// wwwfrbatlantaorg/ research/ 
publications/ economic- review/ 1999/ q3/ vol84no3_ design- of- wholesale- payments- 
networkaspx; Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, ‘The Role of Central 
Bank Money in Payment Systems’, in CPMI Papers, No 55 (12 August 2003), https:// 
wwwbisorg/ cpmi/ publ/ d55htm (observing that wholesale funds transfers between 
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precedent because it covers in much greater depth the rights, obligations, and 
liabilities of banks and other intermediaries involved with the transfers9 Article 
4A’s regulatory framework for wholesale wire transfers also has been widely 
influential both within the United States and internationally10
In the United States, Article 4A has been enacted in all 50 states11 and 
governs both of the principal electronic payment systems – the Federal Reserve 
wire transfer network (Fedwire), and the New York Clearing House Interbank 
Payments System (CHIPS)12 Internationally, Article 4A and the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law’s (UNCITRAL) Model Law on 
International Credit Transfers use the same framework for classifying entities 
and transactions in wire transfers (for example, both focus on credit transfers and 
speak in terms of originators/ beneficiaries and payment orders to banks)13 Also, 
both Article 4A and UNCITRAL’s Model Law influenced the EU Directive14 
 9 The European Directive covers both credit and debit transfers, whereas Article 4A 
covers only credit transfers See Benjamin Geva, ‘Payment Transactions under the 
EU Second Payment Services Directive— An Outsider’s View’, in Texas International 
Law Journal, Vol 54, No 2 (2019), p 215, https:// digitalcommonsosgoodeyorkuca/ 
scholarly_ works/ 2718 However, the distinction between credit and debit transfers is 
not an organizational principle in the Directive Also, notwithstanding the Directive’s 
slightly broader coverage, it lacks depth compared to Article 4A
 10 Mark Sneddon, ‘The Effect of Uniform Commercial Code Article 4A on the Law of 
International Credit Transfers’, in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, Vol 29, No 3 
(April 1996), p 1111– 1112, https:// digitalcommonslmuedu/ llr/ vol29/ iss3/ 11; Barkley 
Clark and Barbara Clark, The Law of Bank Deposits, Collections and Credit Cards, 3rd 
ed, Boston, Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 1990, para 1702, (2)(d)
 11 Uniform Law Commission, UCC Article 4A, Funds Transfers, https:// wwwuniformlaws
org/ committees/ community- home?CommunityKey=2985cf6d- 9c22- 4abe- abf1- 
1f36f8a27201
 12 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), title 12, para 21025; Clearing House Interbank 
Payments System (CHIPS), Public Disclosure of Legal, Governance, Risk Management, 
and Operating Framework, June 2020, p  12, https:// wwwtheclearinghouseorg/ - / 
media/ new/ tch/ documents/ payment- systems/ chips_ public_ disclosure_ june_ 2020
pdf
 13 See generally Carl Felsenfeld, ‘The Compatibility of the UNICTRAL Model Law on 
International Credit Transfers with Article 4A of the UCC’, in Fordham Law Review, 
Vol 60, No 6 (1992), p 53– 75, https:// irlawnetfordhamedu/ flr/ vol60/ iss6/ 4
 14 Cf Mark Sneddon, ‘The Effect of Uniform Commercial Code Article 4A on the Law 
of International Credit Transfers’, cit, p 1109 (remarking on the influence of UCC 















Additionally, both Fedwire and CHIPS have choice- of- law provisions which 
specify that Article 4A will apply to all funds transfers processed in whole or in 
part by their systems15
Article 4A’s framework also includes a consistent vocabulary for describing 
funds transfers and a precise allocation of rights, obligations, and liabilities 
among participating financial institutions and their customers, who initiate and 
receive wire- transfer payments16 Transferring funds from one customer’s elec-
tronic bank account to that of another customer should be the same, in principle, 
whether the transfer is retail or wholesale17 A retail customer would initiate a 
funds transfer by sending a payment order to his bank; that bank would then 
(provided its customer’s account has sufficient funds) send a payment order 
through, for example, Fedwire to the beneficiary’s bank; and the beneficiary’s 
bank would (again, subject to receiving funds) credit the beneficiary’s account18
Thus, while Article 4A is designed for wholesale wire transfers, it should – at 
least with certain consumer- protection provisions, discussed below – provide a 
suitable regulatory framework for retail CBDC transactions To understand why, 
consider the key legal issues of a retail CBDC: (1) risk of loss; (2) counterfeiting 
protection; (3)  privacy and data keeping; (4)  anti- money laundering; and 
(5) consumer protection
 1) Risk of loss Risk of loss includes at least three risks: mistakenly transferring 
funds to the wrong person; fraud risk, including fraudulently transferring 
funds to a wrong person; and credit risk, including the risk of the ‘receiving 
bank’ paying out before being paid Article 4A covers these risks as follows19
 15 CFR, title 12, para 21025 (b)(2); CHIPS, Public Disclosure of Legal, Governance, Risk 
Management, and Operating Framework, cit, p 12
 16 See generally UCC para 4A Available in the Legal Information Institute (LII) web-
site: https:// wwwlawcornelledu/ ucc/ 4A
 17 Cf Morgan Ricks, John Crawford and Lev Menand, ‘FedAccounts: Digital Dollars’, cit, 
p 15 (arguing that retail CBDC transactions could use the same wire transfer system 
currently used by the central bank)
 18 Cf Federal Reserve Banks: FedNow Service Product Sheet, https:// wwwfrbservicesorg/ 
assets/ financial- services/ fednow/ fednow- product- sheetpdf (describing the payment 
flow for a credit transfer using the proposed FedNow interbank real- time settlement 
service, targeted to be available in 2023 or 2024, to enable financial institutions to 
deliver faster payment services to their customers)
 19 The EU Directive provides banks with less discretion in the choice to accept a pay-
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 (a) Mistaken transfer Under UCC para 4A– 207, a payment order with a 
nonexistent or unidentifiable person or account does not create a right in 
a person to receive the payment Where the name and account number 
are known to the beneficiary’s bank, however, that bank may pay the 
person referred to by the account number20
  One possible small adjustment appropriate to adapt Article 4A to regulate 
retail CBDC transactions is in para 4A– 207 Under subsection (a) of that 
section, if the name or bank account number of a payment order received 
by the beneficiary’s bank refers to a nonexistent or unidentifiable person 
or account, no person has the right as a beneficiary to receive the pay-
ment – except as provided in subsection (b) Subsection (b) provides that 
if the name and bank account number associated with a particular pay-
ment order refer – unbeknownst to the beneficiary’s bank – to different 
individuals (ie, the name to one person and the bank account number to 
another), the beneficiary’s bank may pay the person referred to by the ac-
count number21 This level of flexibility may make sense for wholesale wire 
transfers, because in larger transactions, especially business transactions, 
the parties may devote more care to provide the correct information – 
so errors should be relatively rare Retail wire transfers may be more 
error prone22 For that reason, at least from the customers’ standpoint, 
the stricter rule of subsection (a), that both the name and bank account 
number match, make sense Still, that rule should be balanced by banking 
realities At least currently, a ‘very large percentage of payment orders is-
sued to the beneficiary’s bank’ are ‘processed by automated means using 
machines capable of ’ identifying ‘the number of a bank account,’ and 
‘without human reading of the payment order itself’23
 (b) Fraud UCC paras 4A– 202 to 4A– 204 address authorization and accep-
tance of payment orders issued in the name of a customer UCC para 
4A– 202(a) points to the law of agency to resolve a dispute where the 
person identified as sender refuses to pay on the grounds that it did 
not authorize the payment order For example, if the payment order is 
 20 Cf infra notes 21– 22 and accompanying text (providing a more detailed explanation)
 21 UCC para 4A- 207(b)
 22 A retail customer, for example, may be more likely to make a mistake when wiring 20 
US dollars to a babysitter than a wholesale customer would be when wiring 25,000 US 
dollars to pay for a shipment of inventory
 23 Official Comment to UCC para 4A- 207, point 2 Available in the DC Law Library 










sent by an officer of a corporation, the question would be whether that 
officer is an agent of the corporation with the power to authorize pay-
ment orders on the corporation’s behalf More commonly, a bank and 
its customer agree to security procedures that, if followed, result in an 
authorized payment order24
 (c) Credit risk Under UCC para 4A– 405(d), a ‘funds- transfer system rule 
may provide that payments made to beneficiaries of funds transfers 
made through the system are provisional until receipt of payment by 
the beneficiary’s bank of the payment order it accepted’ UCC para 
405(d) continues by providing conditions that, if met, would entitle the 
beneficiary’s bank to a refund
 2) Counterfeiting protection Counterfeiting is defined as ‘the replication or 
manufacture of a financial instrument […] with the intent to defraud 
an individual, entity, or government’25 Traditionally, the counterfeiting 
risk for money has been concerned with illicit production of physical 
representations of the money, such as the unauthorized reproduction 
of US dollar bills The protections involve increasing the complexity 
and markings of bills26 These concerns have no obvious parallel for an 
account- based CBDC
  There are two possible ways to counterfeit an account- based CBDC, although 
both also could be classified as fraud: by double spending, and by making 
transfers involving an unverified account27 Double spending can occur when 
a payor uses the same money in an account to make two purchases before 
the transactions clear in the payment system28 Transfers involving an unver-
ified account can occur when a payee causes the bank to credit money from 
a phantom account, which only appears to exist, to the payee’s account and 
 24 UCC para 4A- 202(b)
 25 Ralph E McKinney et al, ‘The Evolution of Financial Instruments and the Legal 
Protection Against Counterfeiting: A Look at Coin, Paper, and Virtual Currencies’, in 
Journal of Law, Technology & Policy, No 2 (2015), p 299, http:// illinoisjltpcom/ journal/ 
wp- content/ uploads/ 2015/ 12/ McKinneypdf
 26 Ibid, p 302– 303
 27 See Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures, ‘Central Bank Digital 
Currencies’, in CPMI Papers, No 174 (12 March 2018), p 4, https:// wwwbisorg/ cpmi/ 
publ/ d174htm (observing that the form of verification needed differs between token- 
based and account- based money)
 28 Cf ibid, p 4, note 5 (observing the double spending problem for digital tokens) This 
chapter’s reference to double spending includes, of course, any multiple spending of 
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then quickly withdraws the money29 To the extent an account- based CBDC 
makes use of existing banking technology and systems (which is likely),30 
these counterfeiting risks should be comparable to counterfeiting risks in 
current wholesale electronic banking31
  Article 4A covers these counterfeiting risks It does not compel a bank to pro-
cess transactions under conditions that might result in double spending,32 such 
as when there are insufficient funds in an account33 Furthermore, existing 
account agreements authorize debits contingent on there being available bal-
ances34 The current banking system is thus already well guarded against the 
risk of double spending A retail CBDC modelled off the current electronic 
banking system should inherit the same (low) risk of double spending
  Likewise, Article 4A does not compel a bank to process transactions involving 
an unverified account A bank has no obligation to accept a payment order35 
Because acceptance obliges it to pay the receiving bank,36 a sending bank has 
 29 See, eg, Lily Hay Newman, ‘How Hackers Pulled Off a $20 Million Mexican Bank 
Heist’, in Wired, 15 March 2019, https:// wwwwiredcom/ story/ mexico- bank- hack 
(discussing a transfer initiated by hackers from a phantom account to a real account 
within the bank)
 30 Morgan Ricks, John Crawford and Lev Menand, ‘FedAccounts: Digital Dollars’, cit, p 3
 31 The security threat caused by a possible centralization of accounts in the central bank 
would still need to be considered
 32 Neither UCC Article 4A nor the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA) compels a bank 
to process a transaction when there are insufficient funds in an account Under UCC 
para 4A- 212, absent an explicit agreement, a bank has no duty to accept a received 
payment order The EFTA, as codified in part in the United States Code (USC), title 15, 
para 1693h (https:// wwwlawcornelledu/ uscode/ text/ 15/ 1693h), makes insufficient 
funds in a customer’s account an explicit exception to a bank’s liability for damages 
caused by a failure to make an electronic funds transfer
 33 Under UCC para 4A- 212, absent an explicit agreement, a bank has no duty to accept 
a received payment order The EFTA, as codified in part in USC, title 15, para 1693h, 
makes insufficient funds in a customer’s account an explicit exception to a bank’s lia-
bility for damages caused by a failure to make an electronic funds transfer
 34 Eg, Wells Fargo Bank, Deposit Account Agreement (Effective July 24, 2019), p 44, 
https:// wwwwellsfargocom/ fetch- pdf?formNumber=CCB2018C&subProductCode
=ANY Given both the legal framework (see UCC Article 4A, Prefatory Note) and the 
account agreements banks have crafted, double spending is a small risk in an account- 
based system where a third party— the bank— oversees a transaction
 35 Morgan Ricks, John Crawford and Lev Menand, ‘FedAccounts: Digital Dollars’, cit, p 3


















an incentive to ensure that funds are available for reimbursement before it 
accepts a payment order
 3) Privacy and data keeping Central bank digital currencies may help to cen-
tralize data about the money supply To the extent CBDC impacts privacy – 
for example, by making funds transfers easier to trace – how should privacy 
and access to capital be balanced? Governments generally protect their citi-
zens’ privacy better than private entities, such as a non- government sponsor 
of a digital currency37
  It also may be interesting to consider if a kind of central- commercial bank 
‘federalism’ is more effective when it comes to security measures to protect 
privacy If the account- based CBDC is a totally centralized system, then any 
security vulnerability is systemic, everyone will be affected However, if the 
account- based CBDC makes use of infrastructure and security measures at 
commercial banks, then a vulnerability at one bank would not necessarily 
be present at other commercial banks (because of the variability of security 
measures in place)
 4) Anti- money- laundering laws AML laws generally follow the recommendations 
of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an inter- governmental body38 The 
FATF seeks ‘to set standards and promote effective implementation of legal, 
regulatory and operational measures for combating money laundering, ter-
rorist financing and other related threats to the integrity of the international 
 37 Cf Federal Trade Commission, FTC Imposes $5 Billion Penalty and Sweeping New 
Privacy Restrictions on Facebook, 24 July 2019, https:// wwwftcgov/ node/ 1536925 (re-
porting that Facebook agreed to pay a penalty of 5 billion US dollars to settle charges 
that it ‘violated a 2012 FTC order by deceiving users about their ability to control 
the privacy of their personal information’); Natasha Lomas, ‘Libra, Facebook’s Global 
Digital Currency Plan, Is Fuzzy on Privacy, Watchdogs Warn’, in TechCrunch, 5August 
2019, https:// techcrunchcom/ ?p=1864705 (noting the lack of detailed information on 
Libra’s privacy protections and describing the concerns of a set of international pri-
vacy watchdogs); Spencer Bokat- Lindell, ‘Can We Trust Facebook to Run a Bank?’, in 
The New York Times, 24 October 2019, https:// nytims/ 32JdwNz (discussing privacy 
concerns over Libra)
 38 The FATF was established by the 1989 G- 7 Summit in Paris, with the mission of 
addressing the threat posed to the banking system and to financial institutions by 
money laundering Its mission expanded in 2001 to counter the use of the financial 
system for terrorism financing There currently are 39 members of the FATF, covering 
many of the largest financial hubs FATF website: History of the FATF, https:// www
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financial system’39 To this end, it makes recommendations for an AML legal 
framework in member countries40
  If the introduction of a CBDC leaves the commercial banking sector as the retail 
depository institutions, no change should be needed, in principle, to AML laws 
because the CBDC would not impact the FATF recommendations Changes to 
AML laws might be needed, though, if the CBDC scheme contemplates that 
retail CBDC account holders have accounts directly with the central bank; that 
would raise questions whether the central bank or commercial banks should be 
obligated to meet the recommendation’s requirements
  In practice, however, a retail CBDC might require certain changes to AML 
laws For example, FATF Recommendation 10 creates an obligation for finan-
cial institutions to conduct customer due diligence (also known as Know- 
Your- Customer (KYC) laws) If this recommendation requires every retail 
transaction to be scrutinized, it would impose high transaction costs due to the 
sheer volume of those transactions41 To reduce these costs, AML laws could 
place a floor on the value of transfers that would trigger the need to conduct 
customer due diligence42
 5) Consumer protection Although UCC Article 4A covers many domestic and 
international electronic funds transfers, it was designed for use by relatively 
sophisticated parties, such as businesses and financial institutions43 In the 
United States, the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA) governs a range 
of existing retail electronic funds transfers, including ATM deposits and 
 39 FATF website: What Do We Do, https:// wwwfatf- gafiorg/ about/ whatwedo
 40 FATF, The FATF Recommendations. International Standards on Combating Money 
Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation, June 2019, http:// www
fatf- gafiorg/ publications/ fatfrecommendations
 41 FATF Recommendation 17 (ibid, p 16) allows financial institutions to outsource 
their customer due diligence requirements to third parties; however, liability remains 
with the delegating party For a retail CBDC this could mean central banks are out-
sourcing customer due diligence to commercial banks In may be preferable, contra 
Recommendation 17, to have commercial banks responsible to the central bank for 
failed due diligence
 42 Cf CFR, title 31, para 1010311 (setting US reporting practices requiring financial 
institutions only to report ‘each deposit, withdrawal, exchange of currency or other 
payment or transfer, by, through, or to such financial institution which involves a 
transaction in currency of more than $10,000’)












withdrawals and most mobile payment apps (such as PayPal, Venmo, and 
Zelle)44
In contrast to Article 4A, the EFTA pays little attention to what electronic funds 
transfers consist of or how they are carried out; rather, the primary purpose of 
the EFTA is one of consumer protection: to give consumers certain rights when 
engaging in electronic funds transfers45 For example, the EFTA limits consumer 
liability for unauthorized transactions,46 ensures that banks adequately inform 
consumers of their rights,47 protects consumers from being charged excessive 
fees,48 and gives consumers a means of redressing erroneous transactions49
To illustrate these different regulatory approaches, assume a customer of Bank 
A accidently discloses information that enables a third party to make an unau-
thorized transaction Under Article 4A, the customer will be liable for the unau-
thorized transaction so long as Bank A, in good faith, follows a commercially 
reasonable, and mutually agreed upon, security procedure50 Under the EFTA, 
the customer’s liability for the unauthorized transaction is subject to a dollar 
limitation51 Another important difference between Article 4A and the EFTA 
is the extent to which customers and their banks can vary the terms of their 
agreements Article 4A affords much more flexibility to contractually vary the 
rights and obligations of a party to an electronic funds transfer So long as Article 
4A does not expressly provide otherwise, the terms of a funds transfer can be 
varied52 The EFTA does not permit consumer rights to be waived53
 44 CFR, title 12, para 2053 In part because of the Supremacy Clause of the US 
Constitution, the EFTA, which is federal law, supersedes inconsistent provisions of 
Article 4A, which is state law Cf UCC para 4A- 108 and Official Comment, point 1 
(stating and explaining the EFTA’s supremacy)
 45 USC, title 15, para 1693
 46 USC, title 15, para 1693g
 47 USC, title 15, para 1693c
 48 USC, title 15, para 1693o- 2
 49 USC, title 15, para 1693 f
 50 Francis J Facciolo, ‘Unauthorized Payment Transactions and Who Should Bear the 
Losses’, in Chicago- Kent Law Review, Vol 83, No 2 (April 2008), p 614, https:// schol-
arshipkentlawiitedu/ cklawreview/ vol83/ iss2/ 6
 51 USC, title 15, para 1693g(a) (limiting that liability to 50 US dollars if Bank A is prop-
erly notified of the unauthorized transaction, and otherwise 500 US dollars)
 52 UCC para 4A- 501
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These differences between Article 4A and the EFTA reflect their different 
purposes Article 4A was written with wholesale funds transactions in mind 
and contemplates sophisticated users CBDC regulation thus should draw from 
Article 4A to the extent such regulation governs how electronic funds transfers 
should occur  – through a series of payment orders between clearly defined 
parties  – and how generally to allocate rights and obligations between those 
parties In contrast, the EFTA was written to protect everyday retail customers, 
and this policy goal is reflected in provisions that limit consumer liabilities and 
protect their rights CBDC regulation thus also should draw from the EFTA to 
the extent regulators regard retail users of CBDC to need overriding consumer 
protection
This chapter has so far examined what law should apply to a retail CBDC 
A related issue is which regulators should apply that law Although that issue 
is largely beyond this chapter’s scope, a few observations are in order When 
international wholesale funds transfers are made, regulators may supervise the 
relevant aspects of the transfers at their national level Consider, for example, 
a cross- border funds transfer sent through the CHIPS clearing system54 from 
a CHIPS participant bank in the United States to a CHIPS participant bank in 
Germany55 Regulators in the United States would supervise the sending bank, 
and the Federal Reserve regulates the US activities of CHIPS56 Regulators in 
Germany, and Europe more broadly, presumably would supervise the receiving 
bank57 As a result, there is no current need for an international regulator to 
supervise cross- border wholesale electronic funds transfers, nor would there 
appear to be a need for such a regulator to supervise cross- border retail elec-
tronic funds transfers This would not rule out, of course, the potential value of 
 54 See supra notes 11– 14 and accompanying text
 55 Cf CHIPS, CHIPS Participants, last updated 14  August  2020, https:// www
theclearinghouseorg/ - / media/ new/ tch/ documents/ payment- systems/ chips_ 
participants_ revised_ 08- 14- 2020pdf (listing banks from multiple continents as 
participants in the CHIPS clearing system)
 56 Federal Reserve Board, Designated Financial Market Utilities, last updated 
29 January 2015, https:// wwwfederalreservegov/ paymentsystems/ designated_ fmu_ 
abouthtm; Congressional Research Service, ‘Who Regulates Who? An Overview of 
the US Financial Regulatory Framework’, in CRS Reports, 10 March 2020, https:// fas
org/ sgp/ crs/ misc/ R44918pdf
 57 Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, Banks & Financial Services Providers, updated 










establishing an inter- governmental body, like the FATF, to try to produce best- 
practice recommendations for international electronic funds transfers58
Conclusions
As this chapter has shown, a significant portion of the currency transfers among 
businesses and financial institutions already occur digitally The primary legal 
focus of enabling consumers to use central bank digital currency transfers on a 
day- to- day basis, as an alternative to cash, thus involves consumer protection
This chapter assumes the feasibility of technology required to manage such 
a real time, low- cost, retail CBDC This assumption appears to be realistic The 
Clearing House, a banking association and payments company that is owned by 
large commercial banks, has created its Real Time Payments (RTP) network to 
facilitate real- time digital retail funds transfers59 Though still in the planning 
stages, the Federal Reserve is working on its own interbank real- time funds 
transfer service60 And China is already testing a retail CBDC in four cities61
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Chapter 5: The Digital Euro: Challenges and 
Opportunities
Like other central banks, the European Central Bank (ECB) has been working on 
introducing a digital currency While a decision has not yet been made, a report 
has been presented for consultation on the various problems and issues that need 
to be addressed before launch1 The European Commission has also presented 
new draft regulations in the areas of digital finance and payments All these 
moves are intended to facilitate digital innovation in Europe, and to improve the 
quality and costs of payment services At the same time, there is a clear need to 
preserve the monetary integrity of the eurozone at a time when digital payment 
systems being launched by foreign central banks and big technology firms could 
seize a significant share of the domestic market
The development of the new currency is of particular strategic importance 
to the ECB, as it will further the process of integrating the eurozone pay-
ment system, which has already led to the introduction of TARGET 2 (T2) 
and TARGET 2 Securities (T2S) for the settlement of interbank payments and 
security transactions It could also reinforce its role as a catalyst of EU market 
integration The implementation of a digital currency, however, would face sev-
eral challenges, given the highly innovative nature of the instrument and the 
fragmentation of the payment systems and capital markets in Europe
This chapter will first discuss the implications of the digital transformation 
of payment systems for central banking It will then briefly analyse how the 
payment system landscape in Europe is evolving After that it will describe the 
main features of the digital currency proposed by the ECB and the place it would 
occupy in that landscape Next, it will present the main problems and risks asso-
ciated with the introduction of a digital euro, given the unique features of the 
European financial system, and will lay out measures and policies that could 
mitigate these risks2
 1 European Central Bank (ECB), Report on a Digital Euro, Frankfurt am Main, ECB, 
October 2020, https:// wwwecbeuropaeu/ euro/ html/ digitaleuro- reportenhtml
 2 The author thanks Angela Caporrini , Claudio Impenna and Maria Iride Vangelisti for 







5.1  Digital currencies and central banking
The evolution of payment systems has been one of the main drivers of the evo-
lution of central banking3 Technological innovations in the payment system 
and the growing familiarity of the public with digital instruments have not only 
changed the way central banks operate but have also affected some of their core 
functions and institutional features
The first important change is the role central banks play as providers of cash, 
the most widely used medium of exchange by the public4 It is a particularly 
popular instrument because it guarantees anonymity and has the status of legal 
tender, so it cannot be refused when presented to discharge a monetary obliga-
tion5 Banknotes also ensure instant payment, unlike cheques or money orders 
and their value is risk free because they are a liability of safe institutions, central 
banks6 Their purchasing power is in principle preserved even if used as a store 
of value because central banks have a special mandate to prevent the value of 
money being eroded by inflation7 The status of banknotes as a risk- free, widely 
 3 Curzio Giannini, The Age of Central Banks, Cheltenham/ Northampton, Edward 
Elgar, 2011
 4 A payment medium is a financial asset used to discharge obligations in transactions 
between two parties A payment instrument is a device or procedure used to mobilise 
the payment medium Cash refers both to coins and banknotes In some countries, 
banknotes are issued by central banks while coins are minted by the state or govern-
ment agencies Banknotes are both a payment medium and a payment instrument, 
while in the case of bank money bank deposits are the medium and checks, demand 
drafts and the like are the instruments
 5 The concept of legal tender is not applied uniformly across European countries The 
most common interpretation is that it cannot be refused as a means to execute a pay-
ment In countries such as Germany, Finland, the Netherlands and Ireland, ‘the legal 
tender provisions refer to the fulfillment of an essential part of a contract already con-
cluded and do not amount to an obligation to conclude a contract allowing for cash 
payments’ See Euro Legal Tender Expert Group (ELTEG), Definition, Scope and Effects 
of Legal Tender of Euro Banknotes and Coins, Brussels, 2010, p 6, http:// eceuropaeu/ 
economy_ finance/ articles/ euro/ documents/ elteg_ enpdf
 6 With banking instruments, there is a lag between the time the payment is made and 
the time the money is actually transferred to the receiver’s account The longer the 
interval between the payment and settlement, the greater the likelihood that some 
payments will not be successfully completed, whether because of technical problems, 
liquidity issues, insufficient funds of the counterpart (the so- called counterparty risk) 
or, in extreme cases, the sudden, unexpected failure of a participant This creates credit 
risk, liquidity risk and systemic risk
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accepted payment medium has historically given central banks a monopoly in 
the retail payments market
A number of innovations are taking place in the area of retail payments that 
have the potential to challenge this state of affairs The one with the greatest 
implications is the ‘stablecoin’ Libra, which may not be as risk- free as a central 
bank liability, but would be backed by a mix of reasonably safe assets with low 
volatility and stable purchasing power Furthermore, like cash, it could be used 
even by those who do not have bank accounts, and would allow instant transfer 
of money8 With respect to cash it could make transactions much easier for con-
sumers and merchants9 The role of cash as legal tender could become less rel-
evant with the growth of new instruments guaranteeing immediate transfer of 
financial assets
The second important change is in the role central banks play with respect 
to the banking system Currently only supervised institutions, mostly com-
mercial banks, can open accounts with central banks The provision of central 
bank money to banks implies a vertical ‘pyramid- like’ structure of the mon-
etary sector, in which commercial banks are intermediaries in the payments 
made by private customers and central banks serve as settlement agent for 
payments among banks This structure gives central banks special responsibil-
ities with regard to the whole system and justifies the catalytic and operational 
roles most of them play with respect to payment systems10 It also gives them 
the possibility to exercise oversight over the functioning of the payment system 
to prevent security breaches or other forms of malfunctioning In a possible 
future configuration, tech companies could use their platforms to create par-
allel systems as alternatives to traditional systems Their capacity to reach a vast 
number of clients would put the ‘pyramid under siege’11 Central banks’ capacity 
 8 European Central Bank (ECB), Implications of Digitalisation in Retail Payments for the 
Eurosystem’s Catalyst Role, Frankfurt am Main, ECB, July 2019, https:// opeuropaeu/ 
s/ or2s
 9 Another category of entrants are the providers of digital wallets which are based on 
bank money but allow users to make instant payments on their bank accounts, using 
their phones or other portable electronic devices For an overview and assessment of 
the instruments offered by big tech companies see Nicola Bilotta and Simone Romano, 
eds, The Rise of Tech Giants. A Game Changer in Global Finance and Politics, Bern, Peter 
Lang, 2019
 10 Many, central banks, like the Eurosystem, directly operate the interbank payment 
system (the T2 system in Europe) Others do not directly operate the system but have 
special powers of supervision and regulation over privately operated systems










not only to ensure the well functioning of the payment system but also to reg-
ulate the money in circulation or to influence credit conditions could be weak-
ened, especially if the new players would have access to global markets for their 
funding needs
The response to these challenges requires first of all a regulatory and supervi-
sory framework extended to the new entrants in the payment system A parallel 
evolution would be for central banks to offer the public a central bank digital 
currency (CBDC), a central bank liability that can be mobilised electronically 
Even if done indirectly, by leaving the technical interface with final customers 
to commercial banks, it would still mean a generalised use of a central bank 
liability
The substitution of bank deposits with central bank money could increase 
the financing capacity of central banks and reduce that of commercial banks 
This could have various implications First of all central banks would have to 
change their lending and investment practices, which are at present motivated 
mainly by monetary policy considerations and are designed to shield them 
from political pressures to finance the state or certain sectors of the economy12 
Second, it could become more expensive for commercial banks to lend to the 
private sector, because the banks would have to pay higher interest rates on 
their deposits or rely more on capital markets, in direct competition with other 
financial intermediaries Finally there is a fear that a central bank currency 
alternative to bank deposits could amplify financial instability, because it could 
facilitate the transfer of funds from bank deposits to central bank accounts 
during crises
As it will be argued, these issues need to be carefully considered for the case 
of a digital euro, given the bank- based model of the European financial system, 
the absence of developed and integrated capital markets and the risks of banking 
systems’ fragmentation during crises
5.2  The changing retail payments landscape in Europe
The reason why the central banks of some countries, such as Sweden or China, 
have made more progress in their digital currency projects is that in those coun-
tries the use of cash is rapidly declining and large internet providers are gaining 
 12 The principle of central banks’ autonomy states that central banks should refrain from 
financing the state’s budget deficits and from conducting commercial business with 
non- bank customers To prevent misallocation of resources, commercial banking and 
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a dominant position in the monetary system In Europe, the situation is very dif-
ferent First, a recent rapid increase in the availability of alternative instruments 
has been paralleled by continued growth of cash use Second, the use of cards in 
the eurozone is not as widespread as in countries like the United States or the 
United Kingdom, and varies greatly from country to country Third, the pace of 
innovation is accelerating, but it is mostly at the local or national levels Finally 
banks’ most promising initiatives, such as those in the area of instant payments, 
are still highly fragmented along national lines The risk is that innovative new 
players will operate mostly at the local level while global players will dominate 
the Europe- wide market, as has happened with major credit card brands
Cash is still the preferred instrument for small transactions and it is increas-
ingly being hoarded amid decreasing interest rates and higher uncertainty13 The 
situation however is very different from country to country Austria, Germany, 
Italy and Ireland have a marked preference for cash, while in the Netherlands its 
use is rapidly declining Beyond the eurozone, cash is close to disappearing in 
Sweden14
The use of card payments in the eurozone is far less widespread than in other 
regions of the world In 2016, it amounted to 156 per cent of combined gross 
domestic product, in contrast to 455 per cent in the UK and 317 per cent in 
the US15 The use of cards varies considerably within the eurozone In 2018, the 
number of payments by card per capita ranged from between 332 in Finland and 
275 in the Netherlands, to around 64 in Italy and Germany16
There are however signs of accelerating change, especially because the 
COVID- 19 crisis has given a major impetus to the use of online transactions 
 13 Roberto Rinaldi, ‘Cash’, in Luiss SEP Working Papers, No 9/ 2019 (24 May 2019), https:// 
sepluissit/ node/ 2437 The ratio of cash to GDP is higher in the eurozone than in the 
US, but in both economies has been increasing – between 2005 and 2017 it has gone 
from 63 to 82 per cent in the United States and from 71 to 107 per cent in the eur-
ozone – mainly because of the reduction of interest rates and other macroeconomic 
factors
 14 European Commission, A New Vision for Europe’s Capital Markets. Final Report of 
the High Level Forum on the Capital Markets Union, June 2020, https:// europaeu/ 
!gU33Hm; Roberto Rinaldi, ‘Cash’, cit
 15 BIS data reported by Ferdinando Giugliano, ‘Europe Is Planning Its Very Own E- Currency’, 
in Bloomberg Opinions, 16 November 2020, https:// wwwbloombergcom/ opinion/ ar-
ticles/ 2020- 11- 16/ christine- lagarde- s- ecb- is- planning- its- very- own- e- currency
 16 Not including Luxembourg which, with 5,276 card payments per year is a clear outlier 
Banca d’Italia, Appendice alla Relazione annuale sul 2019, 29 May 2020, p 101, https:// 










and contactless instruments Consumers prefer them for safety reasons and 
merchants and business owners view faster payments as a way to reduce the set-
tlement risk in a deteriorating business environment
The crisis has accelerated the technological innovation that was already taking 
place in fintech, and in the area of electronic money, mostly at the local level17 
A recent ECB report shows the majority (45 per cent) of fintech initiatives in the 
area of retail payments are offered by local start- ups, while banks and banking 
associations come second with a third of the total18 Start- ups have an especially 
significant share of cross- currency solutions, in which banks lag far behind19 
This trend has been encouraged by the second Payment System Directive 
(PSD2), which has allowed the co- existence of third- party providers and banks 
in the provision of payment and payment- related services
Banks are responding, most notably by pushing for instant payments, but 
there is still considerable fragmentation along national lines20 As the European 
Commission reports,
many citizens still face unacceptable refusals of cross- border SEPA Direct Debit 
transactions (‘IBAN [International Bank Account Number] discrimination’) This means 
that they cannot use IBANs from a different country to make a payment Payees are still 
often unwilling or not technically able to accept cross- border SEPA Direct Debits21
In 2017 the European Payments Council (EPC) developed a scheme to enable 
instant money transfers without exchanging IBANs However participation has 
been rather limited and the European Commission is considering making it 
compulsory22
 17 Oxera Consulting, The Competitive Landscape for Payments: A European Perspective, 
March 2020, https:// wwwoxeracom/ ?p=131237
 18 ECB, Implications of Digitalisation in Retail Payments for the Eurosystem’s Catalyst 
Role, cit
 19 ‘As the current correspondent banking model is widely perceived as profitable and 
constitutes a relatively high market barrier, current players may have little incentive 
to devise new fintech solutions in this field in the absence of competitive pressure 
Therefore, in this domain we can identify fintech start- ups as real competitors to banks’ 
Ibid, p 15
 20 Many banks are responding by creating partnerships and joint products with fintech 
companies and provider of electronic money
 21 European Commission, On a Retail Payments Strategy for the EU (COM/ 2020/ 
592), 24  September  2020, p  10, https:// eur- lexeuropaeu/ legal- content/ EN/ TXT/ 
?uri=CELEX:52020DC0592
 22 The participation has been insufficient either because of their voluntary nature or 
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Another trend is the growing popularity of services offered by big players 
with a strong customer base, mainly driven by their vast social or commercial 
networks For example, PayPal has a strong presence in Germany and in Italy 
where it manages 52 per cent and 32 per cent respectively of all e- commerce23 
Another possible development is greater penetration into financial services by 
big tech companies with well- established digital interaction with customers The 
most prominent example is that of Amazon, which has created its own online 
payment platform (Amazon Payments), open to customers and merchants24
In conclusion, in the European Union there is rapid innovation at the local 
level, but there is a concrete risk that the pan- European market for digital 
payments for digital payments will be taken over by global players
5.3  The central bank digital euro
These trends in the European payments landscape help explain the motivation 
of the ECB At this stage the ECB has presented a study, open for consultations, 
which could prepare the ECB to deploy a digital euro ‘should the need arise’ 
In mid- 2021 the European System of Central Banks (Eurosystem) will decide 
whether to implement the project
Motivations
Most commentators have focused on the ‘defensive’ motivation Indeed the ECB 
has stressed the need to preserve the integrity of the monetary system which, 
as mentioned in the previous paragraph, could be challenged by global players 
These could be operators of big Internet platforms, dominant card schemes or 
stablecoin suppliers A recent G7 report has highlighted several risks related to 
the issuance of stablecoins25 However, given Facebook’s ability to reach millions, 
EU level In addition, the providers of mobile devices limit the access to Near Field 
Communication technology Ibid, p 7
 23 Oxera Consulting, The Competitive Landscape for Payments: A European Perspective, cit
 24 ECB, Implications of Digitalisation in Retail Payments for the Eurosystem’s Catalyst 
Role, cit
 25 They could lead to monetary substitution and financial instability, and also weaken 
countries’ ability to execute monetary policy From a regulatory point of view there 
would be problems in assessing their compliance with anti- money laundering (AML) 
and counter- terrorism financing rules Instead of fostering competition, they may end 
up weakening it See G7 Working Group on Stablecoins, ‘Investigating the Impact of 











if not billions, of customers, its stablecoin Libra could rapidly gain popularity 
with the public Another challenge could come from the digital currency issued 
by ‘early mover’ foreign central banks, which could attract domestic users
However, another important motivation is to overcome the existing frag-
mentation and to recover the ECB’s catalytic role in promoting Europe- wide 
initiatives in a market that is highly dynamic, but mostly at the local level At the 
same time, a digital euro could foster the international role of the euro or, in the 
ECB’s language, support the ‘strategic autonomy’ of the European Union26
Another important consideration would be improvement in the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy to the real economy While deposit rates now 
react very slowly to changes in reference rates, with a remunerated digital cur-
rency, changes in central bank policy rates would be directly reflected in the rates 
households and businesses receive
The ECB has clarified that the new central bank currency would complement, 
but not replace cash This is inevitable, because there are an estimated 30 million 
adults in the EU who do not have bank accounts
Furthermore, the ECB has stressed that the new currency would complement 
private digital instruments and enhance competition, rather than suppressing it 
by creating a public monopoly ‘The prospect of central bank initiatives to issue 
a digital euro should neither discourage nor crowd out private solutions for effi-
cient digital retail payments in the euro area’27 The ECB has gone so far as to state 
that a digital euro might not be issued if alternative solutions become available
Main features
The CBDC would be a central bank liability accessible not just to banks, but to 
all citizens and firms Unlike cash, it would function both as a means of payment 
and as a remunerated financial asset
Technical details have yet to be specified regarding two main issues The first 
is whether it should be a bearer instrument similar to cash or an account- based 
system similar to electronically accessible bank deposits (or both) The second is 
whether this access should be direct, or intermediated by banks and other finan-
cial institutions
 26 For an overview of the benefits of the status of international currency, and of why the 
euro has not yet attained it, see Stefano Micossi, ‘An International Role for the Euro?’, 
in Luiss SEP Policy Briefs, No 37/ 2020 (2 October 2020), https:// sepluissit/ node/ 3132






The Digital Euro: Challenges and Opportunities 121
The bearer payment tool could operate by means of an instrument – a ‘token’ – 
to be used offline It would represent the logical successor to the banknote and 
could require the storage of a certain amount of euro in a digital wallet which 
would be replenished through an online account The offline instrument, like a 
digital wallet, would need online access to add funds in the wallet28 Alternatively, 
the bearer instrument could operate through an internet connection with the 
ECB accounts available at the points of sale It would be free of charge for basic 
use and would be a ‘simple, risk- free and trusted digital means of payment, 
accepted throughout the euro area’ Depending on its technical specifications, 
the instrument could also be used by those who currently do not have bank 
accounts
In principle the ECB could open an account directly with all the users of 
the digital euro It would however be very technically challenging and also not 
desirable because of the risks implied The model that the ECB, like most central 
banks, is considering for the account- based digital euro is a two- tier system in 
which banks have direct access to central bank accounts and manage the inter-
face with the customers’ accounts with the central bank In this way banks could 
retain their relationships with customers for value- added services
A possibility would be to use the instant payment settlement system launched 
in November 2018 as an extension to retail payments of the Target 2 system In its 
current configuration the TARGET Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS) system 
would allow money to be credited to recipients’ account within seconds and could 
potentially settle 500 payments per second (some 43 million transactions a day) 
in central bank money Unlike T2, it could also be a multi- currency system29
Anonymity and privacy
A web- based central bank digital euro would have to comply with current 
European regulations and legal obligations regarding money laundering For 
large- value transactions in particular, the regulation makes the identification of 
users compulsory Furthermore, the ECB intends to impose restrictions on some 
 28 It will be similar ‘to the current coexistence of (online) commercial bank deposits and’ 
(physical) cash that can be withdrawn from bank accounts via ATMs, the digital euro 
could be made available online and amounts loaded onto a physical device for offline 
use’ Ibid, p 34– 35
 29 Outside the eurozone, the Riksbank has shown interest in using TIPS for its digital 
currency project and has announced that it will begin to settle instant payments in 







categories of users, such as non- eurozone residents, and on some operations 
To do this it will need to be able to identify users The offline bearer instrument 
could remain anonymous
The ECB stresses that the digital euro would have to respect the right to 
privacy As stated by Panetta, ‘A digital euro would increase privacy in digital 
payments thanks to the involvement of the central bank, which – unlike private 
suppliers of payment services – has no commercial interests related to consumer 
data’30 It also envisages an independent, neutral third party that could audit the 
system to monitor compliance with privacy rules
5.4  Main challenges
As already mentioned, the introduction of a CBDC would have profound 
implications for commercial banks as well as for the way central banks operate 
and pursue policy objectives For the digital currency of a monetary union, the 
complexities would be compounded by the differences in payment habits and 
banking structures in member countries
Disintermediation of banks
As mentioned, one major concern about CBDCs is that they could lead to bank 
disintermediation, because the public would substitute bank deposits with 
CBDCs To retain funding capacity, banks would have to offer higher interest 
rates, which could in turn force them to either increase the cost of loans or 
reduce the volume of lending However, this outcome may not be very significant 
quantitatively and, to a certain extent, might even be desirable
Only some categories of deposits, mostly sight deposits, are likely to migrate 
to the central bank, and banks would still retain savings accounts and could 
increase their reliance on wholesale funding31
The availability of an alternative medium for sight deposits would also incen-
tivise banks to offer more innovative payment services and enrich their financial 
product offerings A number of banks are already offering value added services 
 30 Fabio Panetta, A Digital Euro for the Digital Era, Introductory Statement at the ECON 
Committee of the European Parliament, Frankfurt am Main, 12 October 2020, https:// 
wwwecbeuropaeu/ press/ key/ date/ 2020/ html/ ecbsp201012_ 1~1d14637163enhtml
 31 See Fabio Panetta, ‘21st Century Cash: Central Banking, Technological Innovation 
and Digital Currencies’, in SUERF Policy Notes, No 40 (August 2018), https:// www
suerforg/ policynotes/ 3251/ 21st- century- cash- central- banking- technological- 
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in addition to payment services including pre- transaction and post- transaction 
services or credit related services32
Banks would also have to gradually move away from the classic intermedia-
tion model, based on a maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities, wherein 
they finance long- term investments while serving investors’ short- term liquidity 
needs On the one hand they could offer or intermediate a wider range of finan-
cial and savings instruments to the public On the other they could help corpo-
rate clients gain better access to capital markets, or complement the products 
they offer with those available in the capital markets A review of the regulations 
in some specific sectors, such as those regarding securitisation, could facilitate 
this process
This would be a desirable development in Europe given the abnormal share of 
banks in the financial system and the well- known shortcomings of bank- based 
financial systems, especially at time of crisis According to some estimates the 
ratio of total bank assets to GDP is three times bigger in the EU than in the 
United States33 Securitisation would be a particularly useful tool for banks, 
allowing them to transfer illiquid loans to investors34 Currently, securitisation 
represents only 3 per cent of GDP in the EU- 27, as opposed to 125 per cent in 
the United States and 12 per cent in the UK35
Some technical features of the new currency could also be designed for 
a smooth disintermediation One possibility would be for the ECB to intro-
duce quantitative limits for different categories of customers and differentiated 
interest rates For example, Bindseil and Panetta suggest setting a limit of up to 
 32 Pre- transaction services include identification of parties, management of payment data, 
choice of payment instruments, electronic invoicing and ex- ante compliance process 
Post- transaction services relate to the provision of electronic receipts, management of 
complaints and cancellations, and additional commercial offers See ECB), Implications 
of Digitalisation in Retail Payments for the Eurosystem’s Catalyst Role, cit
 33 According to Langfield and Pagano, the total assets of banks in the EU amounted to 
334 per cent of the GDP in 2013, as opposed to the 196 per cent for Japanese banks 
and 86 per cent for US banks Converting the US figure to international accounting, 
the size of the US banking system would reach 115 per cent of US GDP, still only about 
a third of the size of Europe’s banking system See Sam Langfield and Marco Pagano, 
‘Bank Bias in Europe: Effects on Systemic Risk and Growth’, in ECB Working Paper 
Series, No 1797 (May 2015), https:// wwwecbeuropaeu/ pub/ pdf/ scpwps/ ecbwp1797
enpdf
 34 Securitisation implies the repackaging of these assets and dividing the resulting security 
into tranches with different risk profiles










3,000 euro per capita, which would cover the average monthly net income of eur-
ozone households36 The interest rate applied to this amount would be zero, while 
for larger amounts, which would be reserved for categories of users other than 
households, interest would be lower, or even negative, to discourage holding dig-
ital currency for investment purposes
Expansion of central banks’ balance sheets
If a CBDC were meant mainly to replace banknotes, the size and composition of 
the central bank’s balance sheet would not change substantially However, it could 
greatly increase if non- residents shifted part of their portfolios into the national 
CBDC or if the public moved commercial bank deposits held for transaction 
purposes to the CBDC37 This hardly seems to be a problem at a time when cen-
tral bank’s balance sheets are bulging However, changes in lending and invest-
ment policies of central banks may have important institutional implications 
Certainly, central banks could not take over the function of lenders to the private 
sector, which would lead to misallocation of resources and crowding out of a key 
function of commercial banks38
The most immediate possibility would be of the ECB using the additional 
funds to increase loans to banks This solution would preserve the separation of 
roles between central banks and commercial banks, but could be problematic 
from several points of view First, the collateral banks could offer, especially in its 
loan component, could not be of the high quality that the ECB usually requires 
Second, it would represent an important change in the ECB’s current lending 
policies, which are exclusively aimed at fulfilling the ECB’s monetary and finan-
cial stability objectives Current long- term maturities  – up to three years for 
long- term repo operations or LTROs – are justified only by monetary policy con-
siderations, ie the need to avoid a prolonged deviation from the inflation target 
 36 ‘For corporates (financial non- banks and non- financials) the tier one allowance could 
be set to zero, or it might be calculated to be proportional to a measure of their size and, 
thus, presumed payment needs Foreigners could be allowed to hold CBDC, but should 
not have any tier one allowance’ See Ulrich Bindseil and Fabio Panetta, ‘Central Bank 
Digital Currency Remuneration in a World with Low or Negative Nominal Interest 
Rates’, in VoxEU, 5 October 2020, https:// voxeuorg/ node/ 66304
 37 The exception is the component of these assets represented by banks’ liquidity in the 
form of banks’ reserves with the central bank
 38 Agustín Carstens, The Future of Money and Payments, Speech at the Central Bank of 
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Finally, complex conflicts of interests would arise if the ECB were to become a 
‘structural’ long- term investor in the banks it supervises
The other asset the Eurosystem could acquire are government securities 
Currently, the Eurosystem’s portfolio includes a huge volume of public bonds 
which have been acquired almost exclusively as a result of quantitative easing 
operations rather than to finance states, which it is not allowed to do It could 
also increase its investments in corporate bonds, but given the lack of depth of 
European capital markets, this could excessively reduce the quantity of corporate 
bonds held in private banks39 A deep securitisation market could greatly help 
in this respect, because it would allow the ECB to subscribe to a less risky and 
highly liquid tranche of securitised assets
Overall, this problem does not seem to be insurmountable, especially if limits 
were imposed on the amount of the digital currency the public could access 
Probably the best option for the central bank would be a proper combination 
of all the previously mentioned options, following some transparent rules of 
diversification and principles of market neutrality Furthermore, from this point 
of view, the development of deeper and more highly integrated capital markets 
would be crucial for Europe
Financial instability and volatility of capital flows.
Another concern is that the digital euro could increase the risk of bank 
runs During a confidence crisis, bank customers would no longer have to form 
long queues to withdraw cash at bank branches or ATMs – they could do it elec-
tronically from the comfort of home This possibility already de facto exists for 
large value deposits, which can at any time be converted to Treasury bills or 
other low- risk assets This would become available to the public at large, and for 
small- value deposits which could be easily converted into risk- free CBDC
A shift from bank deposits into cash is not a remote possibility It happened 
in 2008, when flights from bank deposits peaked after the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers and remained high during the 2010– 13 sovereign debt crisis40
 39 It could also increase investments in non euro area bonds but this would expose the 
ECB to the risk of exchange rate volatility See Santiago Fernández de Lis and Olga 
Gouveia, ‘Central Bank Digital Currencies: Features, Options, Pros and Cons’, in 
BBVA Working Papers, No 19/ 04 (March 2019), https:// wwwbbvaresearchcom/ en/ 
publicaciones/ central- bank- digital- currencies- features- options- pros- and- cons







Quantitative limits on the use of the CBDC or its remuneration could limit 
this risk The ECB believes that a variable remuneration system could be used to 
reduce the conversion of bank deposits into CBDC at times of crisis41 However 
a rate change of this kind would be a very sensitive instrument to use during 
banking crises because of the signal it would send to the markets about the 
concerns of the central bank, based on the granular information at its disposal, 
which is not always publicly available42
At the same time, it is very unlikely that a run on banks would become general-
ised across the eurozone Most likely it would affect either individual institutions 
or the entire banking systems of some member countries In the former case, 
strengthened traditional instruments of lending of last resort could be sufficient 
In the latter case it would certainly be very difficult to reduce the remuneration 
of the digital currency in the entire eurozone in response to financial instability 
in a few member countries
The exposure of the eurozone to the risk of fragmented banking crises is a 
well- known problem, and policy actions to address it are well known, but there is 
no consensus on how to implement them They include completing the banking 
union, in particular introducing cross- border deposit insurance, a sustainable 
crisis resolution mechanism for banks and a stronger public backstop in case of 
a systemic crisis Because of the possible impact on financial instability, the crea-
tion of a digital euro requires further progress on all these fronts
Reputational risks
Perhaps the main risks for the ECB would be that the new currency will not be 
successful among the public Countries that are more cash- oriented would con-
tinue to use cash, while countries that already use digital instruments would con-
tinue to use them, because of the value- added services they offer with respect to 
the CBDC and the less stringent quantitative limitations This risk will be higher 
the longer it will take to actually implement the project, because in the current 
 41 A variable rate could also help limit sudden inflows of money, which could cause an 
undesirable appreciation of exchange rates It has been shown that the introduction of 
CBDCs facilitates international arbitrage that links together interest rates, the exchange 
rate and the remuneration of the CBDC See Massimo Minesso Ferrari, Arnaud Mehl 
and Livio Stracca, ‘The International Dimension of a Central Bank Digital Currency’, 
in VoxEU, 12 October 2020, https:// voxeuorg/ node/ 66335
 42 A similar problem would arise with changes in the quantitative limits which would 
raise the same concerns as a reintroduction of capital controls, with all the problems 
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dynamic environment the first mover, be it a private entity or a foreign central 
bank, could acquire a lasting dominant position
Another important risk is the possible breakdown or malfunctioning of the IT 
systems on which the CBDC is built Events of this kind unfortunately do occur 
even in the best regulated and supervised market infrastructures, like stock 
exchanges, and clearing or settlement networks This would have high reputa-
tional costs, because a sudden inability to use the currency, even for a few hours, 
would foster strong public resentment against the ECB There is also the issue of 
whether the central bank could be held responsible for economic losses suffered 
by some users Another problem could arise if the CBDC, at least the compo-
nent covered by anonymity, were used for illegal activities like tax evasion, drug 
trafficking, money laundering, and financing terrorism
A digital currency could also become a key target for cyberattacks because 
of its relevance to the economy of the entire eurozone Terrorist groups or hos-
tile nation- states could develop the capacity to use this as a warfare instrument 
or as a tool for extortion Of course this risk would exist even with private sys-
tems, and a public entity like the Eurosystem would be better equipped to defend 
itself because of its role in the operation of major platforms like T2 or T2S 
Nevertheless, such risks can never be completely eliminated There would there-
fore be an obvious need to strengthen common deterrence tools in the eurozone, 
and develop a common intelligence pool that would collect intelligence gathered 
by the various member states
To mitigate these risks, the construction of the new platform will require huge 
investments in technology It would be important to clearly disclose whether the 
returns on these investments, including social benefits, justify those costs
Conclusion
The new digital currency will be an opportunity to greatly improve the effi-
ciency of the European payment system which, in its retail component, has been 
highly innovative but is still highly fragmented along national lines It could also 
improve the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and the role of the 
euro as an international currency The initiative is timely, because doing nothing 
would amplify the risk that the only Europe- wide digital payment schemes 
would be those offered by global private institutions or foreign central banks
One of the main challenges will be limiting bank disintermediation Although 
this risk has probably been overstated in the CBDC debate, it is a critical issue 
for Europe because of the high reliance on bank intermediation of European 
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enterprises, especially the SMEs that form the bulk of the industrial sector in many 
member countries Also the risks of instability should not be underestimated 
because the recent experience shows that when they materialize they result in 
fragmentation of banking markets along national borders Whether the CBDC 
could exacerbate these risks requires further analysis, but at the same time it 
would not be easy to design measures to mitigate them, like variable interest 
rates on the CBDC, whose impact would greatly differ from country to country
The digital currency could be designed to facilitate a gradual adaptation of 
the banking system to the new environment However, both the banking sector 
and the corporate sector will eventually have to increase their reliance on capital 
markets for funding needs The ECB will also have to rely more on capital market 
instruments to diversify the investments of the additional funds which it will 
have at its disposal The launch a digital euro, therefore, should not been seen in 
isolation from the efforts to remove the obstacles to the Capital Markets Union 
The launch of the currency also needs to be complemented by the completion 
of the banking union, in order limit the risks of financial markets instability and 
strengthen the role of the euro as an international currency
Perhaps the biggest risk is that the digital euro will not win over the public, 
because those who prefer cash will continue to use it and those used to innova-
tive digital instruments will not abandon them More than the legal tender status 
of the new currency, what will matter is the technical design, the protection of 
privacy, the ease of use, the perceived risks for users, the cost to the public of the 
new instrument and its timely implementation
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Chapter 6: Digital Currency Initiatives on the 
African Continent
Financial technology (fintech) developments present opportunities that may be 
leveraged by regulatory authorities and the financial sector to enhance financial 
service offerings In leveraging these opportunities, regulatory authorities also 
guard against possible risks that these developments may present
The focus of the authorities is mainly on how these developments support 
achievement of public policy objectives In this process, it is imperative that the 
focus should not be on the new technologies but rather on new business models 
that will enhance the fulfilment of the needs of the business and communities 
that consume financial services
It should therefore not be surprising that a number of central banks have estab-
lished fintech units or programmes within their jurisdictions or that these have been 
undertaken in collaboration with other relevant regulatory authorities In South 
Africa, although the central bank has established a fintech programme within the 
bank, a collaborative structure known as the Intergovernmental Fintech Working 
Group (IFWG) was also established, comprising members from the National 
Treasury, the central bank, the financial sector conduct authority, the anti- money 
laundering authority, the national credit regulator and the revenue authority In 
the 15- member regional bloc of the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), the committee of central bank governors has also established a multi- 
disciplinary regional working group that focusses on specific initiatives in fintech 
Several central banks in Sub- Saharan Africa have also launched initiatives focusing 
on this area of work with some specifically dealing with central bank issued digital 
currencies (CBDC) and addressing policy positions on crypto- assets/ currencies
Many discussions around retail CBDC today revolve around ambitious 
policy- focused use cases Most recently, in the face of potential competition 
from a growing assortment of innovative private crypto- assets like Bitcoin and 
stablecoins such as Facebook’s Libra, central bankers around the world have been 
consumed with the possibility of implementing CBDC as a solution to regain 
control over their national money supply1
 1 Michaela Allen and Barry Cooper, ‘CBDC— The Next Frontier of Mobile Money?’, in 
Central Bank Payments News, Vol 3, No 3 (March 2020), p 22– 25, https:// cenfriorg/ 






Consumer and business demands for financial services are constantly evolving 
The need for real- time, frictionless services is evident, and the demands of service 
providers to internalize current needs and be proactive in researching and devising 
new business models that will meet both known and anticipated consumer needs 
are top of mind Where business models offered by incumbents are not able to sat-
isfy the needs of users of the financial system, these will be complemented or some-
times cannibalized by offerings from new entrants
In an effort to remove the frictions relating to means of payment within the pay-
ment system, there has been an evolution relating to these mediums of payment In 
past decades, ‘electronic money’ has become a buzzword E- money is explained as 
stored value held in the accounts of users, agents and providers of mobile money 
services Essentially, the total value of e- money should be mirrored in a bank ac-
count or bank accounts to ensure that users who stored the value in the account can 
safely recover 100 per cent of their value even if the service providers were to fail
In recent times, mobile money schemes have emerged In Africa, M- pesa has 
been the most prominent mobile money scheme Mobile money schemes operate 
mainly in a closed- loop arrangement as their systems are not interlinked, and 
their instruments and infrastructure is not interoperable, which means the stores 
of value are not interchangeable However, these instruments and schemes may 
be made interchangeable through complex clearing and settlement mechanisms 
to switch instruments and transfer stored value
Recently, the concepts of crypto- assets/ currency and CBDC have been 
introduced These concepts are sometimes used interchangeably with virtual 
currencies, digital tokens and crypto tokens The IFWG defines a crypto- asset as 
a digital representation of value that is not issued by a central bank, but is traded, 
transferred and stored electronically by natural and legal persons for the pur-
pose of payment, investment and other forms of utility, and applies cryptography 
techniques in the underlying technology This definition captures the various 
broad use cases and so the preferred term is crypto- assets rather than crypto- 
currency The term central bank digital currency, however, refers to a central 
bank liability, such as cash or deposits, issued in digital or electronic form, 
denominated in a sovereign currency and backed by the central bank’s assets2
 2 Fabio Panetta, 21st Century Cash:  Central Banking, Technological Innovation and 
Digital Currencies, Keynote address on the occasion of the SUERF- BAFFI CAREFIN 
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Although there are no known fully implemented CBDC arrangements, sev-
eral central banks are researching and experimenting with such arrangements 
within their jurisdictions, and perhaps even considering their use for removing 
frictions in cross- border payments
A CBDC can be designed as an offering for either the wholesale or retail cur-
rency segment of the financial system CBDC used in the retail sector will be 
similar to physical cash In its design, it will offer users the same characteristics 
of physical cash: serving as a store of value, a medium of exchange and a unit of 
account It will lend itself to use for frequent and relatively low- to medium- value 
transactions In its wholesale form, CBDC may represent central bank money 
that is currently used to facilitate wholesale payments in national payment sys-
tems including real- time gross settlement systems Ole Bjerg depicts CBDC as 
follows (see Figure 61)
Most central banks or monetary authorities working in this area are driven 
by certain public policy objectives As stated earlier, CBDC is an attractive prop-
osition where current instruments are not able to fulfil the desired need, such 
as enabling peer- to- peer electronic exchange of value In some respects, there 
may be expectations that a CBDC may support the public policy objectives of 
enhancing financial inclusion and efficient disbursement of social benefits from 
the state
6.2  Review of key aspects relating to digital currency initiatives 
in Sub- Saharan Africa
The South African IFWG has published a position paper on crypto- assets 
through its Crypto Assets Regulatory Working Group3 Several countries in 
Africa have also published policy positions on crypto- assets/ currencies
On the CBDC front, most initiatives underway on the continent are mainly 
exploratory This chapter will provide further details on some of them
and Psychology’, Milan, 7 June 2018, https:// wwwbancaditaliait/ media/ notizia/ fabio- 
panetta- speaks- on- 21st- century- cash- central- banking- technological- innovation- and- 
digital- currencies
 3 Intergovernmental Fintech Working Group (IFWG), Position Paper on Crypto Assets, 
April 2020, https:// wwwifwgcoza/ wp- content/ uploads/ IFWG_ CAR_ WG- Position_ 






Objectives behind the initiatives
The objectives of the development and issuance of policy and/ or regulatory 
positions on crypto- assets/ currencies by regulatory authorities is to outline and 
clarify their policy/ regulatory positions on these developments In this process, 
these authorities also recognize that their positions cannot be static and will 
need to be reviewed from time to time, as these business models and technolog-
ical developments evolve The objectives behind initiatives relating to CBDC are 
varied A few are listed below:
 1) to build capacity and gain a deeper understanding of the CBDC concept, as 
well as to analyse its benefits and potential risks;
 2) to explore the feasibility of CBDC for possible issuance of electronic currency 
by central banks;
Figure 6.1: Different forms of money
Source: Author’s elaboration on Ole Bjerg, ‘Designing New Money The Policy Trilemma of Central 
Bank Digital Currency’, in CBS MPP Working Papers, June 2017, https:// researchcbsdk/ en/ 
publications/ designing- new- money- the- policy- trilemma- of- central- bank- digital- c
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 3) to modernize the financial system, reduce cost of transactions and service 
delivery, increase efficiency in payments and improve financial inclusion;
 4) to reduce the cost of circulating fiat currency, increase control of money 
supply and limit threats posed by the emergence of third- party firms in the 
area of currency issuance
As evident from above, these objectives are interrelated and although some are 
focused on short- to medium- term exploration and learning, they may ulti-
mately lead to the longer- term goals of modernizing and improving current 
arrangements and systems
The specific objectives of CBDC programmes can include the identification of 
viable use cases and deployment models; legal and regulatory issues; monetary 
policy implications; financial stability implications; other policy- related matters; 
possible impact on the national payment system; and technical and security 
aspects
Key drivers of the initiatives
For policy or regulatory positions adopted in relation to crypto- assets, the main 
goals are to highlight risks and possible benefits that could be derived from these 
developments and make financial system stakeholders and the public aware of 
the stance of the regulatory authorities
Although the objectives and drivers for the CBDC initiatives may seem the 
same, it is important to at least outline the following three key drivers
One key driver for exploring CBDC is to take a proactive stance in terms of 
evaluating the feasibility of its usage to address the possible decline in cash use 
Although the actual decline of cash use has not been observed in many African 
countries, there are indications that this development is occurring in other parts 
of the world It is therefore prudent to adopt a proactive stance and begin to 
explore the concept as this driver may be complemented by others and that may 
benefit the payment ecosystem
Another driver emerges from the growth of unregulated private sector firms 
exploring offering crypto- assets as a means of payment This compels central 
banks to look into what they can do to meet the demand, as their concern is 
related to the risks that such initiatives from private companies could create for 
the economy The departure point for central banks would be that the adoption 
of the offerings by the private firms would be supported by the fact that there 
is an unfulfilled need in the market that current payment mechanisms do not 
meet Therefore it is sensible to explore CBDCs that would meet the market’s 
needs while also ensuring financial stability
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The final key driver is the quest to adapt the payment system to maintain 
efficiency and resilience As central banks have a mandate to ensure the devel-
opment of the payment ecosystem, they have to observe changes in the finan-
cial system and develop appropriate responses Developments in the digital era, 
where service offerings need to be frictionless and real- time, have prompted cen-
tral banks to rethink their support arrangements for the broader financial system 
in line with their key mandates This driver is therefore aligned to the mandate 
relating to payment systems
Although this list of drivers is not exhaustive, it outlines drivers that are 
shared by stakeholders on the continent that are embarking on CBDC initiatives
Some key considerations for initiatives that are underway
Considerations by central banks when determining policy positions relating to 
crypto- assets mainly relate to the risks that the offerings may present and the 
benefits that they may offer to the financial system
When assessing the risks, the starting point is to evaluate these offerings 
in terms of whether they can serve as a unit of account, medium of exchange 
and store of value Evaluating crypto- assets against each of these characteristics 
would reveal potential risks The regulators would thus be in a good position to 
consider the risks and adopt appropriate policy positions that could be commu-
nicated to the public Crypto- assets may also present benefits or remove frictions 
from the current payment system, and these will also be considered by author-
ities before approving their use as means of payment to discharge obligations
A number of key considerations are involved in evaluating the possibility of a 
CBDC These could sometimes sound like drivers, but they may be considered 
to strengthen or confirm a business case for exploring a CBDC This section 
proposes some of these considerations
Regulatory authorities and central banks may consider whether the offering of 
a CBDC would enhance efficiency and stability of the payment system by diver-
sifying the system and reducing risk of concentration The central bank may also 
consider whether the issuance of a CBDC may advance financial inclusion, and 
improve monetary policy implementation and transmission A further consid-
eration could be whether a CBDC would enhance competition and engender 
trust in the monetary system These considerations could strengthen or weaken 
the business case
Another set of considerations by regulatory authorities is the cost of issuing a 
CBDC compared to cash, whether a CBDC could reduce the cost of remittances, 
and whether a CBDC would be a secure and stable alternative for cross- border 
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payments The final consideration is the Financial Action Task Force implications 
and the practicalities in terms of specific proposals with reference to the issu-
ance, distribution, transacting, and monitoring and maintenance of CBDC
6.3  Envisaged key characteristics of a successful crypto asset 
or CBDC
For a crypto- asset or CBDC to be a success, it must have certain key charac-
teristics These would be what users of a payment system look for in payment 
instruments that they use for transactions Although the list is not exhaustive, 
these are however the most important ones
The crypto- asset or CBDC should be accepted as legal tender, build trust in its 
holders and parties that accept it as a means of payment, and be non- exclusive or 
ubiquitous This will reassure users, merchants and service providers that they 
will always be able to exchange it for value with other users, merchants, service 
providers and participants in the conventional payment system
The currency should not be cumbersome to use, be interoperable with other 
conventional payment systems and meet the best security standards These are 
benchmarks met by payment instruments that are currently used widely The 
instrument should further comply with regulations to fight money laundering 
and terrorism financing, be scalable and flexible, and ideally be usable both for 
online and offline transactions When an instrument meets these requirements, 
its issuance when approved regulatory authorities, will be flexible for issuers 
within control measures that they are able to manage, and will further provide 
convenience to its users
As stated earlier, these characteristics are prerequisites for a successful launch 
and sustainability of the payment instrument
6.4  Anticipated possible challenges
When evaluating factors relating to crypto- assets, it is imperative that a balance 
be struck in weighing the risks and benefits This is a challenging task because 
if the risks are easily identifiable, regulators may be confronted with negative 
perceptions that could blur mitigating factors This may lead to the initiative 
being prematurely abandoned or to the adoption of a negative policy stance
While the exploratory journey might be exciting, a cautious approach that 
recognizes possible challenges upfront is useful Anticipating challenges and 
consequences prepares the authorities to navigate the complex process that may 




The first unintended consequence is that a retail CBDC that gives the public 
direct access to the central bank may lead to a loss of confidence in commercial 
banks and a shift of deposits to CBDC in times of financial crisis and systemic 
stress
A second possible challenge that will need to be thought through from incep-
tion and affect design of the CBDC is interoperability with existing payment 
systems to enable seamless transactions while using the CBDC with other con-
ventional payment instruments
Third, it is crucial to anticipate public acceptance of CBDC, the response of 
other financial intermediaries, cyber security concerns and consumer data pro-
tection and privacy issues
Lastly, the central bank needs to be prepared for the possibility that its balance 
sheet could grow considerably in case of high demand for CBDC
These challenges may not be insurmountable, but must be considered during 
the planning of the CBDC exploration project
6.5  Approaches that have been adopted to crypto- currencies/ 
assets and CBDCs
Approaches to crypto- currencies in the SADC have been reviewed, but these 
arrangements are less formalized nor inaccessible for the rest of the continent 
Crypto currencies or assets are not recognized and regulated formally for use 
cases anywhere in Africa Within the SADC region, many countries are closely 
observing developments in fintech in general and crypto- assets in particular, and 
the relevant use cases where they reserve the right to intervene where appropriate 
Countries have issued policy stances stating that they will not regulate the issu-
ance and use of crypto- currencies/ assets, while also highlighting risks that these 
may pose and warning the public to be careful when using these instruments 
Examples of these position or policy papers have been provided in the reference 
section, including the position on distributed ledger technologies and virtual 
currencies in Namibia,4 and the revised position on crypto- currencies5
In South Africa, a joint warning statement was initially issued by the National 
Treasury, South African Reserve Bank, Financial Services Board, Financial 
 4 Bank of Namibia, Position on Distributed Ledger Technologies and Virtual Currencies 
in Namibia, September 2017, https:// wwwboncomna/ getattachment/ cd7ea698- 3e85- 
4b79- b111- c97c7fae20fc/ aspx
 5 Bank of Namibia, Revised Positon on Cryptocurrencies, May 2018, https:// wwwbon
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Intelligence Centre and South African Revenue Services in 2014, which referred 
to crypto- currencies as virtual currencies6 This was shortly followed by a posi-
tion paper from the South African Reserve Bank on the same subject7 The posi-
tion in the two papers is however currently under review by a joint structure that 
has since been established to coordinate action on fintech developments in the 
country A position paper on crypto- assets has been issued by the crypto- assets 
regulatory working group of the broader Intergovernmental Fintech Working 
Group8 This position paper reviews the applicability of crypto- assets to various 
use cases and makes 30 specific recommendations for policy positions that need 
to be considered and possibly adopted
It is generally recognized that the global landscape relating to CBDC is still 
fluid, and while some countries are conducting feasibility studies, others are 
already contemplating issuing CBDCs An interesting paper by Stephen O’Neal 
shows that the situation regarding CBDC initiatives in Africa is somewhat 
confusing9
According to this paper and other online publications, Senegal and Tunisia 
have adopted and issued CBDCs These assertions have however been met with 
immediate denials by the authorities in the two countries
In Tunisia news broke of the issuance of an E- dinar in November 2019, 
claiming the initiative would bring transparency, reduce cost of issuance and 
change how banks work10 This was rejected by the Central Bank of Tunisia the 
same month in a sweeping statement that dismissed as ‘unfounded’ rumours 
that it had become the first monetary authority to issue a CBDC, while asserting 
instead that an unaffiliated ‘proof of concept’ project had been taken ‘out of 
 6 South Africa National Treasury, User Alert:  Monitoring of Virtual Currencies, 
18 September 2014, http:// wwwtreasurygovza/ comm_ media/ press/ 2014/ 2014091801% 
20- %20User%20Alert%20Virtual%20currenciespdf
 7 South African Reserve Bank, Position Paper on Virtual Currencies, 3 December 2014, 
https:// wwwresbankcoza/ RegulationAndSupervision/ NationalPaymentSystem(NPS)/ 
Legal/ Documents/ Position%20Paper/ Virtual%20Currencies%20Position%20Paper%20
%20Final_ 02of2014pdf
 8 IFWG, Position Paper on Crypto Assets, cit
 9 Stephen O’Neal, ‘State- Issued Digital Currencies: The Countries Which Adopted, 
Rejected or Researched the Concept’, in Cointelegraph, 19  July  2018, https:// 
cointelegraphcom/ news/ state- issued- digital- currencies- the- countries- which- 
adopted- rejected- or- researched- the- concept
 10 Adrian Zmudzinski, ‘Tunisia to Launch E- Dinar National Currency Using 
Blockchain’, in Cointelegraph, 9  November  2019, https:// cointelegraphcom/ news/ 












context’ The bank did however admit that it was considering a CBDC and said 
that it is studying ‘all existing alternatives’ It stressed that there are no immediate 
plans for an E- Dinar to go live and said; ‘The bank is studying the opportunities 
and risks inherent in these new technologies, particularly in terms of cyber secu-
rity and financial stability’11
Reports also emerged claiming that Senegal would soon launch a digital 
currency known as eCFA It was said to be an opportunity for fintech to help 
emerging markets leapfrog traditional banking systems and increase financial 
inclusion These reports began in late 2016 and intensified in early 2017, only to 
be met by a similar rejection which has also been confirmed by the Central bank 
of the West African States, which said that it is observing developments related 
to CBDC
Although these reports generated considerable excitement due to the enthu-
siasm of service providers, they were quickly denied This is a new developing 
area that requires careful exploration, as demonstrated by approaches taken by 
other countries Most importantly, central banks should guard against embracing 
solutions that are ahead of the problems they are supposed to solve The O’Neal 
paper of 2018 identifies several countries that have either rejected or abandoned 
CBDC feasibility studies, and others that have chosen to continue experiments 
or research12
Two African countries have taken a cautious approach The Bank of Ghana, 
in its 91st Monetary Policy Committee Press Release on 25  November  2019, 
announced its intention to explore a CBDC pilot project in a sandbox environ-
ment13 The bank has created a committee to explore the feasibility of a CBDC 
project and possible issuance of an electronic cedi (e- cedi) The work is still in its 
infancy, but its progress will be monitored with interest
South Africa has also launched a CBDC feasibility study The study will cover 
the lifecycle of a CBDC, comprising issuance, distribution, transacting, moni-
toring and maintenance, as outlined in Figure 62 At the initiation of the project, 
the central bank issued a request for information to prospective partners, from 
which it may select participants for the study
 11 Danny Nelson and Anna Baydakova, ‘Denies Reports Claiming It Issued 
an E- Dinar’, in Coindesk, 12  November  2019, https:// wwwcoindeskcom/ 
tunisias- central- bank- denies- reports- claiming- it- issued- an- e- dinar
 12 Stephen O’Neal, ‘State- Issued Digital Currencies…’, cit
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Some of the secondary objectives of the study include design consider-
ations, policy impact, intended and unintended consequences, supportive 
legal and regulatory regime, process for ongoing monitoring, and incorpo-
rating learnings and perspectives from other central banks and related local 
and international forums The project will explore different CBDC designs in 
parallel, test different use cases, and explore policy and regulatory implications 
and trade- offs It is important to note that in this study, business processes 
are the key drivers and these are neutral in terms of solutions and technology 
infrastructure configurations In summary, the project will cover the aspects 
shown in the Figure 63
The South African CBDC feasibility study is still in its initial phase Once 
the central bank has identified enough potential partners that will join the 
study, useful insights will be gathered and a final position will be reached We 
expect the study to make a significant contribution to the body of knowledge 
on CBDC
Figure 6.2: CBDC lifecycle





This chapter discussed policy positions that have been adopted by a number 
of jurisdictions in Sub- Saharan Africa regarding crypto- currencies/ assets and 
CBDCs Most of these positions have been observed in the SADC region 
Although some countries are reviewing or considering reviewing their policy 
positions, the authorities have generally warned the public about possible expo-
sure in using crypto- assets These positions are largely informed by the fact 
that the countries have currently chosen not to regulate crypto- currencies/ as-
sets while closely observing and studying their development In South Africa, a 
position paper issued by the IFWG has made recommendations that, if adopted, 
Figure 6.3: CBDC project
Source: South African Reserve Bank
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could lead to some form of regulation of crypto- assets14 The recommendations 
are under consideration
Available information regarding CBDC initiatives in Africa is interesting but 
may also be misleading The enthusiasm of some players although welcome, has 
caused confusion when followed by denials from central banks This highlights 
the level of caution that central banks adopt in approaching the CBDCs, which 
contrasts with the enthusiasm of service providers
The exploratory approach taken by two African central banks seem to be 
aligned to some of the feasibility and research approaches adopted by central 
banks in the other parts of the world The ultimate success of a CBDC will 
depend on implementation that effectively addresses critical pain points in the 
payment ecosystem
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Chapter 7: China’s New Digital 
Currency: Implications for Renminbi 
Internationalization and the US Dollar
Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) are predicted to transform the way 
ordinary payments will be made in the future, both within countries and across 
national borders Several countries have begun the process of developing them, 
and China is widely recognized as running the world’s most advanced pro-
gramme in this area As early as 2014, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) had set 
up an expert research team to explore the technical and regulatory requirements 
for a CBDC, and in 2017 it established its own Digital Currency Research 
Institute1 The most significant development occurred in April 2020, when China 
became the first country to launch a pilot programme to test its digital currency 
Given the head start China has had over other countries in developing a CBDC, 
the suitability of a digital currency to what is already a largely cashless society 
and the determination of the Chinese government to forge ahead with this pro-
ject, it is reasonable to expect that the first CBDC in the world will be launched 
by China
For China, being a first mover in the development of such an important new 
technology can be of particular geo- strategic significance Not only would an 
early introduction of a CBDC place China in an advantageous position for an 
upcoming battle against other digital currencies and Facebook’s Libra, it would 
also play a role in China’s ongoing efforts to internationalize its currency, the ren-
minbi (RMB), aimed at increasing its attractiveness as a global trade, investment 
and reserve currency As the second largest economy that is on track to become 
the world’s largest, and as the world’s largest exporter, China holds aspirations 
to unseat the United States as the leading global political and economic power 
A strong RMB would enhance China’s ability to project its power internation-
ally and challenge the US dollar’s preeminent global role Could a CBDC be a 
 1 ‘Digital Currency Research Institute of the People’s Bank of China’, in China 
Banking News, 2  October  2018, https:// wwwchinabankingnewscom/ ?p=12050; 
Chuan Tian, ‘China’s Central Bank Opens New Digital Currency Research 
Institute’, in CoinDesk, 30  June  2017, https:// wwwcoindeskcom/ chinas- central- 





game- changer, effectively enabling China to elevate the RMB to a more domi-
nant international position?
This chapter examines China’s plans for a CBDC in detail to assess its poten-
tial significance for China and the world It begins by analysing the expected 
properties of the proposed digital currency and the implications it could have 
for payments in China and beyond Next, it will discuss progress made with the 
internationalization of the RMB and the potential contribution China’s digital 
currency can make in this process of currency internationalization Finally, the 
chapter will consider the extent to which China’s CBDC could enable the RMB 
to challenge the US dollar and what the implications are for global currency 
politics2
7.1  China’s new central bank digital currency
China’s CBDC project runs under the label Digital Currency/ Electronic 
Payments (DCEP) While many details are still subject to final confirmation and 
may change according to insights obtained from the pilot phase, and much is 
being kept secret, the current state of knowledge suggests that DCEP will have 
the following properties and functions
Properties and functions of DCEP
As the terminology indicates, DCEP’s main purpose is to create an electronic 
mode for payments that is sanctioned as legal tender by the Chinese govern-
ment3 It will be fully backed by the central bank at a 1:1 ratio to RMB fiat cur-
rency and effectively constitute a central bank liability DCEP aims to substitute 
cash (M0 money supply) without altering the money in circulation and will be 
non- interest bearing and subject to transaction limits and payments regulations4 
It is expected to be token- based and is not envisioned to serve as a store of value
DCEP will operate a two- tiered system The first tier will involve the PBoC 
issuing digital currency to intermediaries, which will be China’s four major state- 
owned commercial banks (Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China, China Construction Bank and Agricultural Bank of China), and payment 
 2 The author would like to thank four experts for the thoughts and insights they provided 
on the subject
 3 Michael Gu, ‘China’s National Digital Currency DCEP/ CBDC Overview’, in Boxmining, 
13 October 2020, https:// boxminingcom/ dcep/ #What_ is_ DCEP
 4 Katie- Ann Wilson, ‘China’s Next World- First’, in OMFIF Articles, 3 July 2020, https:// 
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services such as Alibaba’s Alipay, Tencent’s WeChat Pay and China UnionPay 
Telecommunications companies China Telecom, China Mobile, China 
Unicom and, potentially, Huawei, will also be involved As the second tier, the 
intermediaries will distribute digital currency to individuals and companies in 
the retail sector While avenues for distribution might vary, many expect the dig-
ital currency will be held in digital wallets, with electronic payments to be made 
through transfers between these wallets Using DCEP will not be tied to the pos-
session of a bank account, though bank deposits can be converted into digital 
currency5 It is therefore not intended to substitute demand or savings deposits 
(M1 or M2), although this could be attempted at a later stage of DCEP’s develop-
ment6 The technology is expected to have functionality for near- field communi-
cation (NFC), such as Bluetooth, to enable payments even when the devices used 
at the time of transaction are offline or in areas with low internet coverage Such 
offline payments could be accomplished by touching two smartphones7
The technological properties of DCEP have yet to be finalized, and the cur-
rent approach accommodates various technological solutions to allow for future 
adjustments in view of technological advances Technological solutions will have 
to meet specified requirements in the first tier (such as high scalability, high con-
currency, good customer experience and strict technical specifications), while 
different types of ledger systems (distributed, centralized, blockchain) and pay-
ment methods (mobile, internet, offline) could be accommodated in the second 
tier, depending on the preferences of the intermediaries8 It is quite possible that 
distributed ledger technology (DLT) will play an important role and is likely 
to involve ‘permissioned’ DLT or blockchain networks,9 in which access to the 
blockchain and ledger updating will be limited to a select group, enabling the 
 5 Michael Gu, ‘China’s National Digital Currency DCEP/ CBDC Overview’, cit; ‘China’s 
Digital Currency to Start Pilots’, in Ledger Insights, 9 December 2019, https:// www
ledgerinsightscom/ ?p=10208
 6 Cissy Zhou, ‘China’s Digital Currency Edges Closer with Large- Scale Test by 
Four State- Owned Banks’, in South China Morning Post, 6  August  2020, https:// 
wwwscmpcom/ economy/ china- economy/ article/ 3096296/ chinas- digital- 
 currency- edges- closer- large- scale- test- four
 7 Michael Gu, ‘China’s National Digital Currency DCEP/ CBDC Overview’, cit
 8 Sundeep Gantori et al, Information Technology. Understanding China’s Digital Currency 
and Blockchain Initiatives, UBS, 23  April  2020, https:// docplayernet/ 191072050- 
Information- technologyhtml
 9 Yuan Yang and Hudson Lockett, ‘What is China’s Digital Currency Plan?’, in 
Financial Times, 25  November  2019, https:// wwwftcom/ content/ e3f9c3c2- 0aaf- 












central bank to maintain control over the money supply10 China’s leaders have 
been vigorously pushing research into blockchain technologies over the past 
few years and its State Information Center (SIC) has recently established the 
Blockchain Service Network (BSN) to expand and better integrate blockchain 
infrastructure both domestically and internationally11 However, the technolo-
gies used for DCEP must have the capacity to process a vast number of small- 
scale transactions, potentially as many as 300,000 transactions per second,12 
which may be difficult to achieve with existing blockchain technologies (Alipay 
has reported being able to process up to 256,000 payment transactions per 
second)13 The PBoC has filed more than 80 patents related to DCEP,14 and the 
large Chinese internet giants (eg Alibaba and Tencent) are working with the 
Chinese government on the development of DCEP15
DCEP will probably operate under the principle of ‘controllable anonymity’ 
This means that, while all transactions are recorded, only the PBoC will have 
the capability to track overall payment behaviour16 This could erode privacy, 
 10 PwC, The Rise of Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs). What You Need to Know, 
November 2019, https:// wwwpwccom/ gx/ en/ financial- services/ pdf/ the- rise- of- 
central- bank- digital- currenciespdf
 11 Sundeep Gantori et al, Information Technology…, cit; David Pan, ‘China’s Blockchain 
Infrastructure to Extend Global Reach’, in CoinDesk, 21  July  2020, https:// www
coindeskcom/ chinas- blockchain- infrastructure- to- extend- global- reach- with- six- 
public- chains
 12 Sundeep Gantori et al, Information Technology…, cit
 13 See Alipay Twitter post of 11  November  2017:  https:// twittercom/ alipay/ status/ 
929123909970153472
 14 Hannah Murphy and Yuan Yang, ‘Patents Reveal Extent of China’s Digital 
Currency Plans’, in Financial Times, 12 February 2020, https:// wwwftcom/ content/ 
f10e94cc- 4d74- 11ea- 95a0- 43d18ec715f5
 15 Henny Sender, ‘China’s New Digital Currency Takes Aim at Alibaba and Tencent’, 
in Financial Times, 4 August 2020, https:// wwwftcom/ content/ fec06de9- ac43- 4ab8- 
81f3- 577638bd3c16; Jonas Gross and Alexander Bechtel, ‘China’s Digital Currency 
Project: What Is DC/ EP All About?’, in Medium, 4 June 2020, https:// linkmedium
com/ IbOTCm63Mab
 16 Ye Shi and Shucheng Zhou, Central Bank Digital Currencies:  Towards a Chinese 
Approach. Design Choices of Digital Currency Electronic Payment, Master Thesis, 
Jönköping University International Business School, May 2020, http:// urnkbse/ 
resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva- 48662; Raymond Zhong, ‘China’s Cryptocurrency 
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and the PBoC will need to offer reassurances that it will use such powers only in 
circumstances where illicit financial activities are suspected
The overall operational structure of DCEP is expected to follow a ‘1,2,3 frame-
work’,17 referring to the digital currency as the one token and the PBoC’s central 
ledger and the data centres of the intermediaries as two separated but connected 
addresses There are also three centres – an Identification Centre to identify new 
users, a Record Centre to record all transactions, issuances and transfers, and an 
Analytics Centre to conduct big data analysis of customer behaviours, macro-
economic implications and illicit activities18
The PBoC has announced that the back- end architecture development for 
DCEP, including design, standards and functionality, has been completed DCEP 
is now being tested and corresponding laws are being drafted19 Pilot trials were 
launched in April 2020 in Shenzhen, Suzhou (Xiangcheng District), Chengdu 
and Xiong’an near Beijing, in which government and bank employees and public 
servants have received specified funds such as parts of their transport subsi-
dies in digital currency, and selected catering and retail companies have been 
involved in testing the digital currency20 As part of the trials, state- owned com-
mercial banks have been developing and testing consumer- facing DCEP digital 
wallets As the pilot phase continues, new types of trials are being launched, cov-
ering various kinds of economic activities For example, one trial involved giving 
50 thousand Shenzhen residents digital coupons worth RMB 200 yuan each, to 
be spent between 12 and 18 October 2020 in designated shops21 How long trials 
 17 Ryan Todd and Mike Rogers, A Global Look at Central Bank Digital Currencies. From 
Iteration to Implementation, The Block Research for KPMG and Blockset, August 2020, 
https:// wwwtbstatcom/ wp/ uploads/ 2020/ 08/ KPMG- CBDC- ReportFINAL_ v102
pdf
 18 Shuyao Kong, ‘DCEP:  An Inside Look at China’s Digital Currency’, in Decrypt, 
28 June 2020, https:// decryptco/ 33866; Ye Shi and Shucheng Zhou, Central Bank 
Digital Currencies: Towards a Chinese Approach, cit
 19 Mohammad Musharraf, ‘Digital Yuan’s Backend Development Complete, Says Chinese 
Official’, in CoinTelegraph, 22 June 2020, https:// cointelegraphcom/ news/ digital- yuans- 
backend- development- complete- says- chinese- official; Michael Gu, ‘China’s National 
Digital Currency DCEP/ CBDC Overview’, cit
 20 Helen Davidson, ‘China Starts Major Trial of State- run Digital Currency’, in The 
Guardian, 28 April 2020, https:// gucom/ p/ dmgg3; Sundeep Gantori et al, Information 
Technology…, cit
 21 Hu Yue and Luo Meihan, ‘China Gives Away $15 Million to Test Digital Currency’, 
in Caixin Global, 9 October 2020, https:// wwwcaixinglobalcom/ 2020- 10- 12/ china- 












will continue until DCEP is ready for a full launch is unclear and no official time-
table has been given The 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics have been suggested as a 
venue to test DCEP on foreign visitors,22 an indication that some time might still 
pass before the digital currency is ready for a full launch
Implications of a digital currency for China
There are many reasons why DCEP could be beneficial to China, especially when 
launched relatively early These benefits could explain Beijing’s ambitions to vig-
orously push this initiative
Generally, DCEP could lower the cost of issuing paper money and coins, 
reduce the friction of bank transfers and make financial transactions more effi-
cient23 In pushing DCEP, the government is reacting to the rapidly declining role 
of cash in Chinese society, where people are exceptionally adept in using their 
smartphones for all kinds of transactions, large or small24 More than 80 per cent 
of smartphone owners use them for payments in China, which has the largest 
mobile payment adoption rate globally25 Private payment services such as Alipay 
and WeChat Pay have become powerful and systemically relevant in China and 
clawing back some of this power into the hands of the state- owned commercial 
banks and the PBoC could strengthen financial supervision and financial sta-
bility26 Wresting back some of this power will also reduce the influence these 
companies will have on determining the future evolution of digital payments
DCEP can further advance financial digitization, innovation and produc-
tivity27 Its functionality with NFC technology is expected to promote finan-
cial inclusion by making electronic payments services available to non- banked 
people in smaller cities and rural areas Digital money is also more hygienic than 
cash, an aspect that has gained great relevance with the COVID- 19 pandemic28
 22 Ryan Todd and Mike Rogers, A Global Look at Central Bank Digital Currencies…, cit
 23 PwC, The Rise of Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs)…, cit; Sundeep Gantori 
et al, Information Technology…, cit
 24 Henry M Paulson, ‘The Future of the Dollar’, in Foreign Affairs, 19 May 2020, https:// 
wwwforeignaffairscom/ node/ 1126037
 25 Sundeep Gantori et al, Information Technology…, cit
 26 Henny Sender, ‘China’s New Digital Currency Takes Aim at Alibaba and Tencent’, cit; 
Jonas Gross and Alexander Bechtel, ‘China’s Digital Currency Project: What Is DC/ 
EP All About?’, cit
 27 Sundeep Gantori et al, Information Technology…, cit
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The traceability and potential programmability of a digital currency will 
enhance central bank supervision and the government’s control over money 
flows and financial activities These two features of DCEP could help combat 
illicit financial activities, such as corruption, fraud, money laundering, terrorist 
financing and tax evasion,29 though they may potentially intensify government 
monitoring of society30 The data obtainable from traceable digital currency 
could facilitate the monitoring of money flows, offering an improved means for 
analysis of economic activity and financial stability Traceability and potential 
programmability of digital money would provide a new instrument to better 
control the money supply, make monetary policy smarter and enhance macro- 
prudential regulation31 Cross- border transactions might also be better con-
trolled32 All this is unlikely to change the money supply itself and there should 
be no implications for inflation33
At an international level, DCEP could facilitate broader global circulation 
of the RMB and potentially weaken the US- dominated cross- border payment 
system34 An early launch of DCEP will also defy Facebook’s Libra, which the 
Chinese government considers a threat, and will position China ahead of others 
should the rise of digital currencies trigger a fundamental reorientation of the 
global financial architecture35 These considerations will be discussed in greater 
detail in the next sections
 29 PwC, The Rise of Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs)…, cit; Sundeep Gantori 
et al, Information Technology…, cit; Ye Shi and Shucheng Zhou, Central Bank Digital 
Currencies: Towards a Chinese Approach, cit
 30 Roger Huang, ‘China Will Use Its Digital Currency to Compete with the USD’, 
in Forbes, 25  May  2020, https:// wwwforbescom/ sites/ rogerhuang/ 2020/ 05/ 25/ 
china- will- use- its- digital- currency- to- compete- with- the- usd
 31 Yao Qian, ‘Central Bank Digital Currency: Optimization of the Currency System and 
Its Issuance Design’, in China Economic Journal, Vol 12, No 1 (2019), p 1– 15; Yao 
Qian, ‘A Systematic Framework to Understand Central Bank Digital Currency’, in 
Science China Information Sciences, Vol 61, Article 033101 (2018)
 32 Jonas Gross and Alexander Bechtel, ‘China’s Digital Currency Project: What Is DC/ EP 
All About?’, cit
 33 Sundeep Gantori et al, Information Technology…, cit; PwC, The Rise of Central Bank 
Digital Currencies (CBDCs)…, cit
 34 Michael Gu, ‘China’s National Digital Currency DCEP/ CBDC Overview’, cit

















Despite the potential benefits of DCEP, its introduction will not be without 
risks A key concern is that DCEP might erode the role of commercial banks as 
financial intermediaries and could result in disintermediation36 The two- tiered 
setup and non- interest- bearing nature of the DCEP plan is meant to reduce 
the likelihood of this occurring37 DCEP will be particularly disruptive if not 
destructive to the business of card companies, and payment services offered 
by Alipay and WeChat Pay will have to adapt as well38 The current Alipay and 
WeChat Pay systems are not compatible, and DCEP offers an opportunity to 
decompartmentalize the digital payments system Despite these systemic shifts, 
the commercial banks and digital payment service providers should also be 
able to identify numerous new business opportunities from the introduction of 
DCEP39 Cyber security is another area of concern, especially threat of hacking,40 
and some may also be concerned about the lack of guaranteed privacy and ano-
nymity of DCEP, which could be abused by authorities eg to intensify control 
over the behaviour of citizens41
Finally, other implications not mentioned here can also be expected, and 
rolling out such a technologically complex project in an area so important for 
the functioning of the economy and financial system may result in unforeseen 
and possibly serious consequences42 These problems might be particularly acute 
for the first- mover CBDC To avoid this, the maintenance of high technical 
standards and requirements will be important43 A pragmatic, stepwise introduc-
tion of DCEP could also help forestall unforeseen problems The fact that China 
is testing DCEP through pilot projects indicates a cautious approach, in line with 
the policy experimentation China has traditionally employed to advance its eco-
nomic reforms
 36 PwC, The Rise of Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs)…, cit
 37 Katie- Ann Wilson, ‘China’s Next World- First’, cit
 38 Richard Turrin, ‘China’s CBDC’, in PCN Magazine, Vol 6, No 2 (July 2020), p 6– 9, 
https:// wwwteampcncom/ magazine/ magazine/ china- s- cbdc
 39 Sundeep Gantori et al, Information Technology…, cit
 40 PwC, The Rise of Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs)…, cit; Sundeep Gantori 
et al, Information Technology…, cit
 41 Raymond Zhong, ‘China’s Cryptocurrency Plan Has A Powerful Partner: Big Brother’, 
cit; Jonas Gross and Alexander Bechtel, ‘China’s Digital Currency Project: What Is DC/ 
EP All About?’, cit
 42 Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures, ‘Central Bank Digital Currencies’, 
in CPMI Papers, No 174 (March 2018), https:// wwwbisorg/ cpmi/ publ/ d174htm
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7.2  China’s renminbi internationalization
Since 2009, in the wake of the financial crisis, China began to actively promote 
the internationalization of the RMB There was frustration that US dollar hege-
mony enabled the country at the source of the crisis – the United States – to use 
monetary policy to shield itself better from the economic fallout than peripheral 
countries like China, which incurred considerable damage44
Steps taken to internationalize the renminbi
From the financial crisis onwards, China engaged in a series of activities to 
advance the internationalization of the RMB The first step was to create off-
shore RMB bond markets, starting with so- called dim sum bonds in Hong Kong 
in 2007 and then expanding the issuance of RMB- denominated bonds to other 
geographical areas45 This made possible the purchase of RMB- denominated 
bonds outside China, where they were subject to fewer restrictions46 At this 
time China also launched the offshore renminbi (CNH) next to its onshore 
counterpart (CNY) A  more direct effort at advancing the internationaliza-
tion of the RMB soon followed with China’s conclusion of a large number of 
bilateral currency swap arrangements with other countries, providing greater 
cross- border liquidity and other benefits By 2020, more than 30 swap lines 
were established, resulting in China by far exceeding the number of swap lines 
of other countries – the United States in second place had less than half that 
number47
An important focus area of RMB internationalization was the promotion of 
international trade settlement, advanced primarily in the early- to mid- 2010s 
 44 Di Dongsheng, ‘The Economics and Politics of China’s Currency Internationalization’, 
in Global Asia, Vol 15, No 2 (June 2020), p  58– 64, https:// wwwglobalasiaorg/ 
v15no2/ cover/ the- economics- and- politics- of- chinas- currency- internationalization_ 
di- dongsheng; Daniel McDowell, ‘The (Ineffective) Financial Statecraft of China’s 
Bilateral Swap Agreements’, in Development and Change, Vol 50, No 1 (January 2019), 
p 122– 143
 45 Hung- Gay Fung et al, ‘The Offshore Renminbi Bonds: The Dim Sum and Formosa 
Bonds’, in The Chinese Economy, Vol 49, No 4 (2016), p 287– 299
 46 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), ‘Will China’s Push to 
Internationalize the Renminbi Succeed?’, in ChinaPower, 18 June 2020, https:// wpme/ 
p8Side- 1AP
 47 Di Dongsheng, ‘The Economics and Politics of China’s Currency Internationalization’, 













This involved the establishment of a network of offshore RMB clearing hubs 
in financial centres across the globe to facilitate the cross- border settlement in 
RMB Each hub had one of the state- owned commercial banks as the designated 
clearing bank48 This massively expanded cross- border trade settlement in RMB, 
though much of it remained concentrated in Hong Kong Clearing of inward 
and outward foreign direct investment in RMB was also permitted49 In 2015, 
China launched its Cross- border Interbank Payments System (CIPS) to facilitate 
international clearing and settlement in RMB in parallel to the SWIFT global 
standard
China’s ambition to internationalize the RMB has been supported by various 
other domestic and cross- border initiatives and reforms Participation by for-
eign institutional investors in China’s bond and stock markets has been grad-
ually expanded, and stock- connect programmes were introduced with Hong 
Kong and London, followed by a bond- connect programme with Hong Kong 
in 2017 Domestic interest rates have become more market- determined and 
the RMB exchange rate has been allowed to float more widely in recent years50 
In 2015, the currency’s managed float regime was reset to follow a basket of 
currencies, whereas previously it had only followed the US dollar These and 
other initiatives can be seen as slow steps towards a tentative relaxation of capital 
account restrictions The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with financing support 
from China’s recently established international development banks – in partic-
ular the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Silk Road Fund and the 
New Development Bank – have also been identified as vehicles to promote RMB 
internationalization51
The growing international role of the RMB was recognized in 2016 by the 
currency’s inclusion into the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) basket, which is an 
international reserve asset created by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
Primarily of symbolic importance, its inclusion elevated the RMB to a status 
 48 Ramon Pacheco Pardo, Jan Knoerich and Yuanfang Li, ‘The Role of London and 
Frankfurt in Supporting the Internationalisation of the Chinese Renminbi’, in New 
Political Economy, Vol 24, No 4 (2019), p 530– 545
 49 CSIS, ‘Will China’s Push to Internationalize the Renminbi Succeed?’, cit
 50 Di Dongsheng, ‘The Economics and Politics of China’s Currency Internationalization’, cit
 51 Ibid; SWIFT, Beyond Borders: China Opens Up to the World, RMB Tracker special 
edition, June 2019, https:// wwwswiftcom/ swift- resource/ 227391/ download; Jan 
Knoerich and FranciscoUrdinez, ‘Contesting Contested Multilateralism: Why the West 
Joined the Rest in Founding the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’, in The Chinese 









China’s New Digital Currency 155
alongside the US dollar, euro, yen and pound despite its still limited importance 
as an international investment and reserve currency
Limitations of renminbi internationalization
All these initiatives at promoting the internationalization of the RMB had the 
effect of expanding global use of the currency But after an initial push during 
the first half of the 2010s, the crash on China’s stock markets in 2015 compelled 
the government to devalue the RMB Capital controls were tightened to prevent 
even greater currency depreciation and capital flight This reduced international 
confidence in the RMB and had the effect of slowing down its internationaliza-
tion, in some areas reversing progress already made52
Table  1 illustrates how, despite China being the world’s second largest 
economy and largest trading nation, the share of the RMB in three important 
measures of currency internationalization – global payments, activity in the for-
eign exchange market and foreign exchange reserves – remains well below 5 per 
cent, ranking behind the other major reserve currencies Having started at close 
to zero just a decade earlier, the current level can nevertheless be considered 
impressive, yet China still has a long way to go until its currency becomes truly 
international The US dollar and the euro clearly dominate, and the fact that 
these two currencies are already deeply enmeshed in the international financial 
architecture will make it hard to unseat them
These still comparatively modest figures and the slowing down of RMB inter-
nationalization in recent years have exposed the limitations of China’s reliance 
on payment infrastructure programmes and conditional access schemes, aimed 
at promoting internationalization while maintaining full control and poten-
tial reversibility of the process China’s capital account remains among the least 
open in the world and its financial markets among the most restricted to foreign 
participants These self- imposed limitations are keeping the RMB below its true 
potential53
Achieving further meaningful currency internationalization will require 
greater trade- offs To truly internationalize, the RMB needs to circulate glob-
ally at a higher rate, but China’s persistent current account surplus is hin-
dering an increase in global circulation of the currency Another option to 
 52 CSIS, ‘Will China’s Push to Internationalize the Renminbi Succeed?’, cit
 53 Maximilian Kärnfelt, ‘China’s Currency Push The Chinese Yuan Expands Its 









increase global circulation is by expanding capital outflows,54 but this requires 
greater convertibility on the capital account, removal of restrictions on inward 
and outward capital flows and continuous opening up of China’s financial 
markets to foreign participation Removing capital flow restrictions would 
force China to accept reduced control over capital flows and greater swings 
in the exchange rate, potentially having to relinquish control over it entirely 
But the government is unlikely to accept such loss of control any time soon, 
out of fear such moves could destabilize China’s financial system and facilitate 
capital flight
The financial system in China remains weak and underdeveloped, facing 
many problems including lack of regulation, inefficiency in allocating credit 
to the most productive investments, excessive speculation and risk- taking, 
corruption, financial scandals, moral hazard, and soft budget constraints55 
A  major concern are high levels of debt, held primarily by state- owned 
enterprises, local governments and individual households, and a surging 
number of non- performing loans Some estimate China’s debt to exceed 300 
per cent of GDP, though the true extent of the problem remains unknown 
Table 7.1: Global utilization of the RMB is still comparatively limited
Currency Share of global 
payments
June 2020, % (Rank)
Share of foreign 
exchange market 
turnover
April 2019, % (Rank)




USD 4033 (1) 883 (1) 6199 (1)
EUR 3410 (2) 323 (2) 2005 (2)
GBP 708 (3) 128 (4) 443 (4)
JPY 374 (4) 168 (3) 570 (3)
CNY 1.76 (5) 4.3 (8) 2.02 (5)
Source: (*) SWIFT, (SWIFT, RMB Tracker, July 2020, https:// wwwswiftcom/ swift- resource/ 
249256/ download) (**) BIS, (The maximum possible is 200 per cent, as two parties are involved 
in any one transaction Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Foreign Exchange Turnover in 
April 2019, 16 September 2019, https:// wwwbisorg/ statistics/ rpfx19_ fxhtm) (***) IMF(IMF 
Data: Table 1, World Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves, https:// data
imforg/ regularaspx?key=41175)
 54 George Magnus, Red Flags. Why Xi’s China is in Jeopardy, New Haven, Yale University 
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A considerable amount of financial leverage has emerged in China’s obscure 
shadow- banking sector, which has tolerated opaque financial practices such 
as the issuance of off- balance sheet loans, peer- to- peer lending and high- risk 
wealth management products
Since 2017, the Chinese government has intensified efforts to address some of 
these problems It has issued new rules, regulations and guidelines, restructured 
regulatory institutions, re- organized financial governance, clamped down on 
illicit behaviour and dubious financial practices, and reigned in shadow- banking 
activities including peer- to- peer lending and the sale of high- risk wealth man-
agement products56 But more needs to be done before China can confidently 
open its financial markets without having to fear major capital flight or other 
forms of financial instability Unfortunately, it is likely that the coronavirus pan-
demic will reduce Beijing’s appetite for financial reforms On the contrary, China 
appears prepared to allow debt to accumulate further to cushion the economic 
fallout from the crisis
For broader international adoption of the RMB, Beijing will need to build 
international confidence in the regulatory, governance and institutional 
structures underpinning the currency This will require greater reliance on 
market mechanisms and reduction of government intervention, which can be 
erratic, as the sudden devaluation of the exchange rate after the stock market 
crisis has shown Moreover, continuous de- politicization of financial matters will 
be important, despite the current political instability in Hong Kong and the geo-
political environment becoming more antagonistic towards China
7.3  The potential global impact of the digital currency
The introduction of DCEP thus comes at a time when some meaningful progress 
has been made in internationalizing the RMB, but significant headwinds exist in 
advancing it further It remains unclear whether DCEP will be focused on China 
or become more widely adopted beyond its borders If its adoption does inter-
nationalize, will DCEP then become just another infrastructure programme to 
facilitate RMB internationalization next to all the others, or will it constitute a 
larger breakthrough in raising the status of the RMB as an international trade, 
investment and reserve currency, potentially challenging the dominance of the 
US dollar?





Impact on renminbi internationalization
Given the setup of DCEP primarily as a payments system, if pushed to an inter-
national level it can be expected to further facilitate international payments in 
RMB DCEP could offer companies importing to or exporting from China a sim-
plified method for cross- border RMB- denominated settlement, with the added 
advantage of reducing currency exchange costs and risks by eliminating the 
need for the US dollar as an intermediary currency57 The cost- effective nature of 
DCEP could help break through the entrenched network characteristics of the 
global currency system, in which it is often still more convenient to use the US 
dollar as an intermediary currency even when it would be possible to exchange 
third currencies directly into RMB58 DCEP might become even more interesting 
for traders if it is incorporated into broader programmes for the digitization of 
trade with China, some of which are already being developed59 China has been 
taking advantage of its leading role in international trade to intensify global 
demand for its currency,60 and DCEP provides an important opportunity to fur-
ther intensify this strategy
Beyond its adoption in international trade, individuals in other countries 
could also use DCEP for common payments and transactions, should the tech-
nology allow it61 An accessible payments system in RMB could be particularly 
attractive in developing countries with underdeveloped financial infrastructures 
or unstable currencies Here, DCEP could even function as an alternative to local 
currency,62 and its NFC functionality could provide digital payments to remote 
areas and unbanked populations in these countries The global number of un-
banked adults is at 17 billion, according to the World Bank, though around two 
thirds of them have access to a mobile phone63 Most of them live in developing 
countries DCEP might become increasingly popular especially in countries 
 57 John Xie, ‘China’s Digital Currency Takes Shape; Will It Challenge Dollar?’, in 
Voice of America, 25  April  2020, https:// wwwvoanewscom/ economy- business/ 
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with closer links to China, such as in Asia or along the Belt and Road, and in 
countries receiving large numbers of Chinese tourists Cross- border payments 
traffic with China in RMB is already rising considerably in many Asian and 
African countries,64 and Chinese electronic payment companies Ant Financial 
and Tencent are making inroads into developing country markets in Africa and 
elsewhere China UnionPay already has a vast global presence The expansion of 
these payment services paves the way for a potential future adoption of DCEP 
in these countries
Another way DCEP could have an international dimension is through 
its potential to circumvent the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunication (SWIFT) payments system used for most international 
transactions between financial institutions65 This system is in many ways archaic 
and expensive, with transactions needing several days for completion, despite 
technologies with much shorter transaction times being currently available 
DCEP could offer a faster and cheaper alternative to SWIFT
All these considerations suggest that DCEP is likely to expand global payments 
in RMB, but how the digital currency could play a role in advancing the RMB as 
an investment or reserve currency is less obvious While companies, institutional 
and retail investors may draw on DCEP to invest into and out of China, the exis-
tence of a new method for cross- border transactions is unlikely to significantly 
affect investment decisions, which will continue to depend on the fundamentals 
of the Chinese financial system DCEP will not eliminate the need for financial 
reforms, capital account liberalization and a more flexible exchange rate Rather, 
these may become more necessary to make DCEP effective as a cross- border 
payments mechanism between China and the rest of the world As it currently 
stands, DCEP would need to be subject to the same convertibility restrictions as 
the RMB66
For similar reasons, DCEP will be less relevant in government choices on the 
reserve currencies they hold Major reserve currencies will continue to be those 
backed by strong economic fundamentals, good financial governance and an 
open currency system The adoption of DCEP as a payments system backed by 
the central bank is not likely to change that
 64 SWIFT, Beyond Borders: China Opens Up to the World, cit
 65 Richard Turrin, ‘China’s CBDC’, cit
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Implications for the global dominance of the US dollar
DCEP’s most promising strength is its potential to shift the world payments 
system in favour of the RMB If it is successful in making RMB payments more 
convenient in other countries, DCEP could offer a readily available alternative 
to the US dollar for payment transactions Many businesses conducting interna-
tional trade with China would embrace an opportunity to cut transaction costs 
and enhance payment efficiency Given that China is the world’s largest exporter, 
international adoption of DCEP for trade settlement could scale up rapidly In 
addition, individuals, especially in developing countries, will probably show 
interest Gradually, the use of the RMB would rise at the expense of the US dollar
To accelerate this process, Beijing could proactively encourage China’s inter-
national economic partners to promote DCEP Countries with particularly 
strong ties with China or those more critical of the United States and concerned 
about the dominance of the US dollar may well be receptive to such initiatives67 
Any future economic decoupling between the United States and China may 
create even greater space for DCEP to develop and spread, at least within areas 
where China has a strong influence, such as in some of the countries along the 
Belt and Road
DCEP offers China an opportunity to provide a complete and potentially 
more efficient alternative to existing global payments systems, such as SWIFT 
and the Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS) As the gov-
ernance of these established systems could be considered Western- centric, 
China should have an interest in developing alternatives Its attempt to estab-
lish CIPS was one move towards creating such alternatives, but this system still 
collaborates with SWIFT and its adoption has been relatively modest DCEP 
could provide a completely new and different mechanism, entirely removed 
from these traditional payments systems It would enable China to circumvent 
and avoid the current system of international transactions (and become less 
vulnerable to Western sanctions)68
However, although the future of DCEP looks promising in payments 
transactions, its potential to help the RMB challenge US dollar dominance as an 
international investment and reserve currency is more limited Greater promi-
nence of the RMB in these two areas would however be necessary to dethrone 
the US dollar, and international liquidity of the RMB would need to be higher 
 67 Michael Greenwald, ‘Digitizing the Dollar in the Age of COVID- 19’, in New Atlanticist, 
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DCEP cannot be expected to help China challenge the US dollar outright unless 
China significantly reforms and liberalizes its financial system
Nevertheless, a strong global rollout and scaling up of DCEP in cross- border 
payments should offer China an important opportunity to eat into US dollar 
hegemony by gradually expanding the space for the RMB and slowly building 
up a viable alternative to the US dollar69 Over a longer period of time, these 
efforts could lay the groundwork for a greater challenge to US dollar hegemony, 
especially once the time has finally come for China’s financial system to undergo 
more decisive and persistent reforms
7.4  Conclusions and future outlook
China will, without doubt, have a first- mover advantage in rolling out a CBDC 
The large size of its population and extraordinary familiarity of its people with 
digital payment technologies and cashless transactions through smartphones 
and QR codes provides its central bank with a unique platform to test and scale 
up any rollout of DCEP Alipay or WeChat Pay are standard, ubiquitous forms 
of payment in China, with mobile payments transactions having reached 415 
trillion US dollars in 201870 Concerns over privacy are also less of a concern in 
China,71 which makes the country a practical testing ground for a DCEP that 
only promises ‘controllable anonymity’
A first- mover advantage might also enable China to internationalize digital 
currency payments before other countries’ CBDCs emerge China would then 
be able to define many relevant technological standards, placing it in a privileged 
position when it comes to determining the future direction of the technology72
However, it is far from certain that DCEP will also trigger a major overhaul of 
international digital payments, and there will be challenges and downsides To 
successfully internationalize DCEP, China would need to resolve the contradic-
tion of how to rapidly expand international circulation of RMB despite a current 
account surplus and limited international capital flows Beijing will also need to 
 69 Hannah Murphy and Yuan Yang, ‘Patents Reveal Extent of China’s Digital Currency 
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Ultimate Hard Power Tool, Deutsche Bank Research, January 2020, https:// www
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build confidence among overseas users of DCEP in the strength of the Chinese 
economy, its institutions, policies and financial system, the governance of the 
RMB, and the functionalities and security of DCEP Most importantly, Beijing 
will need to offer reassurance about what ‘controllable anonymity’ means for 
overseas users of DCEP, who may be more concerned than the average Chinese 
citizen about privacy and potential surveillance by the Chinese government
In being the first country to roll out DCEP, China will also assume the risks 
should anything go wrong in what is a sensitive area of any national economy 
Other countries will learn from China’s roll- out of DCEP and adapt the positives 
to their circumstances while being able to anticipate and avoid any mistakes 
China may make This will help speed up any subsequent development of com-
peting digital currencies, including for the US dollar Many central banks are 
already developing competing digital currencies, the IMF has been encour-
aging their development,73 and the G7 countries are discussing collaboration on 
CBDCs in direct response to China’s efforts74 Some advanced- economy CBDCs, 
even if launched belatedly, might draw on their stronger and more internation-
ally integrated financial systems to leapfrog the DCEP
China does not assume a leadership role in fintech, as its real advantage is 
scalability The United States – itself a strong fintech power with a high volume 
of cashless payments using both mobile phone (eg Apple Pay) and card- based 
technologies – should be able to quickly follow China into the digital currency 
era, together with other countries This might reduce the extent to which China 
will be able to capitalize on its first- mover advantage The result may be a system 
of several, possibly quite integrated, digital currencies But to achieve catch- up 
with China in digital currencies, the US government must develop greater policy 
determination to develop its own CBDC Moreover, to keep the hegemony of its 
currency in the long run, the US will need to maintain overall confidence in its 
economic fundamentals, financial system, policies and institutions, and play a 
constructive leadership role in multilateral economic affairs
In sum, an early launch of DCEP offers China an additional channel for the 
internationalization of the RMB and an opportunity to eat away at the US dollar’s 
dominance in the international financial architecture Initial focus is likely to be 
on international payments, but in the medium- to long- term, DCEP could help 
advance the RMB as an international investment and reserve currency, should 
 73 PwC, The Rise of Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs)…, cit
 74 Cissy Zhou, ‘China’s Digital Currency Edges Closer with Large- Scale Test by Four 
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China’s domestic financial system become more favourable to such an objective 
and should the international liquidity of the currency improve Although its first- 
mover advantage in developing DCEP will benefit China, there will be associated 
challenges as well The final outcome will depend on how China leads the way 
into this new CBDC era, how other countries – including the United States – will 
respond, and how both the Chinese and US economies will evolve in the future 
What remains quite certain is that we will soon witness some ground- breaking 
transformations in the global system for cross- border payments and potentially 
broader international financial infrastructure, spearheaded by China
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Chapter 8: CBDCs and Stablecoins: The 
Scramble for (Controllable) Anonymity
In an increasingly digitalized society, citizen– consumers create an enormous 
volume of data, enabling the empowerment of new business opportunities pro-
duced by data aggregation and analysis This unprecedented megatrend has 
already raised several questions around data governance, concerning the rules 
that frame availability, management, accessibility, security and usability of data 
These concerns are heightened when considering the accumulation of financial 
data, which is experiencing a remarkable growth in both volume and quality, 
due to the increasing digitalisation of payments Cash – in the form of banknotes 
and coins – has the unique feature of full anonymity Someone can pay for goods 
or services without disclosing one’s identity or personal/ financial information 
This is something that credit/ debit cards and mobile payment apps do not have 
Whenever a transaction is intermediated by a third- party, the latter gathers and 
stores data on that transaction Cash then reduces the information asymmetry 
between governments and private corporations, and citizens
On the one hand, a progressively cashless society can help mitigate the risks 
of tax evasion and money laundering, as regulators would be able more easily 
to monitor and keep track of citizens’ transactions On the other hand, the ex-
isting digital payment solutions are developed and owned by private actors  – 
incumbent financial institutions, big technology companies and non- banking 
actors – enabling these players to establish an intermediary function between 
governments and public money Furthermore, these private players can col-
lect valuable data that can empower their models of behavioural profiles This 
is particularly relevant for big tech and non- bank actors that will be able to 
develop a more comprehensive profile of consumers through a cross- sources 
analysis, combing through information on what consumers like, desire, buy and 
can afford Financial data is valuable because it provides an accurate picture of 
consumer’s habits and financial situation The growing public policy concerns 
on the effects of this payment disintermediation increase if private non- banking 
actors are also seeking to launch private digital currencies that could potentially 
create parallel money systems, operating on a new architecture rather than on 
traditional infrastructures and networks
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Governments are worried that, if this trend of cashless payments keeps 
expanding, private actors would dominate the digital payment market, pro-
ducing risks related to data aggregation and accumulation To strengthen the 
role of central bank money as a relevant unit of account in a digital society, 
central banks are exploring the development of domestic general purpose cen-
tral bank digital currencies (CBDCs) Despite CBDCs being a public- issued 
form of money, they also produce risks around how much information central 
governments can retain from consumer’s transactions This makes it challenging 
to find and establish a balance between controllable anonymity and compliance 
with the current anti- money laundering (AML) rules Apparently, CBDCs could 
be technically designed to blind or regulate states’ supervision to allow users 
some degree of privacy and anonymity1 Yet the equilibrium of the degree of 
anonymity in relation to efficiency and security in a CBDC system appears to 
primarily be a political decision rather than a technical and design issue The 
underlying infrastructure is determined by a conscious choice Most of the 
current literature and discussion on privacy/ anonymity and CBDCs has been 
focused on the possible technical solutions to guarantee security and to limit 
accessibility2 Those engaged in this discussion should however take a step back 
first and focus on which degree of privacy/ anonymity monetary systems should 
guarantee to citizens In terms of their different natures and the risks they pro-
duce, both CBDCs and private- owned stablecoins raise concerns on anonymity, 
data aggregation and balance of power: how much privacy should be available, 
and from whom, are key public policy issues Nevertheless, whereas the debate 
on stablecoins at the multilateral level appears to have recognized the political 
dimension of this innovation, the discussion on CBDCs seems to lack a political 
approach to anonymity
8.1  Anonymity in CBDCs and privately owned stablecoins
One often hears the common  – and yet simplistic and misconceived  – argu-
ment that the only people who care about anonymous payment systems are 
 1 European Central Bank (ECB), ‘Exploring Anonymity in Central Bank Digital 
Currencies’, In Focus Papers, No 4 (December 2019), https:// wwwecbeuropaeu/ paym/ 
intro/ publications/ pdf/ ecbmipinfocus191217enpdf
 2 Ibid; Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures, ‘Central Bank Digital 
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those who are violating the law3 This has been an extremely popular reasoning 
to stigmatize the development of untraceable means of digital payment – such 
as Bitcoins – as a sort of anarcho- utopian project However, in the book Privacy 
and Freedom, published in 1967, Alan Westin asserted that privacy is an indi-
vidual freedom: ‘the claim of individuals […] to determine for themselves when, 
how, and [to] what extent information about them [citizens] is communicated 
to others’4 That commercial payment platforms monetize data is no secret They 
either sell data to third parties for cross- source aggregation or use payment 
data to cluster users and sell these consumer profiles to third parties Google, 
for instance, bought data on millions of card transactions from Mastercard The 
deal aimed at tracking when and whether the online advertisements powered 
by Google resulted in a sale in physical shops5 Although both Google and 
Mastercard guaranteed the privacy and the safety of the financial data, Google 
has started offering a service called ‘Store Sales Measurement’, which allows it 
to anonymously match ads and actual store sales6 Clients have, however, not 
been informed that their banking data has been sold and shared with a third 
party Similarly, in China, the flow of data in Alibaba’s various activities has been 
feeding and empowering its large ecosystem, such as with the transfer of data 
from Alibaba’s e- commerce stores and Alipay to MyBank to assess creditworthi-
ness, or from Alipay to Sesame Credit7 This market is still underdeveloped, and 
it is likely to grow very fast, driven by the increasing scale of data accumulation 
and by the advancement of prediction tools
Whether (controllable) anonymity is a right or an individual freedom in the 
realm of payments is arguable, but the digitalisation of payments is de facto 
altering the equilibrium between privacy and security that has endured for 
centuries in the relationship of citizen– consumers, governments and private 
 3 Felix Salmon, ‘Why Payments Won’t Ever Be Anonymous’, in Reuters, 16 December 2011, 
http:// reutrs/ 1pjAtfX
 4 Alan F Westin, Privacy and Freedom, New York, Atheneum, 1967, p 7
 5 Mark Bergen and Jennifer Surane, ‘Google and Mastercard Cut a Secret Ad Deal to 
Track Retail Sales’, in Bloomberg, 30 August 2018, https:// wwwbloombergcom/ news/ 
articles/ 2018- 08- 30/ google- and- mastercard- cut- a- secret- ad- deal- to- track- retail- sales
 6 Sridhar Ramaswamy, ‘Powering Ads and Analytics Innovations with Machine Learning’, 
in Google Blog, 23 May 2017, https:// bloggoogle/ products/ marketingplatform/ 360/ 
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companies With the traceability produced by digital payments, several questions 
can be raised How is the financial data collected used? Could ‘financial sur-
veillance’ be a threat? In that case, can that threat be mitigated? Could digital 
currencies affect the balance of power in the relationship of individuals with 
state and private corporations? This range of questions is more relevant now than 
ever, considering a future society in which digital currencies are widely used, 
increasing risks of misbehaviour in data exploitation by private corporations as 
well as by public authorities
The development of private- owned stablecoins within a larger ecosystem 
could be a turning point in monetary systems as this form of digital money could 
reach scale very quickly The first intrinsic advantage of stablecoins is that they 
can assure a less volatile asset to users, providing these digital currencies with a 
potential function of medium of exchange and of store of value Nevertheless, 
the attractiveness of these initiatives is causally linked to two factors that affect 
money circulation First, the credibility of the issuer Consumers need to trust 
that they can convert their digital tokens into fiat money anytime they like, and 
that the value of the stablecoin is indeed stable and backed by reserves Second, 
the degree of acceptance Users could be incentivized to adopt a stablecoin 
that is backed by a corporation that has a pre- existing relationship with a large 
consumer base and has high brand recognition, as this could mitigate the per-
ceived risks related to its governance and, at the same time, it could empower 
an ecosystem of services and products accessible through this digital currency, 
exploiting network effects Such characteristics could allow both diffusion of 
information and adoption, reducing the common entry barriers to traditional 
currency8
If the intermediation of private players is already dominating electronic and 
mobile payments, stablecoins could provide large private tech corporations with 
the opportunity to generate and record unique data on transactions directly on 
their independent infrastructure, facilitating the empowerment of faster, cheaper 
and more efficient solutions for data predictive analysis and tools Network exter-
nalities are stronger when an ecosystem offers an integrated platform of services 
and products, creating value through knowledge Digital payment solutions then 
become a tool to strengthen the business models of these players, which aim at 
building an ‘aggregator of mutually complementary activities’
 8 Tobias Adrian and Tommaso Mancini- Griffoli, ‘Digital Currencies:  The Rise of 
Stablecoins’, in IMF Blog, 19 September 2019, https:// blogsimforg/ ?p=27149
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A further consolidation of digital payment solutions through stablecoins 
developed by private players could lead to a deeper concentration of cross- 
sources data aggregation, creating far- reaching implications for how data will 
be used within the ecosystem or shared with third parties9 Even though both 
established e- wallets (such as Google Pay or Apple Pay) and stablecoin’s piv-
otal projects (such as Libra - recently renamed Diem - ) have given assurances 
that they will not share or monetize financial data, these intermediaries could 
anyway ultimately access and gather information to empower their eco-
system For example, if users integrate Calibra, Facebook’s e- wallet, with their 
Messenger or WhatsApp accounts, Facebook will be able to track basic infor-
mation, such as with whom or at which shop users have started a transaction, 
without needing specific approval by users themselves Furthermore, in the 
name of convenience, large tech corporations are likely to encourage users to 
allow the free flow of information within their ecosystem’s activities with the 
promise of rewards
Despite private banking and non- banking players claiming that personal 
data is only used in an anonymized form, data is normally only protected by 
pseudonymized keys To highlight how weak the system is, some experts were 
able to correctly track names or card numbers of 90 per cent of 11 million credit 
card holders only based on their ‘anonymized’ card transactions made over three 
months10 In addition to a set of technical concerns related to data protection, the 
aggregation of financial data could produce newer risks of anti- competitive use 
of data Exploiting network effects and market dominance, big tech companies 
could be incentivized to engage in price discrimination (charging consumers 
different prices for the same product) due to the increasing information asym-
metry between consumers and companies11 Think about Uber’s ‘route- based 
pricing’ This system uses various factors to set rates based on a prediction that 
evaluates how much a user will be willing to spend Or consider the petition filed 
 9 G7 Working Group on Stablecoins, ‘Investigating the Impact of Global Stablecoins’, in 
CPMI Papers, No 187 (18 October 2019), p 15, https:// wwwbisorg/ cpmi/ publ/ d187
htm
 10 Heike Mai, ‘Cash Empowers the Individual Through Data Protection’, in 
Talking Point, 2 July 2019, https:// wwwdbresearchcom/ PROD/ RPS_ EN- PROD/ 
PROD0000000000495958/ Cash_ empowers_ the_ individual_ through_ data_ protecti
xhtml
 11 Bank for International Settlements (BIS), ‘Big Tech in Finance: Opportunities and Risks’, 
in Annual Economic Report 2019, June 2019, p 67, https:// wwwbisorg/ publ/ arpdf/ 








by Consumer Education Foundation with the Federal Trade Commission on 
Walmart’s online shop The former found that users could purchase a set of basic 
goods at different prices Anonymous users were offered lower prices12 In this 
sense, aggregating financial data would radically increase the potential of predic-
tive analysis models, maximizing the efficiency of their ecosystems Therefore, to 
accurately assess and understand the possible effects of stablecoins connected to 
pre- existing ecosystems, the framework under which financial data is regulated 
in these ecosystems needs to be analysed in the wider context of a data- driven 
economy and of the competitive use of data, as showed by several studies carried 
out by international supervisory bodies13
CBDCs could however mitigate the abovementioned issues by providing 
‘what the private sector cannot: privacy in payments’14 Thus, CBDCs could 
aim at counterbalancing the current dominance of private players in the 
mobile payment market15 Central banks are not profit- driven They do not 
monetize the data they gather Instead, their main aim is to ensure a robust 
and safe monetary system By being able to track CBDC data more efficiently, 
central banks could better monitor the status of their domestic economy, 
reducing the existing information asymmetry when deciding on a monetary 
policy intervention Data aggregation for central banks makes a lot of sense 
A tighter control on transaction histories could improve their ability to fight 
money laundering and tax evasion, at the same time reducing the size of the 
informal economy
While all this is true, central banks would also be able to access and col-
lect information unavailable before, empowering a newer and deeper identi-
fication of users and payment flows Beyond spending habits, it would enable 
location tracking and the accumulation of sensitive personal data If misused, 
CBDCs could adversely foster an unprecedented centralisation of informa-
tion in the government’s hands It is not a matter of predicting an Orwellian 
 12 REPRESENT project, Secret Surveillance Scoring: Urgent Request for Investigation and 
Enforcement Action, 24 June 2019, https:// wwwrepresentconsumersorg/ wp- content/ 
uploads/ 2019/ 06/ 20190624- FTC- Letter- Surveillance- Scorespdf
 13 Maurice E Stucke, ‘Should We Be Concerned About Data- opolies?’, in Georgetown 
Law Technology Review, Vol 2, No 2 (2018), p 275– 324, https:// wpme/ p8IxBy- zh
 14 Christine Lagarde, ‘Winds of Change The Case for New Digital Currency’, in IMF 
Speeches, January 2019, p 5, http:// dxdoiorg/ 105089/ 9781484389171076
 15 Alexander Kriwoluzky and Chi Hyun Kim, ‘Public or Private? The Future of Money’, 
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scenario, but of assessing potential risks related to a rise of public visibility 
into a financial system, altering the relation of power between citizens and 
governments If financial transactions are fully traceable, public authorities 
may be incentivized to abuse data and, in some cases, it may facilitate political 
surveillance in domestic markets Moreover, if retail and corporate consumers 
use a foreign CBDC, foreign governments may be able to directly gather data 
on those transactions (such as in projects for cross- border interbank settle-
ment, migrant remittance, or in case of tourists or business travellers) If a 
domestic CBDC has different customer data privacy policies and safeguards, 
then foreign user data may be vulnerable when people use those CBDCs For 
example, in 2018, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada advised 
its citizens to buy legal cannabis using cash, fearing that some countries could 
deny consumers entry if they find out that those consumers have purchased 
legal cannabis16
These concerns are amplified in authoritarian regimes, where governments 
could drastically increase the efficiency of their surveillance and repression tools 
For instance, if a citizen attends a political protest, the central bank could imme-
diately freeze their CBDC account Even in democratic countries governed by 
the rule of law, an extreme centralisation of payment history data could produce 
risks Democracy is more fragile than many realize The reduction of the infor-
mation asymmetry would provide public authorities with additional power over 
citizens There is a big difference between trusting a government to not misuse 
transaction data and trusting it to develop a system that is built to protect infor-
mation17 Therefore, to mitigate risk, CBDCs should have privacy safeguards 
with compliance measures included in their design from the outset This ap-
proach could ensure a more secure functional design If, instead, privacy and 
compliance are added at a second stage, it could leave in loopholes18
 16 Canada’s Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC), Protecting Personal 
Information:  Cannabis Transactions, December 2018, https:// wwwprivgcca/ en/ 
privacy- topics/ collecting- personal- information/ gd_ can_ 201812
 17 Charles Kahn, ‘Payment Systems and Privacy’‚ in Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
Review, Vol 100, No 4 (Fourth Quarter 2018), p 337– 344 https:// doiorg/ 1020955/ 
r100337- 44
 18 Ann Cavoukian, Privacy by Design. The 7 Foundational Principles, updated January 









8.2  Why is anonymity not a design issue?
Most of the current research underlines that a system can seek counterparty 
anonymity and/ or third- party anonymity in payments The former implies 
that payers do not reveal their identities to recipients The latter instead implies 
that the true identities of payers and recipients are not accessible to parties not 
directly involved in the transaction Whereas counterparty anonymity seems 
to be less controversial, third- party anonymity has remarkable implications as 
it directly affects the efficiency of AML procedures19 While it is easier to con-
sciously blind counterparties – such as blinding merchants from accessing the 
true identity and transaction history of the payer – hiding this information from 
the government could be more complicated These concerns drive the discussion 
over the choice between a token- based or account- based CBDC (see Chapter 1 
in this volume) The former could provide better privacy for users by default, 
offering the opportunity to establish varying degrees of anonymity This system 
would however increase risks related to financial integrity The latter would, 
despite varying degrees of anonymity shaped by its design, resemble a model 
similar to deposits20 The two systems could also co- exist, exploiting their com-
parative advantages In a recent paper, the Bank of Canada proposed an architec-
ture in which larger transactions would be carried out through an account- based 
CBDC, while smaller- value transactions could use anonymous token- based 
options21 Where to set the cap for the token- account transactions or the amount 
at which AML rules would come into play is yet to be decided22
In the vibrant research on possible design to protect users’ privacy in CBDC’s 
systems, the European Central Bank has developed an interesting proposal The 
 19 Morten Linnemann Bech and Rodney Garratt, ‘Central Bank Cryptocurrencies’, in 
BIS Quarterly Review, September 2017, p 55– 70, https:// wwwbisorg/ publ/ qtrpdf/ r_ 
qt1709fhtm
 20 Santiago Fernández de Lis and Pablo Urbiola, ‘Retail Central Bank Digital 
Currencies: Means of Payment vs Store of Value’, in SUERF Policy Notes, No 183 
(July 2020), https:// wwwsuerforg/ policynotes/ 15609/ retail- central- bank- digital- 
currencies- means- of- payment- vs- store- of- value; Raphael Auer and Rainer Böhmep, 
‘The Technology of Retail Central Bank Digital Currency’, in BIS Quarterly Review, 
March 2020, p 93, https:// wwwbisorg/ publ/ qtrpdf/ r_ qt2003jhtm
 21 John Miedema et al, ‘Designing a CBDC for Universal Access’, in Bank of Canada Staff 
Analytical Notes, No 2020– 10 (June 2020), https:// wwwbankofcanadaca/ ?p=212517
 22 Raphael Auer, Giulio Cornelli and Jon Frost, ‘Rise of the Central Bank Digital 
Currencies: Drivers, Approaches and Technologies’, in BIS Working Papers, No 880 
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ECB acknowledged that ‘the payments ecosystem needs to find an answer to 
an issue that concerns all citizens:  the question of how to allow some degree 
of privacy in electronic payments, while still ensuring compliance with AML/ 
CFT regulations’23 The technical solution proposed is to develop ‘anonymity 
vouchers’ for low- value transactions, while high- value transactions would be 
subjects to standard AML checks Users would be granted time- and quantity- 
limited vouchers monthly, regardless of their account balances These vouchers 
would not be transferable to other users and their value would be one voucher 
per one unit of CBDC In the scenario described, the CBDC system would have 
four main features: (i) balances are not remunerated; (ii) it would be a two tier 
system; (iii) the ECB would be the only authorized issuer of CBDC units; and 
(iv) an ad hoc AML authority would monitor the parties involved in high value 
transactions A two- tier system requires an intermediary to provide a user with a 
pseudonymous identity to be used as a network address for CBDC transactions 
In case a transaction is carried out without an anonymity voucher, the inter-
mediary will initiate the transfer via the AML authority, which will ultimately 
authorize or reject the transaction24
In addition to a set of technical areas of improvement, a key question that 
could be raised in this scenario is of which factors the ECB will use to decide the 
limits of anonymity vouchers accessible to users This will be a political decision 
rather than a technical one
8.3  Multilateralism for (controllable) anonymity in CBDCs
If technical solutions exist to selectively blind governments and private 
corporations in digital currency systems,25 the key questions are where the 
boundaries between anonymity and security are, and how to ensure that those 
boundaries are respected26 Full anonymity in digital currency systems is not 
desirable, as it could potentially ease illegal transactions and undermine com-
pliance with regulations (KYC and AML) Similarly, no anonymity at all would 
 23 ECB, ‘Exploring Anonymity in Central Bank Digital Currencies’, cit, p 3
 24 Ibid, p 8
 25 Sarah Allen et al, ‘Design Choices for Central Bank Digital Currency: Policy and 
Technical Considerations’, in NBER Working Papers, No 27634 (August 2020), https:// 
wwwnberorg/ papers/ w27634
 26 Sriram Darbha and Rakesh Arora, ‘Privacy in CBDC Technology’, in Bank of Canada 












produce unnecessary risk Despite raising different sets of concerns on the effects 
of data visibility, both CBDCs and privately owned stablecoins would require 
a set of common rules to establish international standards on the degree of 
anonymity and privacy these systems should guarantee On the one hand, the 
awareness has rapidly emerged that stablecoin’s financial data accumulation is 
first a political matter, fostering an extensive debate on how to regulate iden-
tity and management of transaction data to mitigate the risks of moral hazard27 
Although the international dialogue on this matter is not easy, several interna-
tional organisations are collaborating to set global responses to the challenges 
produced by stablecoins28 Setting aside mitigation of money laundering and 
tax evasion risks and interoperability,29 the political dimension of anonymity 
in CBDCs has been reduced to a discussion on design and technical solutions 
While this is true, the answer lies in the technological infrastructure of a CBDC 
However, the shape that an infrastructure takes is the result of an ex ante political 
decision, as clearly acknowledged by the IMF in a recent study30
Moreover, the effects of the varying degrees of anonymity blur the bound-
aries of a domestic market As fiat money operates in a globalized and intercon-
nected world economy, national/ regional CBDCs, being also accessed by foreign 
retail and corporate customers, could produce adverse effects both domestically 
and internationally Therefore, to avoid potential misuse of data and ensure fair 
and transparent systems, international supervisory bodies should promote a 
 27 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), FATF Report to G20 on So- called Stablecoins, June 
2020, http:// wwwfatf- gafiorg/ publications/ virtualassets/ documents/ report- g20- so- 
called- stablecoins- june- 2020html; G7 Working Group on Stablecoins, ‘Investigating 
the Impact of Global Stablecoins’, cit; Financial Stability Board (FSB), Addressing 
the Regulatory, Supervisory and Oversight Challenges Raised by “Global Stablecoin” 
Arrangements, 14 April 2020, https:// wwwfsborg/ ?p=20011
 28 Such as: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the Committee on Payments 
and Market Infrastructures (CPMI), the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO), the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Organization 
for Economic Co- operation and Development (OECD) and the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB)
 29 FATF website: Regulation of Virtual Assets, https:// wwwfatf- gafiorg/ publications/ 
fatfrecommendations/ documents/ regulation- virtual- assetshtml; and, Public 
Consultation on FATF Draft Guidance on Digital Identity, https:// wwwfatf- gafiorg/ 
publications/ fatfrecommendations/ documents/ consultation- digital- id- guidancehtml
 30 John Kiff et al, ‘A Survey of Research on Retail Central Bank Digital Currency’, in IMF Working 
Papers, No 20/ 104 (2020), p 31, https:// wwwimforg/ en/ Publications/ WP/ Issues/ 
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multilateral effort to specifically discuss and establish the level of privacy that 
a CBDC system should provide Even though anonymity and privacy concerns 
radically differ across countries due to diverse cultural, socio- economic and 
political contexts, a multilateral policy compromise could help achieve not an 
optimal solution, but basic shared pillars on how much privacy CBDC infra-
structure should be designed to guarantee This effort should be led by central 
banks and international organisations together with civil society, governments 
and private financial intermediaries By this, citizens would be incentivized to 
trust CBDCs in domestic and foreign markets
Finding a consensus on as highly sensitive and core subject as the rules for 
a national digital sovereign currency would be extremely complicated Some 
countries would refuse to comply with any global standards As in the current 
situation in the broader multilateral governance of digital space, where the major 
powers (the United States, China, and the EU) have different approaches and 
tend to pursue divergent interests, a multilateral dialogue on the degree of ano-
nymity in CBDCs is likely to hit roadblocks However, the establishment of a 
few common pillars adopted by a club of countries could guide more national 
legislations through spill- over effects As highlighted by Hathaway and Shapiro, 
most current international laws have been shaped by this approach of ‘shared 
interests and decentralized enforcement’31 Following Buchanan’s economic 
theory of clubs, this ‘club’ of countries could influence the development of 
standards in other jurisdictions by cutting off access to their network of CBDCs 
to nations that do not comply with their rules Partial or full exclusion from a 
shared network would undermine the economic benefits of the CBDC, incentiv-
izing membership to gain the potential advantages of being in the club32
Conclusion
Cash has created an information asymmetry among citizens, governments and 
private players, ensuring a degree of anonymity in transactions The develop-
ment of digital currencies, particularly CBDCs and privately owned stablecoins, 
could radically transform this equilibrium, allowing great visibility into finan-
cial data transactions Whereas the implications of private corporations’ data 
accumulation have raised several concerns among international and national 
 31 Oona Hathaway and Scott J Shapiro, ‘Welcome to the Post- Leader World’, in Foreign 
Policy, 4 July 2020, https:// foreignpolicycom/ 2020/ 07/ 04/ after- hegemony
 32 James M Buchanan, ‘An Economic Theory of Clubs’, in Economica, New Series, Vol 







policymakers, the discussion on the political dimension of anonymity in CBDCs 
appears to have been marginalized Nevertheless, if the technological solutions 
to consciously blind governments exist, the degree of anonymity designed into 
the system must be determined by an ex ante political choice
No anonymity produces privacy risks for users, ultimately threating indi-
vidual freedom It is therefore widely acknowledged that CBDCs need to guar-
antee some privacy to their users However, there is no consensus in on which 
the degree of privacy To avoid moral hazard and the political misuse of visibility 
in transaction data, a multilateral effort is needed to set the limits of anonymity 
that CBDCs should provide CBDCs being a matter of sovereignty, it would be 
extremely difficult to find a global consensus on the issue A solution could be to 
promote shared standards and boundaries on guaranteed privacy within a club 
of countries Membership in such a network would foster economic advantages 
related to full interoperability, while non- members would have only partial or no 
access to the network
This is the time to start such a discussion In this period of intense research 
and development, before individual countries launch national CBDCs, countries 
should develop a common framework in which the boundaries of privacy and 
anonymity are set As it is essential that privacy and anonymity by designed into 
the infrastructure at the very onset, this multilateral exercise must take place 
before it is too late
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Chapter 9: Digital Currency: A Global 
Regulatory Framework is Needed
Digitalization is reshaping society, and monetary systems, commerce and 
banking are no exception1 So far, the private sector is driving the change: sev-
eral specialized payment providers in China, Kenya and India offer e- money 
to specific geographic regions However, private digital currencies, crypto or 
stablecoins have yet to make a dent in mainstream payments2
This could change quickly with the deeper involvement of leading card 
networks, banks and technology giants Leveraging their existing platform and 
network could allow these companies to capture a relatively large part of the 
payment activities Visa, the world’s largest electronic- payment network, has 
filed a patent application for a ‘Digital Fiat Currency’ In contrast, banks such as 
Signature Bank and Chase have launched digital currencies (token- based Signet 
and JPMCoin, respectively) that focus on business- to- business payments Wells 
Fargo Digital Cash, however, will support cross- border payments Facebook is 
moving forward with a less ambitious version of the Libra that focuses on cre-
ating a more traditional payment network tied to local currency3
The public sector has also seen significant developments recently In April 
2020, China became the first major economy to pilot a digital currency, while 
the Bank of England has published the design principles for a similar approach4 
Overall, central banks are now expressing a keen interest in the topic and 
 1 The author would like to thank Oscar Contreras and Benjamin Smith for their assis-
tance and useful discussions on the topic
 2 Some of the specialized payments providers are Alipay and WeChat in China, PayTM 
in India, and Moffer- Pesa in Kenya Other private initiatives are cryptocurrencies like 
bitcoin or stablecoins like Tether, TrustToken’s TrueUSD, Circle’s USD Coin, DAI, or 
the Universal Protocol Alliance’s UPUSD and UPEUR
 3 Nathaniel Popper and Mike Isaac, ‘Facebook- Backed Libra Cryptocurrency Project is 
Scaled Back’, in The New York Times, 16 April 2020, https:// wwwnytimescom/ 2020/ 
04/ 16/ technology/ facebook- libra- cryptocurrencyhtml
 4 Bank of England, Central Bank Digital Currency. Opportunities, Challenges and Design, 
A  Discussion Paper, March 2020, https:// wwwbankofenglandcouk/ paper/ 2020/ 











more than 70 per cent are engaged in Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) 
related work5
The multiplication of private digital currencies and the potential for CBDCs 
emphasize the necessity of a global framework More specifically, it shows the 
need of requirements and standards to ensure that all these initiatives lead to 
an improvement of financial inclusion, security and consumer protection, effi-
ciency in domestic and cross- border payments, and resilience of the payments 
landscape
So far, much of the regulatory initiatives are uncoordinated They are seg-
mented across countries and focus on the extension of existing models to 
the potential introduction and form of CBDCs, on regulations of private 
cryptocurrencies, and on the implementation and regulation of various types of 
fast payment systems Most ignore that, ultimately, the new innovative money 
instruments may not fit within the existing regulation and legacy systems 
Indeed, technological innovation challenges current practices and existing legal 
and regulatory jurisdictions, either geographic or sectoral
To avoid unnecessary regulatory and monitoring burdens, as well as regula-
tory arbitrage, an international network of regulators, such as the G20, needs to 
play a more decisive role in shaping these developments, from the innovation 
to the regulation This would also ensure they contribute to global economic 
growth and financial inclusion
This chapter lays out a few elements that must be part of the discussion when 
designing the global oversight framework for a digitalized financial world to 
ensure the outcome is a pertinent, inclusive and adaptable system of standards, 
rules, practices and regulations So far, most of them have received less attention 
than more technical issues such as personal privacy, the architecture of a digital 
currency system or their potential impact on the financial system
First, the chapter highlights two necessary requirements in the design of dig-
ital currencies that are essential to their success as well as to their contribution 
to economic growth and financial inclusion: transparency and interoperability 
Then, it discusses the oversight framework that will support the global imple-
mentation of these and other requirements, and facilitate the emergence of a less 
fragmented approach to the global digital regulation of finance More specifi-
cally, it identifies trade- offs among global regulatory issues encountered when 
 5 Codruta Boar, Henry Holden and Amber Wadsworth, ‘Impending Arrival – a Sequel 
to the Survey on Central Bank Digital Currency’, in BIS Papers, No 107 (January 2020), 
https:// wwwbisorg/ publ/ bppdf/ bispap107htm
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focusing on capital access, market structure and consumer experience It shows 
that developed and less developed countries tend to have different sets of regu-
latory priorities and propose a road map to bridge these gaps when discussing 
global policies
9.1  Requirements: interoperability and transparency
The digitalization of the financial world will support public policy goals such 
as financial inclusion and enhanced effectiveness of cross- border transfers if it 
creates a digital ecosystem that is trustworthy, convenient, easy to use, accessible, 
fast and affordable For a digital currency, this means it has to demonstrate the 
integrity of its design and overall architecture (transparency) and it has to work 
well across different platforms and functions (interoperability)
Transparency
The creation of Bitcoin in 2008 coincides with a time where the level of trust 
in governments and banks was low This attempt to shift the trust from banks 
and states to algorithms and encryption software did not succeed as much as 
expected Yet it provides an excellent illustration of the necessity for a digital cur-
rency to convince its users of the integrity of its design and overall architecture 
This is true whether the digital currency is from a decentralized or centralized 
system
A distributed network, such as Bitcoin, has to synchronize, validate and 
record token transactions in a replicated database Such a system includes incen-
tive mechanisms (consensus protocols) to ensure that the group of connected 
computers agree on the transactions that it is recording6 These consensus 
protocols are necessary due to the decentralized nature of the cryptocurrency 
networks: the servers that participate in the network are untrusted7
A centralized system, such as a CBDC, faces a different problem Because the 
set of activities will go beyond the trusted current mechanism, the design and 
architecture of the CBDC platform need to be known to all to create an appro-
priate level of integrity and verification in the system The central bank will have 
 6 The best- known example in cryptocurrencies is Proof of Work (PoW), which is also 
known as Bitcoin mining
 7 David KC Lee and Ernie GS Teo, The New Money: The Utility of Cryptocurrencies and 








to be clear about the various activities and capabilities of each participant in 
the system It will have to share the code used to disclose the CBDC functions 
and the responsibilities and liabilities of key actors The trust in the CBDC will 
come from the ability for all stakeholders to assess the computer code, to check 
if it functions as disclosed, to look for bugs and to test its resilience to hacks 
Stakeholders need to trust the code to trust the CBDC
Transparency is not a new concept in financial services regulation, where 
transparency and disclosure by regulated entities, and their activities, sys-
tems and processes is a core element The same logic should apply to all digital 
currencies
Interoperability
The digitalization of the economy may lead to a more segmented world as each 
technological platform may have an incentive to develop a self- sustainable eco-
system Yet digital currency users who hold an account in a bank or non- bank 
financial institution should be able to send and receive money from anyone 
else at low latency and cost In other words, a digital currency has to be multi- 
functional and multi- platform
Unlike physical cash, whose interoperability declines outside of its domestic 
context, digital money can have excellent interoperability Credit cards help illus-
trate some of the expected benefits: they allow users to spend money in different 
countries (because the credit card company and banks convert to the appro-
priate fiat currency) and online In contrast, cash is mostly limited to domestic 
transactions
It is highly likely that the future digital world will be a collection of disparate 
platforms and ecosystems The success of any digital currency, whether a private 
or public initiative, will rely on its broad usage across them Furthermore, and 
especially for CBDC, interoperability with existing and future systems is crit-
ical to ensure its adoption and longevity8 Finally, a digital currency designed to 
function on or in conjunction with any platform will have a significant role in 
commerce: by working almost everywhere, it will create a simple store of value, 
and will facilitate fast, efficient and immediate payments
 8 Markus K Brunnermeier, Harold James and Jean- Pierre Landau, ‘The Digitalization 
of Money’, in NBER Working Papers, No 26300 (September 2019), https:// scholar
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9.2  Elements for an inclusive and adaptable global framework
Requirements for the design of a digital currency need to be standardized and 
implemented across the world as there will be more than one digital currency 
A  global regulatory framework is a necessary complement to ensure global 
standards in the design and their implementation Furthermore, this internation-
ally coordinated effort is the only solution to deal with the disconnect between geo-
graphic regulatory jurisdictions and coverage of the digital platforms that expand 
beyond countries’ borders9 Added to that, the increasing cross- border use of digital 
currencies, the growing presence of non- financial companies providing financial 
services and the fast pace of these changes will very soon make the current regula-
tory and monitoring framework used to assess financial stability obsolete
The new framework should include concepts such as governance for data 
usage and exchange The network of relevant authorities needs to grow beyond 
financial regulators to include technology- related ones Finally, the standard-
ized regulations, rules and practices need to consider how digitalization impacts 
countries differently
The level of development, needs and concerns of the country drives its regu-
latory focus, leading to a segmented landscape of initiatives dealing with tech-
nological change in finance There is a clear delineation between developed and 
less- developed countries; in terms of issues related to capital access, between 
financial inclusion and financial stability; in terms of issues related to market 
structure, between market efficiency and antitrust; and in terms issues related to 
consumer experience, between consumer welfare and data usage10
Capital access: financial inclusion and financial stability
MercadoLibre in Latin America, Alipay, and WeChat in China, and M- Pesa in 
Kenya and India are often used to illustrate how tech firms’ involvement in finan-
cial services helps financial inclusion11 Large tech companies rely on their abili-
ties to pool, process and use pertinent information to provide financial services 
 9 Ibid
 10 Claude Lopez and Benjamin Smith, It’s Bigger than Big Tech: A Framework to Understand 
the Economy of Tomorrow, Milken Institute, 2020, forthcoming
 11 Bank for International Settlements (BIS), ‘Big Tech in Finance: Opportunities and 
Risks’, in Annual Economic Report 2019, June 2019, p 55– 79, https:// wwwbisorg/ publ/ 
arpdf/ ar2019e3htm; Dennis Ferenzy, A New Kind of Conglomerate: BigTech in China, 
Institute of International Finance (IIF), November 2018, https:// wwwiifcom/ Portals/ 










to the untapped population Consumers can use smartphones and free internet 
access to open bank accounts, pay for goods electronically and apply for loans
In contrast, in the United States, strategic partnerships between large tech 
companies and incumbent financial institutions raise concerns regarding finan-
cial stability The tech company can provide a third- party service to a financial 
institution, such as Capital One using Amazon Web Services, or offer a finan-
cial service through its digital platforms with a financial institution managing 
the back- end delivery, such as the Apple Card resulting from the partnership 
between Apple and Goldman Sachs In both cases, a single disruption to the tech 
company could have downstream effects on the financial institutions, magni-
fying the risk to the broader financial ecosystem12
Similarly, most international institutions focus on the potential risk these 
companies may represent to financial stability These companies dominate the 
provision of some financial services and the lack of alternative, if they were to 
fail, is a concern: a sudden loss in consumer trust for Alibaba could lead to a mass 
exodus of deposits, with the potential to disrupt the entire interbank funding 
system in China Alibaba owns one of the world’s largest money market funds13
Market structure: market efficiency and antitrust
A country’s needs in infrastructure – physical and digital – drive the effects of 
tech companies on its market structures and regulatory focus
Emerging and developed economies’ regulators and international organ-
izations have praised the efficiencies brought by tech companies to domestic 
markets, from developing the necessary infrastructure to lower costs, improved 
quality of goods and services and increased amount of capital investment in 
research and development14
In contrast, antitrust regulators in developed economies focus on the lack of 
competition inherent with the dominant position of large companies in some 
markets Their ability to invest large amounts of capital into new technologies 
Rise of Digital Money’, in FinTech Notes, No 19/ 01 (July 2019), https:// wwwimforg/ 
en/ Publications/ fintech- notes/ Issues/ 2019/ 07/ 12/ The- Rise- of- Digital- Money- 47097
 12 Financial Stability Board (FSB), BigTech in Finance. Market Developments and Potential 
Financial Stability Implications, 9 December 2019, https:// wwwfsborg/ ?p=19398
 13 Ibid; Dennis Ferenzy, A New Kind of Conglomerate: BigTech in China, cit
 14 In China, Alibaba was essential in the expansion of the freight and logistics infra-
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such as artificial intelligence and machine learning allows them to increase their 
offering of products and services while controlling the associated costs15 While 
acknowledging the efficiency gains, European officials have raised concerns 
derived from this dominant position, such as killer acquisitions, limitation of 
consumer freedom and manipulations of the consumer decision- making process
Consumer experience: consumer welfare and data usage
The contribution of technology to both capital access and market structure relies 
on the ability to access and process data collected from the customer
The benefits are unquestionable Technology is the main contributing factor 
in the lowering of the remittance system’s cost and the increasing speed of 
transactions16 The use of artificial intelligence and machine learning helps iden-
tify fraud and other criminal activities17
But tech companies’ usage and management of consumer data have been a 
concern for regulators, mainly from Europe and the United States The issues 
raised range from digital authoritarianism and the spread of misinformation to 
systematic bias in the financial services sector, data privacy and data ownership 
rights18
Data access, usage and management are at the core of the technological inno-
vation that improves access to services – financial and others This is especially 
the case for underserved populations, often located in less developed coun-
tries Yet Europe drives most of the regulatory efforts related to data protec-
tion, dictating the terms of the regulatory framework based on its priorities 
 15 Luigi Zingales and Filippo Maria Lancieri, Stigler Committee on Digital Platforms. 
Policy Brief, September 2019, https:// wwwchicagoboothedu/ research/ stigler/ news- 
 and- media/ committee- on- digital- platforms- final- report; Digital Competition Expert 
Panel, Unlocking Digital Competition, London, HM Treasury, March 2019, https:// 
wwwgovuk/ government/ publications/ unlocking- digital- competition- report-  
of- the- digital- competition- expert- panel
 16 In Asia, Alibaba’s subsidiary Ant Financial provides remittance services that are 
cheaper and quicker than the ones offered by financial institutions BIS, ‘Big Tech in 
Finance: Opportunities and Risks’, cit
 17 Dennis Ferenzy, A New Kind of Conglomerate: BigTech in China, cit
 18 Ibid; Luigi Zingales and Filippo Maria Lancieri, Stigler Committee on Digital Platforms. 
Policy Brief, cit; Kathryn Petralia et al, ‘Banking Disrupted? Financial Intermediation 
in an Era of Transformational Technology’, in Geneva Reports on the World Economy, 











Unchallenged, these standards will become global and could adversely impact 
economic growth in other countries with different needs and challenges
Conclusion
The digitalization of the economy will not lead to one global and unique system 
but to several platforms A successful digital currency would have to function 
in most of them Yet these platforms will expand beyond countries’ regulatory 
and monitoring jurisdictions, emphasizing the need for a new global oversight 
framework
Interoperability and transparency are essential requirements to ensure that 
technology leads to financial inclusion as well as cost reduction and speed 
increase for cross- border transfers They will also provide a level of competition 
that will continue to encourage the fast pace of innovation
They need to be complemented by a global coordinated effort to imple-
ment these requirements as well as to design a set of rules, regulations and best 
practices that will ensure the good functioning and monitoring of the financial 
system
This chapter suggests reorganizing financial regulatory discussion related to 
the creation of this oversight framework around three dimensions: capital access 
for financial integration and financial stability, market structure for market effi-
ciency and antitrust, and consumer experience for consumer welfare and data 
usage This classification of the regulatory concerns allows us to understand 
how they are related to each other and why different countries prioritize them 
differently A country may prioritize financial inclusion over financial stability, 
depending on its level of development, but that may change with the evolution 
of its economy Similarly, underserved communities, individuals or companies 
in developed countries will benefit from a more nuanced approach to financial 
regulation
Digitalization imposes a new way of thinking to fully exploit the benefits of 
technology An idea supported by the G30’s recommendation:  ‘the benefits of 
network effects in payments should be set against the detrimental effects of reli-
ance on dominant private firms’19 The goal is to create an inclusive framework 
that supports inter- jurisdiction coordination and minimizes the risk of regula-
tory fragmentation
 19 Group of Thirty, Digital Currencies and Stablecoins. Risk, Opportunities, and Challenges 
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The coordination of international standards will ensure technical interopera-
bility between digital currency infrastructure and payment and banking systems, 
as well as for cross- border transfers Digital currencies will force an evolution 
of the financial services, yet there is a strong potential of complementarity 
between digital money within the banking system and outside it20 As previously 
discussed, the success of a digital currency depends on the trust users have in it 
So far consumers in Africa and Asia tend to trust telecommunications and social 
media companies for financial transactions more than regular banks, while in 
advanced economies, they tend to trust CBDC more than tech or credit card 
companies
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Nicola Bilotta and Fabrizio Botti
Conclusion1
Facebook’s project to develop a global stablecoin has been a wake- up call for 
national and international authorities, driving central banks and international 
bodies to intensify the research and development phase around central bank digital 
currencies (CBDCs) When discussing CBDCs, this study refers to a general pur-
pose CBDC that has specific characteristics: (1) it is a central bank liability, so the 
holder of CBDC would in principle expect that the central bank will redeem the 
money with cash upon request; (2) it is denominated in an existing unit of account, 
in most cases ‘pegged’ to the fiat currency issued by the central bank; (3) it serves as 
a medium of exchange and a store of value, which could be remunerated; and (4) it 
is in principle exchangeable at par with no exchange fees, although, there could be 
transaction or service fees claimed by the central bank or the service providers
CBDCs are likely to be introduced in the near future From being a theo-
retical concept, CBDCs seem to have rapidly become an inevitable innovation 
More than 80 per cent of central banks surveyed by the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) declared that they are engaging in CBDC projects and some 
of them have already started pilot experiments2 Countries are carefully eval-
uating the implementation of CBDCs because this innovation, in addition to 
important benefits, can also lead to remarkable risks and challenges In order to 
assess the risks and benefits of a CBDC in a given country, central banks need 
to acknowledge the differences across business sectors, in the stages of devel-
opment and socio- economic contexts, which all play key roles in driving the 
success or the failure of specific payment and financial market models CBDCs 
present an opportunity to develop a more secure and efficient financial system 
than the current one by reshaping the underlying technology The underlying 
technology of a CBDC system will be the foundation that will define how the rest 
of the financial market will work from a technical perspective This innovation, 
however, also raises a set of legal concerns Depending on the design that such a 
CBDC will take, the current laws and regulations could require some degree of 
 1 Conclusion has been developed and shared upon by all the authors of the volume 
 2 Raphael Auer, Giulio Cornelli and Jon Frost, ‘Taking Stock: Ongoing Retail CBDC 








adjustment to properly frame this kind of transaction – in relation to the legal 
implications on legal tender and consumer protection, for example
Considering the relevant factors involved, countries should decide, according 
to their own specific requirements, which unique balance of design and relative 
implications could help to meet their goals CBDCs could greatly improve the 
existing domestic and global payment and financial systems but also have far 
reaching implications Their effects may blur the boundaries of the structure of 
financial markets, giving rise to major macroeconomic and political impacts
CBDCs could lower transaction costs while improving the speed of 
transactions, ultimately enhancing the efficiency of a domestic payment system 
CBDCs could also potentially help in decreasing the high transaction costs asso-
ciated with cross- border payments and international remittances Furthermore, 
CBDCs could promote greater financial inclusion, establishing a more inclu-
sive banking system with cheaper and easier access to financial services while 
helping the creation of basic financial identity Today, more than 17 billion 
people lack access to a bank account3 CBDCs could also promote widespread 
interoperability, linking incumbent financial institutions, fintech industry and 
mobile money providers with central banks and governments No central bank 
has proposed to fully replace physical cash, promoting instead a coexistence 
between cash and CBCD However, if implemented incorrectly, CBDCs could 
exclude social groups for whom cash is the only instrument available, further 
marginalizing them
The development of CBDCs could also counterbalance the progressive expan-
sion of cashless payment alternatives provided by private players, which are 
reducing the demand for cash and ultimately penalizing the use of central bank 
money This megatrend could impact on the effectiveness of monetary policy 
and have implications for financial stability CBDCs could then both reduce the 
market power of large private payment providers and enable the general public 
to access central bank money even if cash declines
A CBDC could be an important instrument for central banks to deliver their 
public policy objectives A remunerated digital currency could also be a pow-
erful tool to improve the transmission mechanism of monetary policy Interest 
rate changes would immediately be transferred to account balances and, in time 
of crisis, it would become easier to break the ‘zero lower bound’ constraints and 
 3 Asli Demirgüç- Kunt et al, The Global Findex Database 2017. Measuring Financial 





facilitate helicopter money However, CBDC systems could challenge the tech-
nical capacity of central banks, even when a significant portion of these opera-
tions is outsourced, increasing operational and reputational risks
Yet, depending on the interest rate policy design, CBDCs could compete with 
commercial bank deposits, increasing the risks of systemic instability There is a 
risk of progressively eroding margins and increasing the cost of bank funding, 
which could lead, eventually, to higher rates on loans Moreover, in extreme 
situations, there could be a risk that CBDCs would ease a running out of bank 
deposits into CBDC The degree of the private banking industry’s crowding out 
and its effects depend, however, on the design of a CBDC Some of the current 
pilot experiments and proposed models in theory involve a two- layer architec-
ture This would imply that there is a basic functional layer of the CBDC itself 
on which a second layer is built, managed by private financial institutions that 
interface with consumers Other experiments, instead, promote a token- based 
and one- tier system CBDC, meaning that central banks would directly distribute 
a CBDC accessible to everyone
A key issue will be the degree of privacy and anonymity that a CBDC system 
can and should incorporate The shift from physical cash to CBDCs will alter the 
current information asymmetry between governments and individuals On the 
one hand, CBDCs could improve the efficiency of rules aimed at AML and tax 
evasion Moreover, central banks are not profit- driven, they do not monetize the 
data they gather, as private corporations could potentially do through the intro-
duction of private digital currencies On the other hand, CBDCs could provide 
public authorities with a concentration of personal information which could 
lead to abuses and, with autocratic governments, to the limitation of personal 
freedoms CBDCs could be technically designed to blind or regulate regulators’ 
visibility into CBDC transactions
CBDCs also have the potential to challenge the dominant role of the US 
dollar in international transactions However, if China does not move forward 
in the direction of a more transparent and open financial market, a digital ren-
minbi may not gain significant international attraction Similarly, if the EU does 
not complete a capital market union, a banking union and further reforms to 
improve the governance of the monetary union, a digital euro is not likely to 
have the firepower to compete with the US dollar Moreover, it will be interesting 
to observe if regional digital currencies (for example, the South African rand, the 
Brazilian real, the Saudi Arabia riyal or the Russian ruble) could take traction 
and substitute international reserve currencies in certain transactions
In view of the technical, regulatory, economic and political challenges and 
implications, the introduction of CBDCs cannot be rushed CBDCs are part of 
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a wider transformation of the financial sector, driven by the digitalization of our 
society For CBDCs, a more coordinated international effort is required to set 
standards, rules, practices and regulations to develop a common framework to 
maximize the benefits of CBDCs and minimize the risks In this phase of intense 
evaluation and research on CBDCs, international cooperation is key And so, 
in order to adopt a broad and inclusive perspective, the current discussion on 
the development of CBDCs must include stakeholders other than financial and 
international regulators – such as technological companies and civil society
The challenge, in short, is to ensure that the introduction of CBDC will help to 
improve the global economy and achieve a more inclusive society
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